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Chapter 1: 
General Introduction
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1.1  ADOLESCENCE AS AN IMPORTANT PERIOD FOR 
GAINING MATURE SOCIAL GOALS
Adolescence, which is the transition stage from childhood to adulthood, is an 
eventful period in life, as it encompasses major changes in physical appearance 
and changes in cognition, affect and social orientation. These changes are thought 
to be related to changes in the social environment, changes in the hormonal 
systems, and neurodevelopmental changes (Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore, 
Burnett, & Dahl, 2010). Whereas in childhood parents or caregivers play the 
most important role, school and playing are central elements, and the contact 
with friends is still quite ‘simple’, all of this undergoes major transformations in 
adolescence (Brown, 2004), and as such, this is one of the most important life 
period for developing mature social goals and independence.
FIGURE 1.1 | Overview of important transitions in adolescence, based on Steinberg (2005).
 
Adolescence is often divided into three stages: 1) early-adolescence (10-14 
years old), 2) mid-adolescence (15-17 years old), and 3) late-adolescence (18-
22 years old) (Steinberg, 2005; see Figure 1.1). Although researchers often refer 
to these stages, the boundaries are quite arbitrary, as they are largely dependent 
on individual differences in hormonal-, cognitive-, and social-affective levels 
(Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore, Burnett, & Dahl, 2010). The onset of adolescence 
is often marked by the onset of puberty, around age 10 for girls and around age 
11.5 for boys, although also within the sexes there is large variability in the age 
of onset (Marshall & Tanner, 1969; Marshall & Tanner, 1970; Shirtcliff, Dahl, & 
Pollak, 2009). The first signs of puberty are characterized by hormonal changes 
related to the secretion of estrogen and testosterone leading to maturation in 
the ovaries and testes, which further result in the development of secondary 
physical features (e.g., pubic hair growth, breast development) (Shirtcliff, Dahl, 
& Pollak, 2009). Although puberty is often associated with bodily changes (such 












1as physical appearance, height, and shapes of the body), it goes beyond that, as puberty also plays a pivotal role in neurodevelopmental- and behavioral 
changes (Blakemore, Burnett, & Dahl, 2010). 
 Whereas the onset of puberty is often considered as the start of 
adolescence, defining the end point of adolescence is less clear. Following 
puberty and moving into adulthood, it is important that adolescents have 
acquired social and cognitive skills that are important for creating new 
friendships, obtaining self-confidence, being successful at an educational 
level, and for becoming an independent individual (Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & 
McHale, 2013). What is considered as the end of adolescence, and at the same 
time the start of adulthood, differs across cultures. In western cultures it is 
often indicated by the ability to manage one’s life independently (Blakemore, 
Burnett, & Dahl, 2010). 
One of the most prominent changes in adolescence is social 
reorientation (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; Steinberg et al., 2008). That is to say, 
adolescents develop more intimate relationships with peers in which mutual 
understanding plays an important role (Selman, 1980), they discover what it is 
like to be involved in a romantic relationship (Zimmer-Gembeck, 2002), and 
they take (social) risks by for example drinking alcohol for the first time (Brown, 
2004) or showing risky driving in the presence of friends (Chein, Albert, O’Brien, 
Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011). These new experiences go hand in hand with the 
development of self-consciousness, which makes adolescents more aware 
of their surrounding peers, their own emotions, and the realization that their 
behavior will be judged by peers (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Somerville et al., 
2013). 
Given that adolescence is an important phase for social reorientation, 
eventually leading to a state of independency and individuality, empathic abilities 
play a crucial role in successfully reaching these goals. Examples of empathic 
abilities are sharing and understanding feelings of others and regulating your 
own emotional responses, which are crucial abilities in social interactions. How 
individual differences in empathic traits are related to the development of social 
reorientation is currently not well understood. 
It is hypothesized that neural changes are related to the behavioral 
changes that are classified under the heading social reorientation (Somerville 
& Casey, 2010; Blakemore & Mills, 2014). In addition, it is hypothesized 
that the involvement of hormones affects social-affective functions. 
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Especially testosterone has proven to play an important role in risk-taking 
behavior during adolescence (Blakemore, Burnett, & Dahl, 2010; Peper, 
Koolschijn, & Crone, 2013). The current thesis has the purpose to understand the 
behavioral and neural underpinnings of developmental changes and individual 
differences in social reorientation and empathic concern across childhood and 
adolescence.
The questions addressed in this thesis concern: 1) how do brain regions 
involved in social reorientation develop in adolescence, 2) what is the role of 
individual differences, and 3) what is the role of pubertal development. These 
questions are addressed using a multi-method perspective of combining 
insights from self-report, task behavior, and neural activity on task tapping into 
components of social reorientation. 
1.2 NEURODEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN ADOLESCENCE
An influential neural system model that aims to explain social reorientation 
in adolescence is the Social Information Processing model (SIPN) (Nelson, 
Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005; see Figure 1.2). This model describes the 
overall development of the brain based on three nodes: the detection node, 
the affective node, and the cognitive-regulation node. Each separate node 
represents a cluster of brain areas that mediates the processing of social 
information. The detection node is involved in detecting whether a stimulus is 
socially relevant, and for recognizing basic social characteristics (e.g. detection 
of faces). The anterior temporal cortex, the fusiform face area, and the superior 
temporal sulcus are the brain areas that are involved in this part of social 
information processing.  
The affective node, including the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), ventral 
striatum (VS), hypothalamus and amygdala, attributes meaning to the perceived 
social information, for instance by indicating whether information is rewarding 
or punishing. This cluster of brain areas is thought to be more sensitive during 
adolescence, resulting in a stronger reaction in these brain areas compared 
to pre- and post-adolescence. This “hypersensitivity” is linked to changes in 
gonadal hormones, which affect functional and structural reorganization of the 
affective node regions (see Herting et al. 2014). This occurs indirectly as gonadal 
hormones affect neurotransmitters like dopamine, oxytocin, and serotonine that 












1help in the transmission of signals in the brain (e.g. social responsiveness). On a behavioral level, this hypersensitivity is claimed to enhance approaching positive 
stimuli and to enhance avoiding negative stimuli (Galván, 2010). In daily life, this 
phenomenon expresses itself in a way that adolescents are taking higher risks 
when peers encourage them, because being approved and socially accepted 
by peers is highly rewarding for adolescents (Chein et al., 2011). The downside 
of this medal is that adolescents who are socially rejected, avoid interactions 
with peers, possibly due to enhanced activation in the (social) pain related areas 
like the anterior insula (AI) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which often 
brings them in a downhill slide of more social rejection and the accompanied 
social pain (Masten, Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Eisenberger, 2012). 
Finally, the cognitive-regulation node is involved in controlling and 
regulating social information (e.g. reasoning about mental states of others) and 
complex cognitive information (e.g. planning behavioral responses in order to 
reach a specific goal). The regions that are involved in this node are the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the ventral prefrontal cortex (vPFC) 
(Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005; Nelson & Guyer, 2011), regions 
that are still developing during mid to late adolescence, because of synaptic 
pruning (reduction of neurons and synapses in order to make more efficient 
neural structures) and myelinization (stimulates fast and guided information 
transmission) (Shaw et al., 2008). Notably, the detection node, affective node, 
and cognitive-regulation node are thought to be interrelated within the social 
information-processing network (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005).
 The SIPN model shares commonalities with a second influential model, 
which is the dual systems model of adolescent development  (Somerville, Jones, 
& Casey, 2010; Ernst & Fudge, 2009; Steinberg et al., 2008). This model places 
more emphasis on adolescent specific changes in reward seeking behavior. 
That is to say, mid-adolescence represents a period in which there is a peak in 
risk-taking behavior (e.g. having sex without protection, drinking an extensive 
amount of alcohol, smoking cigarettes). According to the dual systems model, 
the emotion regions in the brain undergo a sudden change in development, 
meaning that regions like the ventral striatum (a region important for reward 
seeking and approach behavior), and the amygdala (a region important for 
detecting (social) emotions), become “hypersensitive”. These regions are 
often indicated as subcortical regions being part of the affective node (VS and 
amygdala) of the SIPN model (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). 
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FIGURE 1.2 | Display of the regions involved in the Social Information Processing Network (SIPN) model, 
based on Nelson et al. (2005)
 Similar to the SIPN model, the dual systems model puts emphasis on 
the development of the prefrontal (cortical) cortex as an important control 
region in the brain, although whereas the SIPN model places emphasis on both 
the medial and ventral parts of the prefrontal cortex, the dual systems model 
puts more emphasis on the lateral prefrontal cortex. The exact differentiation 
between functions of the medial and lateral PFC are not yet well understood, but 
a general finding is that the medial regions of the PFC are more involved in social 
information processing, such as theory of mind and self-referential processing, 
whereas the lateral regions of PFC are more involved in “cold” cognitive control 
functions such as working memory and response inhibition (Crone & Dahl, 
2012; Blakemore & Mills, 2014; Luna, Padmanabhan, & O’Hearn, 2010). The 
maturation of the lateral prefrontal cortex continues during adolescence in 
terms of structure (Shaw et al., 2008) and function (Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 
2010). Thus, the dual systems model presents the hypothesis that the affective 
system (VS, amygdala) matures faster (mid/late adolescence) than the control 












1system (lateral prefrontal cortex). These different developmental trajectories are leading to a discrepancy between the affective system and the control 
system, and seem to hinder adolescents’ abilities to regulate their emotions 
and to inhibit impulsive reactions (Steinberg et al., 2008).
1.3  EMPATHY DEVELOPMENT FROM CHILDHOOD TO 
ADULTHOOD
Whereas the SIPN model provides an important working model for understanding 
changes in social reorientation during adolescence, less attention has been 
devoted to differences between adolescents. That is to say, some adolescents 
navigate through adolescence relatively well and are less sensitive to, for 
example, peer pressure, and develop into prosocial helping individuals with 
strong peer relations. In contrast, other adolescents have difficulty adapting 
to changing norms in peer relations and are withdrawn, lonely, suffer low self-
esteem, and are likely to be at risk for internalizing disorders (Rubin, Bukowski, 
& Parker, 1998). The absence of social networks is strongly implicated in the 
development of psychopathology (Deater-Deckard, 2001). In this thesis, the 
hypothesis is tested that individual differences in empathy are an important 
predictor for behavioral and neural responses involved in social reorientation. 
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EMPATHY
Empathy has many different faces in terms of labels and definitions. Some of 
the terms that are often used to indicate empathy (or that are closely related to 
empathy) are: emotional contagion, empathic concern, sympathy, compassion, 
Theory of Mind, mentalizing, perspective taking, prosocial behavior, and altruism 
(for a review, see Preston & De Waal, 2002; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012; see Figure 1.3). 
A consistent differentiation in the literature is the definition of empathy 
by two concepts: affective empathy and cognitive empathy. Affective empathy 
has often been defined as sharing feelings with someone by mirroring the 
affective state of the person who is experiencing the emotion (De Vignemont 
& Singer, 2006). Cognitive empathy, on the other hand, has been defined 
as awareness of the self, the ability to make a self-other distinction and 
the ability to take another person’s perspective (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). 
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Prosocial behavior is indicated as an ability rising from cognitive empathy, 
and is explained by helping someone out of compassion without taking into 
account self-interest. 
Empathic abilities have been found to develop during childhood. An 
important component of affective empathy is sharing feelings, which already 
happens in babies, for example when all babies at the nursery start crying 
because one baby started expressing its sad feeling or ‘cry for help/need’. 
This does not mean that all the babies are actually sad or in need, just that 
the emotion of the baby contaminated them (Decety & Meyer, 2008). Making a 
distinction between one’s own feelings and that of someone else comes along 
when cognitive empathy develops, mostly around age 4 or 5, when Theory of 
Mind has been developed (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). However, not all 
components of cognitive empathy are already in place in 5-year-old children, 
that is, the more advanced forms of cognitive empathy, such as perspective 
taking and prosocial development, develops still into adolescence (Güroğlu, 
van den Bos, & Crone, 2014). 
FIGURE 1.3 | Empathy encompasses different processes, which can be categorized as affective empathy, 
cognitive empathy and prosocial concern, based on Zaki & Ochsner (2012)












11.4 NEURAL CORRELATES OF EMPATHY
EMPATHY MODEL DECETY & MEYER
Developmental and individual differences in empathy have been described in 
a model by Decety & Meyer (2008), who demonstrated that empathy derives 
by a ‘bottom-up perception action information process’ in combination with 
a ‘top-down regulation and control’ information process, whereby past life 
experiences and specific contexts/situations are of influence. The bottom-up 
perception action coupling can be explained by underlying biological processes 
that enable people to learn and share feelings by observing action or mimicry. 
This biological process has been referred to as the Mirror Neuron System 
(MNS). When observing someone putting his hands together, the MNS provides 
activation in the same brain areas in the observer as in the actor, though to a 
lesser extent. Thus, by ‘mirroring’ the observed action, the mirror neurons are 
preparing the required brain network for actual performing an action (motor 
empathy). Besides facilitating action performance, the MNS is also important 
for perceiving the emotional state of others. Sharing emotions of others by 
activating the same brain areas helps in empathizing with that other person, 
i.e. by shared representations. The brain regions that are involved in both the 
perception and performance of motor empathy (most likely driven by mirror 
neurons are): the premotor cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the parietal 
lobule, the supplementary motor area, and the cerebellum.
 The ‘top-down regulation and control’ information process is involved 
in regulating emotions that enable us to make a self-other distinction and to 
have self-control. Making a self/other distinction requires the ability to know if 
an action is performed by the self or by the other, and can be determined by: 
1) non-overlapping regions in the brain, i.e. regions for self-representation are 
not involved in other-representations 2) awareness that neural signals of the 
self are giving immediate feedback, whereas motor empathy representations 
perceived in others require more processing. The brain regions that have been 
found to be important for making a distinction between the self and the other 
are the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) and the paracingulate cortex (PCC). The 
anterior insula (AI) is an example of a region that has found to become activated 
when you are responsible for an action, but does not activate when someone 
else is responsible for an action. In the latter case, the right TPJ has found to be 
involved (Farrer & Frith, 2002).
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 In sum, empathy is based on both the ‘bottom-up perception action 
information process’ and the ‘top-down regulation and control’ information 
process. Difficulties in sharing emotions can lead to shortcomings in 
understanding what someone else is feeling, whereas difficulties in controlling 
your own emotions can lead to personal distress and a lack of self-monitoring 
(Decety & Meyer, 2008). Determining how empathy develops on a behavioral 
and neural level has been studied extensively by empathy for pain. 
EMPATHY FOR PAIN
The literature on the neural correlates of empathy is quite extensive and has 
focused on various aspects of empathy varying from empathy for physical pain, 
empathy for social pain (social exclusion), and empathic responses on emotions 
such as anger, sadness, or happiness (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Empathy for 
pain is by far the most investigated aspect of empathy (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011). When seeing someone in pain, this often gives individuals an unpleasant 
feeling. For example when observing someone falling of his/her bike, which 
may lead to the feeling of falling of the bike yourself. Jackson and colleagues 
have studied participants’ reactions on observing pictures in which painful 
situations were presented (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Jackson, Brunet, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006). The brain areas that became active while watching 
these disturbing pictures were the anterior insula (AI), the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), and the anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC). These regions have 
proven to be mainly involved in the observation of painful situations and are 
often referred to as the ‘pain matrix’ (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). 
The regions mentioned above have also been found to be involved in 
the direct experience of pain (Bird et al., 2010; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & 
Singer, 2010; Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2008). Multiple 
studies have investigated empathy for pain and demonstrated overlap between 
the regions that became active when observing pain in others compared to 
experiencing pain. The observation that empathy for pain investigated by pain 
inflicted pictures, video clips, and by abstract visual cues leading to electric 
stimulation result in activation in areas that are part of the pain matrix, indicates 
that empathy for pain is a robust neural mechanism (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011). 
Besides activating pain related areas when observing painful situations, 
another concept is involved as well, namely the contextual or social cues. 












1For determining the intentions of people involved in a social situation, social cues need to be read. By reading social cues from facial expressions and 
posture, it is possible to understand a situation and to determine whether the 
behavior is morally right, wrong or neutral (e.g. harm inflicted accidentally or 
intentionally) (Pfeifer et al., 2009; Sinke, Sorger, Goebel, & de Gelder, 2010). 
The areas previously found to be involved in judging social situations and moral 
behavior are the TPJ, the PCC, and the amygdala (Pfeifer et al., 2009). The TPJ 
and PCC are regions important for making a self/other distinction and taking 
other persons’ perspective, the oMFC is a reward and punishing related area 
that monitors positive or negative outcomes, and the amygdala is involved in 
emotional stimuli and evaluates whether situations are threatening (Decety, 
Michalska, & Akitsuki, 2008). 
Previous studies have examined the developmental changes in activity 
in these empathy networks (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012) and reported 
developmental changes in several key areas of the network, especially in 
amygdala-prefrontal cortex coupling, but much less emphasis has been placed 
on understanding the social-cognitive processing of empathy for pain. In addition, 
almost nothing is known about individual differences in these trajectories, even 
though studies in adults reported an important role for individual differences 
in empathic traits in explaining neural activity during empathy for pain (Decety 
& Jackson, 2004; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Van der Heiden, 
Scherpiet, Konicar, Birbaumer, & Veilt, 2013). Studies that have included 
groups with psychopathology also show differences in empathy networks in 
adolescence (Decety, Chen, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2013). This thesis addresses the 
question how social-cognitive empathy is represented in the adolescent brain 
and how trait individual differences in empathy explain individual differences in 
neural responses to social-cognitive empathy. 
1.5 OUTLINE CURRENT DISSERTATION 
The studies in this thesis are inspired by the combination between the SIPN 
model for the development of social orientation and the Empathy model to test 
development and individual differences in cognitive, affective and prosocial 
empathy. Chapters 2 and 3 use a longitudinal design to examine developmental 
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changes in activity in the detection and affective nodes of the adolescent brain. 
Most previous research on adolescent brain development has been done cross-
sectionally, which gives important information about general neural patterns 
associated with social and/or cognitive abilities in one or multiple (age) groups. 
However, the limitation of cross-sectional research is that it does not allow 
to follow one individual over time and to track how certain abilities change or 
remain stable within a person. This problem can be resolved by longitudinal 
research in which it is possible to examine individual trajectories for an individual. 
The study presented in Chapter 2 describes a longitudinal analysis of neural 
regions involved in mentalizing. Prior studies showed age related changes in the 
social brain network related to mentalizing, though this was only tested cross-
sectionally. The goal of the fMRI study was to test whether the regions involved 
in mentalizing are consistently active within adolescents across time or whether 
regions in this network change during development. 
Chapter 3 involves a combined cross-sectional and longitudinal study on the 
relationship between reward processing and puberty in adolescent boys and 
girls. The hypothesis was that the affective node of the brain, with a specific 
focus on the ventral striatum, would become increasingly activated in response 
to rewards with increase age. Second, this node was expected to show individual 
differences based on self-reported sensation seeking behavior. The first 
experiment describes a cross-sectional study in which adolescents played a 
risky decision task. The second experiment describes a longitudinal study of a 
subset of adolescents who participated in the cross-sectional study (timepoint 
1) that were tested again in a follow-up two years later (timepoint 2). As such, this 
study aimed to examine stability, change, and individual differences in reward 
processing in adolescence in a cross-sectional and longitudinal comparison. 
Next, the cognitive node of the SIPN model was tested in three studies, with a 
specific focus on cognitive empathy and prosocial behavior. First, in Chapter 4 a 
new Empathy Questionnaire was validated that aims to assess different aspects 
of empathy (affective, cognitive and prosocial) in children and adolescents. 
Additionally, the study describes how these abilities are linked with positive and 
negative aspects of social interactions.












1Next, in Chapter 5 a behavioral study examined the role of strategic versus altruistic motivations in bargaining considerations and their developmental 
trajectories. The reason for using bargaining games was to measure how 
individuals divide a stake in which two motivational aspects are important: 
interest in own outcome and concern for the other player (Van Dijk & Vermunt, 
2000). Considering that cognitive and prosocial empathy develops over time 
and that individuals differ in how empathic they behave, a bargaining game in 
which a stake has to be divided between self and the other can provide relevant 
information about cognitive empathy and prosocial behavior. More specifically, 
we tested whether adults show higher levels of concern for others compared to 
children and have more altruistic motives for offering fair distributions. 
In Chapter 6, a cross-sectional fMRI study examines the neural responses 
in response to negative and positive social situations, and whether this is 
related to self-reported levels of empathy. We were specifically interested 
in testing whether the regions in the different nodes of the social brain areas 
were differentially sensitive to the perception of negative social and positive 
social situations, and whether participants differentiated between the agents in 
negative social and positive social situations. 
Finally, Chapter 7 integrates the previous chapters and discusses the 
contribution of the studies to existing literature by drawing attention to 
possible theoretical and practical implications.
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Chapter 2: 
A longitudinal analysis of neural 
regions involved in reading the 
mind in the eyes
This chapter is published as:
Overgaauw, S., van Duijvenvoorde, A.C.K., Gunther Moor, B. Crone, E. A. (2014). 
A longitudinal analysis of neural regions involved in reading the mind in the 
eyes. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. E-pub ahead of print.
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ABSTRACT
The ability to perceive social intentions from people’s eyes is present from 
an early age, yet little is known about whether this skill is fully developed in 
childhood or that subtle changes may still occur across adolescence. This 
fMRI study investigated the ability to read mental states by using an adapted 
version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task within adolescents (aged 12-
19) over a two-year test-retest interval. This longitudinal setup provides the 
opportunity to study both stability over time as well as age-related changes. The 
behavioral results showed that participants who performed well in the mental 
state condition at the first measurement also performed well at the second 
measurement. fMRI results revealed positive test-retest correlations of neural 
activity in the right superior temporal sulcus and right inferior frontal gyrus for 
the contrast mental state > control, suggesting stability within individuals over 
time. Besides stability of activation, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex showed 
a dip in mid-adolescence for the mental state > control condition and right 
inferior frontal gyrus decreased linearly with age for the mental state > control 
condition. These findings underline changes in the slope of the developmental 
pattern depending on age, even in the existence of relatively stable activation 
in the social brain network.


















Understanding what someone else is thinking or feeling is an important 
component of reading intentions, beliefs and needs of others (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1999). A term that is often used to describe this ability is mentalizing, which 
is defined as a certain type of mental state reasoning in order to define how 
social cues are interpreted in the complex world of social interactions (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). In reading the mental states 
of others, at least two processes are involved: a social perceptual process 
and a social cognitive process (Adams et al., 2009); both part of the Social 
Information Processing Network (SIPN; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 
2005). The social perceptual process refers to ‘reading’ someone’s mental state 
by direct observation of non-verbal social cues (Adams et al., 2009; Sabbagh, 
2004). The social cognitive process tends to be more complex as this process 
enables mental reasoning about others in order to estimate intentions and its 
associated goal directed behavior. A key question concerns how reading mental 
states develops in children and adolescents. In this study, we use a longitudinal 
design to study the ability to infer the mental states of others by seeing only 
the eye region of faces across adolescence, and the brain regions involved in 
this process.  
A task which has been used previously in adults to test brain regions 
involved in reading mental states is the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes task’ (RMET) 
developed by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001a). The task displays the eye 
region of faces, which can signal basic (e.g. happy) or complex (e.g., confused) 
mental states whereupon the participant needs to select the correct answer 
from an array of choices (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 
2001b). As such, the task requires both social perceptual and social cognitive 
processes, and has been referred to as a social mentalizing task (Dal Monte et 
al., 2014). With an absence of ceiling effects even in typically developing adults, 
this social mentalizing task can be applied in studies including participants of 
varying ages and in both clinical and typical developing groups (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
With regard to neural activation, a set of studies in adults have 
reported robust activation in posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), 
anterior temporal cortex (ATC), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) when reading 
mental states compared to a control condition which required gender and/or 
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age judgments (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Castelli 
et al., 2010; Gunther Moor et al., 2012). These regions have been related to 
different social cognitive processes (Blakemore & Mills, 2014). That is, the 
STS has been found to be important for predicting intentional behavior based 
on biological motion, i.e. non-verbal body language and facial expressions. 
Therefore this brain region has been associated with mentalizing and theory 
of mind (Blakemore, 2008; Carter, Williams, Minshew, & Lehman, 2012). The 
ATC, also denoted as temporal pole, is labeled as being involved in relating 
an emotional response to social processes involving memory, such as social 
recognition (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005; Pfeifer & Peake, 2012). 
The IFG, an area which is implicated in a wide variety of tasks, has been found 
to be involved in reading action tendency based on non-verbal and verbal 
cues (Liakakis, Nickel, & Seitz, 2011; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Sebastian, 
Viding, Williams, & Blakemore, 2010), in understanding social situations (Carter, 
Williams, Minshew, & Lehman, 2012), and in semantic working memory (Dal 
Monte et al., 2014). These brain areas together are often described as part 
of the ‘social-brain’ network, which are linked to both social perception and 
cognition. The areas concerning the social brain network, which are implicated 
in Reading the Mind in the Eyes (STS, ATC and IFG), are still developing during 
childhood and adolescence as was shown in several mental state reasoning 
studies (reviewed in Blakemore, 2008).  
A prior cross-sectional study reported that 10-12-year-olds and 
14-15-year-olds showed robust activation in posterior STS, ATC and IFG when 
performing the RMET (Gunther Moor et al., 2012). This finding was interpreted 
to suggest that the human system for social perception is already tuned to 
read the intentions of others from the eyes at a young age, consistent with the 
notion that children from the age of 10-12 years were already able to perform 
well on the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b; Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
However, 10-12-year-old children showed additional activation in medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), bilateral IFG and the right temporal pole compared 
to adults, despite similar performance levels. The elevated level of activation 
in mPFC during early adolescence has also been reported in other studies using 
different social cognitive tasks (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009a; Van den Bos, van 
Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011). The researchers explained this 
elevated early-adolescence age effect as a refining period in which structural 
and functional development is still ongoing. This leads to the question whether 

















reading mental states is a stable characteristic which develops early (as was 
suggested for pSTS activity; Gunther Moor et al., 2012), or whether the neural 
regions involved in mentalizing undergo further specialization in adolescence 
(as was suggested for medial PFC, IFG and ATC; Gunther Moor et al., 2012).  
The current study tested stability versus change of mentalizing while 
performing the RMET in adolescents using behavioral and brain measures by 
means of a longitudinal design. That is, longitudinal designs are imperative for 
testing stability because even though cross-sectional results are informative for 
detecting general developmental patterns, the question of whether activation 
is stable within individuals can only be tested using longitudinal assessment 
(Plichta et al., 2012; Van den Bulk et al., 2013). For example, a pattern may seem 
stable across time, but could still be driven by large variability within groups 
and across sessions. 
In sum, the goal of the current fMRI study was to test whether 
the regions of the social brain network related to mental state reasoning 
(Blakemore, 2008) are consistently active within adolescents across time or 
whether regions in this network change during development. In this study, we 
retested adolescents who had previously participated in the study of Gunther 
Moor et al. (2012) after a two-year interval. Participants between ages 10 and 16 
years at the first measurement were tested again between 12 and 19 years and 
completed the RMET in the scanner on both occasions. Brain regions of a priori 
interest concerning stability over time were bilateral STS, determined based on 
the results of the first measurement (Gunther Moor et al., 2012). Brain regions 
of a priori interest concerning changes over time were mPFC, right temporal 
pole, and bilateral IFG (Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
2.2 METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
This longitudinal fMRI study spanned a time period of two years (min = 1.83; 
max = 2.42; SD = .15), with a subset of the 10- to 23 year olds who participated 
in the first measurement (see Gunther Moor et al., 2012). Data from the first 
measurement have been published before and focused on the cross-sectional 
developmental trajectories of brain regions involved in social mentalizing 
abilities. In this study, a total of 37 right-handed adolescents in the age of 12 to 
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19 (Mean age = 15.49, SD = 2.08; 23 females) participated again in the second 
measurement. For the current study, we selected all adolescents (N= 39, ages 
10-16) who took part in the original study of whom 77% of the participants 
were scanned in the follow up (T2). The eight participants (six 14-16 year olds 
and two 16-18 year olds) who did not participate at the second time point (T2) 
were excluded based on braces or because they did not return our calls and/
or e-mails. In addition to the sample reported by Gunther Moor and colleagues 
(2012), ten additional participants were included in the analyses of both T1 
and T2. All participants followed the exact same scanning protocol. Since we 
focused specifically on developmental changes across adolescence, no adults 
were recruited for the longitudinal study. 
Intelligence scores were determined during the first scanning session 
by two subscales of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC): the 
subscales similarities and block design (Wechsler, 1991, 1997), and were not 
significantly correlated with age. Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 
1991) scores on the first time point indicated no clinical thresholds and therefore 
did not indicate exclusion of participants at the second measurement. As a 
result of technical problems during the second scanning session, data from five 
adolescents were lost, which led to a total remaining number of 32 participants 
(who participated at both time points) in the final analysis (Mean age T1 = 13.2, 
SD = 1.95; Mean age T2 = 15.37, SD = 2.01, 20 females). 
Participants provided informed consent, and for minors, parents gave 
informed consent. Depending on the age of the participant, a fixed amount was 
paid to either the parent or the participant. The Institutional Review Board of 
the University Medical Center approved all procedures. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK
Participants performed an adapted version of the child-version of the 
RMET (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001a). In this task, 
participants were presented with photographs of the eye region of faces 
during the performance of two task conditions: a mental state condition and 
an age/gender condition presented as a mixed block/event-related design. 
This design (mixed block/event-related design) is used–instead of an event-
related design–in order to ensure that no executive functioning was measured 
because of enforced attention shifts due to a random presentation of different 
conditions (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997).

















The task conditions were presented in 4 blocks of 14 trials and 
contained 28 different black and white photographs (each photograph was 
displayed once in each condition) that were randomized within each block for 
each participant. The four blocks alternated between a mental state condition 
(A) or an age/gender condition (B), which were presented in an ABAB or BABA 
design (counterbalanced across participants). Depending on the task condition, 
participants were asked to either judge what the person on the photo was 
thinking or feeling (mental state condition) or to judge the age and gender of 
the person on the picture (age/gender condition). Both task conditions required 
participants to select one of the four simultaneously presented words that best 
described the photograph. In the mental state condition, the words included 
both basic emotion terms such as sadness, anger or happiness and more 
complex emotion terms like thinking, joking or being sure about something. 
These mental state terms were translated to Dutch by the help of native Dutch 
speakers (Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
The age/gender condition served as a control condition and consisted 
of the same pictures as shown in the mental state condition. Participants were 
instructed to determine whether the presented person on the picture was: 1) 
either younger than 60 or older than 60, and 2) a man or a woman. Based on 
this assessment, participants could choose from the following four response 
options: “younger male”, “younger female”, “older male”, or “older female”. 
The location of these phrases differed randomly across trials, to avoid that 
participants responded automatically without reading the possible answers 
(see Gunther Moor et al. 2012, for a complete description of the procedure). 
The age judgments used in the RMET were validated by 10 adults and led 
to a discrepancy in age judgment on three of the 28 trials. Therefore, in task 
performance these trials were scored as being correct in cases where the 
participants labeled only gender accurately.
 In between trials, a jittered fixation cross was presented in the center 
of the screen (varying between 600 and 8000 ms). After each fixation cross, a 
facial stimulus was presented, accompanied by the 4 simultaneous presented 
words (see Figure 2.1). All stimuli remained visible for 9 seconds, though 
participants were required to give an answer within 8 seconds. Responses 
that were not made within this time frame elicited the feedback ‘Too slow’ 
for 1 second, signaling the end of the trial. Responses could be made by 
pressing a button with the index and middle fingers of the right and left hand. 
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The position of the response buttons mapped to the location of the four 
response options on the screen. Following the response, the word that was 
selected by the participant was displayed for the remaining length of the trial. 
FIGURE 2.1 | Example of a mental state condition trial (‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task’; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001b).
PROCEDURE
Prior to scanning, participants practiced both task conditions by performing 
eight practice trials. In addition, they were asked to read a list of words to 
make sure they understood all of the mental state terms that were used in the 
experiment. At the first measurement, six children between ages 10 to 12 years 
indicated that they did not understand one or two words on the list. Analyses 
showed that four of these six children made incorrect judgments on a total of 
5 trials (1 or 2 trials per person), despite the explanation of the words before 
the fMRI session started. These trials have been excluded from further analysis 
to ensure that these incorrect judgments were not the result of a lack of 
understanding of the words. At the second measurement, a similar procedure 
was used and none of the participants indicated that they did not understand 
the meaning of a word. 

















During scanning, participants completed two runs of 28 trials and 
switched between conditions once within a run (e.g. AB-short break-AB). Both 
runs started with a short instruction display, explaining participants whether 
they would start with condition A or B. After 14 trials a display with the text 
‘SWITCH’ was presented for 5 s to indicate the switch between task conditions.
DATA ACQUISITION
Prior to scanning, participants were familiarized with the scanner environment 
using a mock scanner. Scanning was performed using a 3.0-Tesla Philips 
Achieva scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. Foam inserts that 
surrounded the head restricted head motion. Functional data were acquired 
using T2*-weighted Echo-Planar Images (EPI) (TR: 2.2 s, TE: 30 ms, slicematrix 
80 x 80, FOV. 220, 35 2.75 mm transverse slices with 0.28 mm gap) during 
two functional runs of 153 volumes each. The first two volumes of each run 
were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. After the 
functional scanning, high-resolution T2*-weighted images and high resolution 
T1 anatomical images were obtained. 
FMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Neurology, London, 
UK). For each participant, the T1 weighted image was segmented and spatially 
normalized using the default parameters. The fMRI data were corrected 
for motion, co-registered with the T1 anatomical image and normalized 
to a T1 template. Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic space 
(Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, & Evans, 1997). The normalization algorithm used a 
12-parameter affine transformation together with a non-linear transformation 
involving cosine basic functions, and resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic 
voxels. Data were then spatially smoothed with a 8mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian 
kernel. Translational movement parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (<3 mm) in 
any direction for any subject or scan. The participants who participated in both 
scanning sessions had a mean and maximum head movement of 0.08 and 2.52 
mm at the first measurement and a mean and maximum head movement 
of 0.1 and 2.32 mm at the second measurement. Hence, head movement 
never exceeded 3 mm at both scanning sessions. Images were corrected 
for differences in timing of slice acquisition, followed by rigid body motion 
correction. 
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Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data 
using the general linear model in SPM8. The fMRI time series data were 
modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). The onset of each presented stimulus was modeled as 
a separate event and was labeled as mental state or as age/gender (i.e., control) 
condition. The duration of the separate events was fitted based on length of 
the reaction time on each trial. Trials in which participants responded too slow 
(not within 8 seconds), or incorrect, were modeled separately as covariates of 
no-interest, and removed from further analysis. The modeled events based 
on correctly performed trials were used as covariates of interest in a general 
linear model along with a basic set of cosine functions that high-pass filtered 
the data and a covariate for run effects. The least-squares parameter estimates 
of height of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair-
wise contrasts. 
The first-level analyses were group-averaged at the second-level 
using a fully flexible factorial design, with the factors: subject, time (T1 and 
T2) and condition (mental state and control). In this random effects model, 
we allowed for violations of sphericity by modeling non-independence across 
images from the same subject and unequal variances between conditions and 
subjects as implemented in SPM8. This analysis allowed studying main effects 
of Time (T1 and T2) and Condition (mental state and control) and possible 
interactions between Time and Condition on a whole-brain level. Task-related 
responses were considered to be significant at a threshold of p < .05 using 
FDR correction, with a minimum extent of 10 voxels. All brain coordinates are 
reported in MNI atlas space (see Table 2.1). 

















TABLE 2.1 | All brain coordinates based on the whole brain contrast mental state > control for N = 32 in 
a flexible factorial design; interconnection of subjects on T1 and T2 (FDR corrected, p > .05; 10 contiguous 
voxels).
Contrast Region MNI (x, y, z) 
coordinates
Z-value Volume1 
(=kE value in SPM)
All participants: mental > control
frontal L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -48, 24, -3 >8 2194
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -54, 18, 18 >8
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -54, 24, 6 >8
Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex -9, 54, 36 5.67 142
Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex 9, 57, 33 4.96
frontal temporal R Superior Temporal Sulcus 48, -39, 3 6.88 906
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 57, 24, 6 6.81
temporal L Temporal Pole -57, -6, -12 7.15 116
R Temporal Pole 51, 12, -24 5.87
We used the Marsbar toolbox for use with SPM8 (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) to perform region of interest (ROI) analyses to 
further investigate patterns of activation for the two different time points. ROI 
analyses focused on brain regions of a priori interest (stability versus change) 
and were based on regions that were identified in the functional mask of the 
whole-brain analyses at T1 (mental state vs. control). Subsequently, activation 
in these regions were tested for stability between T1 and T2 and age-related 
changes in activation (see Koolschijn, Schel, de Rooij, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011 
for a similar procedure). A whole-brain threshold of p < .05 (FDR corrected) 
resulted in activation in the seven task-related areas, that were activated in the 
mental state > control contrast at T1 (N = 32). It appeared that the left STS, 
the left IFG, and the left temporal pole were interconnected, as well as the 
right STS, the right IFG, and the right temporal pole. In order to separate the 
overlapping brain areas, a threshold of p < .05 (FWE corrected) was used for ROI 
extraction of these regions (see Table 2.2). 
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TABLE 2.2 | All brain coordinates for the seven task related ROIs based on the whole brain contrast 
mental state > control for N = 32 on T1 (FWE corrected > .05; 10 contiguous voxels: bilateral STS, bilateral 
IFG, bilateral temporal pole; FDR corrected,  > .05; 10 contiguous voxels: dmPFC). 
Contrast Region MNI (x, y, z) 
coordinates
Z-value Volume1 (=kE value 
in SPM)
All participants: mental > control
frontal L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -51, 21, 18 6.22 183
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 54, 24, 3 5.25 24
Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex -9, 51, 36 4.13 139
temporal L Superior Temporal Sulcus -51, -42, 0 6.32 197
R Superior Temporal Sulcus 48, -36, 0 4.87 14
L Temporal Pole -57, -6, -12 5.44 40
R Temporal Pole 51, -9, -21 5.20 37
The first set of analyses focused on stability within ROIs over time by 
correlating activity for the mental state > control condition at both time points 
for each region. When correlations were present, these were followed up by 
post hoc comparisons for the mental state > fixation baseline and control > 
fixation baseline conditions. 
The second set of analyses assessed the effects of age on neural 
activation in which we used a linear mixed-effect model approach. This approach 
is a type of regression model that is able to account for the nested nature of 
the longitudinal data (participants measured multiple times). These analyses 
were performed using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011). 
P values were determined using Likelihood Ratio Tests as implemented in the 
mixed() function in the afex package (Singmann, 2013). These analyses were 
performed on ROI activation for the contrasts mental state > control, mental 
state > fixation, control > fixation. For behavioral data similar analyses were 
performed to test for effects of age on percentage correct and reaction time 
(RT) in the mental state and control condition. In all models, a fixed intercept, a 
fixed effect of Age (linear), and a fixed effect of Age^2 (quadratic) as predictors 
to test different patterns of change across development were used. These 
predictor-variables were mean-centered. The nested nature of the data was 
modeled by including a random intercept per participant.



















The 2 (Condition: mental state vs. control) x 2 (Time: T1 vs. T2) repeated-
measures ANOVA for percentage correct resulted in a main effect of Condition 
[F (1, 31) = 101.32, p < .001], but showed no main effect of Time or an interaction 
effect between Time and Condition. The main effect of Condition showed that 
percentage correct was higher in the control condition (Mean = 87.33%, SD 
= 5.67) than in the mental state condition (Mean = 66.96%, SD = 11.52). Even 
though percentage correct was generally lower on the mental state condition, 
participants performed well above chance level (25%). 
To test whether there was stability in performance across sessions, we 
computed correlations between percentages correct in the mental state 
condition at T1 and T2. The analysis for mental state trials revealed a significant 
positive correlation between T1 and T2 (r = .37, p = .037; see Figure 2.2A) 
showing that those participants who performed well at the first measurement 
also performed well at the second measurement. There was no significant 
correlation between T1 and T2 for both the control condition (r = .25, p = .16), as 
well as for the difference score in accuracy between the mental state and the 
control condition.
Next, we tested performance changes by testing RT differences 
between conditions on correctly performed trials. For this purpose, a 2 
(Condition: mental state vs. control) x 2 (Time: T1 vs. T2) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was performed. This resulted in a main effect of Condition [F (1, 31) = 
387.13, p < .001], but no main effect of Time nor an interaction effect between 
Time and Condition. The main effect of condition showed that participants 
responded slower in the mental state condition (Mean = 4.03 seconds, SD = 
5.37) than in the control condition (Mean = 2.94, SD = 5.42). 
Correlations between RT in the mental state condition at T1 and T2 revealed 
a significant positive correlation (r = .62, p < .001, see Figure 2.2B). The same 
correlation analysis for the control condition also showed a significant positive 
correlation between T1 and T2 (r = .86, p < .001). These results show that those 
participants who responded fast at the first measurement also responded fast 
at the second measurement for both the mental state as the control condition. 
The correlation between T1 and T2 was not significant for the difference scores 
in RT between the mental state and control condition.
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 Finally, age-related changes were tested with a mixed-model approach 
including behavioral indices from T1 and T2. Results showed no significant age-
effects on performance (percentage correct answers) for both the mental state 
and the control condition (p > .1). Also RT in the mental state and the control 
condition showed no significant age-effects (p > .1).
A  
B  
FIGURE 2.2 | (A) The correlation of the percentage correct responses in the mental state condition 
between T1 and T2, and the correlation of the percentage correct responses in the control condition 
between T1 and T2. (B) The correlation of the mean reaction time (RT) on the correct trials in the mental 
state condition between T1 and T2, and the correlation of the mean reaction time (RT) on the correct 
trials in the control condition between T1 and T2.
FMRI ANALYSES
WHOLE BRAIN CONTRASTS
The whole brain contrast involved a 2 (Condition: mental state vs. control) x 
2 (Time: T1 vs. T2) ANOVA using a flexible factorial design. In the analysis, the 
factors ‘subjects’ (independence = yes, variance = equal), ‘time’ (independence 
= no, variance = equal), and ‘condition’ (independence = yes, variance = equal) 
were included to investigate the effect of time. The main effect of Condition 
revealed more activation in the bilateral superior sulcus (STS), bilateral inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and bilateral 

















temporal pole for mental state > control condition (see Figure 2.3, and Table 
2.1). There was no main effect of Time and no Condition x Time interaction 
(note that even when the threshold was lowered to a lenient threshold of p < 
.001, 10 contiguous voxels, uncorrected for multiple comparisons, there were 
no significant effects). Thus, on a whole-brain level we find merely stability of 
activation over time within these mentalizing areas. 
In order to further investigate patterns of stability versus change we 
focused on ROI analyses for the regions activated by the mental > control 
contrast at T1 and correlated those ROIs with activity at T2. Additionally, these 
ROIs were submitted to analyses testing for age-related changes in neural 
activity across T1 and T2. 
FIGURE 2.3 | Whole brain contrast (flexible factorial design) for the main effect of mental state > control 
for N = 32; constellation of subjects on T1 and T2 (FDR corrected, < .05; > 10 contiguous voxels).
A TEST FOR STABILITY
First, we tested for stability by correlating activation between T1 and T2 for 
the ROIs extracted from the mental state > control contrast (see Table 2.2). A 
correlation analysis for mental state > control between T1 and T2 resulted in 
significant correlations in two areas (see Figure 2.4): RSTS (r = .4, p = .025; not 
Bonferroni corrected) and RIFG (r = .36, p = .046; not Bonferroni corrected). In 
order to determine to what extent the stability in RSTS and RIFG in the contrast 
mental state > control is driven by the mental state condition or the control 
condition, post hoc analyses were performed by correlating mental state > 
fixation and control > fixation at T1 and T2. Correlating mental state > fixation 
at both time points resulted in significant correlations in both RSTS (r = .67, p = 
.001) and RIFG (r = .5, p = .004). A correlational analysis for the control > fixation 
contrast between T1 and T2 resulted in a significant correlation in the RIFG (r 
= .55, p = .001). Together, these results indicate that activation in the right STS 
showed stability over time only for the mental state condition. The right IFG 
showed stability over time for both the mentalizing and control conditions. 
1The reason for choosing PDS as a puberty index instead of testosterone levels was because PDS measures were available for adolescents 
in both experiments (cross-sectional and longitudinal). 
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The remaining post hoc tests that did not follow from the mental state > 
control correlation analyses are included in the supplementary material (see 
supplementary material Figure S2.1).
FIGURE 2.4 | Scatterplots of the correlation between T1 and T2 for the neural activation in the right IFG 
(54, 24, 3) and the right STS (48, -36, 0) for the contrast mental state > control, mental state > fixation 
and control > fixation.
A TEST FOR CHANGE
Additionally, we tested age-related changes in neural activation over time. That 
is to say, even though neural activation is stable over time, smaller differences 
between participants may appear dependent on age. 
The mixed models were fitted separately for each ROI. Results for the 
contrast mental state > control showed significant age-effects in the right 
IFG and the dmPFC. Activation in the right IFG for the mental state > control 
contrast showed a linear decrease with age (p = .02; not Bonferroni corrected; 
see Figure 2.5). Activation in the dmPFC showed a curvilinear pattern with age; 
being lowest around mid-adolescence (p < .02; not Bonferroni corrected; see 
Figure 2.5). No age effects were found for the remaining areas.
Next, we performed post hoc analyses in order to determine to what 
extent these age effects in RIFG and dmPFC in the contrast mental state 
> control were driven by the mental state or the control condition. For right 
IFG, the mental state > fixation activation showed no significant age-related 
changes. Results for the contrast control > fixation showed a linear increase 
with age (p = .04; not Bonferroni corrected; see Figure 2.5). Activation in the 
dmPFC for the contrast mental state > fixation showed a linear decrease with 
age (p = .05; not Bonferroni corrected; see Figure 2.5). The control > fixation 
contrast did not show significant age-related changes. 

















See figure S2.2 (supplementary material) for the remaining post hoc tests that 
did not follow from the mental state > control contrast. 
FIGURE 2.5 | Contrast values at T1 and T2 for the mental state > control, mental state > fixation and 
control > fixation contrasts for dmPFC (-9, 51, 36) and right IFG (54, 24, 3). The connected lines are the 
activation values at T1 and T2 for each participant separately. The dmPFC shows a significant quadratic 
dip for mental state > control and an age-related decrease for mental state > fixation. The right IFG 
shows a significant age-related decrease for mental state > control and age-related increase for control 
> fixation. 
2.4 DISCUSSION
In this study we addressed the question whether reading mental states is 
a stable or changing characteristic during adolescence across a two-year 
interval. The analyses resulted in three important findings. First, behavioral 
results for performance on the RMET demonstrated stability in the 
mental state condition. This indicates that mentalizing is a relatively stable 
characteristic within individuals over time. Second, brain-imaging comparisons 
revealed stability over time in STS and IFG, two regions which have been 
consistently reported in neuroimaging studies using the RMET (Adams et al., 
2009; Castelli et al., 2010; Dal Monte et al., 2014; Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
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Third, developmental comparisons revealed age-related decreases in dmPFC 
and IFG, two regions that have been found to become less active across 
adolescence when performing social mentalizing tasks (Gunther Moor et al., 
2012; Nolte et al., 2013). As such, the findings show that a social mentalizing 
task can expose subtle developmental changes within relatively stable social 
perceptual and cognitive processes. 
STABLE ACTIVITY IN RSTS AND RIFG
An important question in research on the neural mechanisms of social 
information processing concerns whether the neural patterns we observe 
represent trait like characteristics that are stable across time or whether these 
patterns are sensitive to fluctuating emotional states. The neuroimaging 
studies to date which have examined longitudinal patterns, have shown that 
activity in subcortical brain regions associated with processing emotional phases 
is varying over time (Van den Bulk et al., 2013) and changes during pubertal 
developmental (Pfeifer et al., 2011). In addition, also in the frontal medial cortex 
longitudinal comparisons associated with thinking about traits of self and 
others are associated with change over time (Pfeifer et al., 2013). However, little 
is known about the test-retest reliability of the social information processing 
network including the cortical areas STS, IFG, and the temporal poles. The 
current study found evidence for stability in the right STS and the right IFG over 
time, suggesting that these regions are a reliable index of individual differences 
in mentalizing, at least as measured by the RMET. 
In case of the right STS, post hoc tests showed that stability was 
specific for the mental state, but not for the control condition, confirming that 
right STS is an important region for performing the RMET (Gunther Moor et 
al., 2012; Nolte et al., 2013). Overall, the STS region, which has previously been 
identified as a component of the social detection area of the brain, is important 
for detecting other people’s mental states and is therefore a basic component 
of social information processing (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). 
For the right IFG, stability was found for both the mentalizing condition 
and the control condition (mental state > control condition, mental state > 
fixation condition, and control condition > fixation condition). The IFG spans 
a large area of the lateral prefrontal cortex and has previously been related 
to a variety of functions such as language processing, motor control, and 
social understanding (Carter, Williams, Minshew, & Lehman, 2012; Fusar-Poli 

















et al., 2009). A recent study that compared normally developing adults with 
traumatic brain injured (TBI) patients showed that TBI patients performed 
less well on the RMET and especially the left IFG was found to be crucial for 
performing the task. In addition, tasks that made an appeal on the semantic 
working memory system correlated positively with performance on the RMET, 
which led the authors to conclude that the IFG plays an important role in the 
semantic memory components of the RMET (Dal Monte et al., 2014). 
Even though stability was specifically found in the right STS and 
the right IFG, it should be noted that post hoc comparisons focusing on the 
mentalizing condition relative to fixation (instead of mentalizing relative to 
the control condition, presented in the supplement) revealed also stability of 
neural activation in left lateralized areas. Prior whole brain comparisons showed 
that the mental state > control contrast resulted in bilateral activation in both 
STS and IFG (see also Adams et al., 2009; Castelli et al., 2010; Gunther Moor et 
al., 2012). Thus, the current findings do not provide conclusive evidence with 
respect to potential lateralization effects, and the study should be replicated in 
the future using various samples and larger sample sizes. 
AGE-DEPENDENT CHANGES IN RIFG AND DMPFC
Although the ability to judge someone’s mental state is present from an early 
age (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005), the influence of hormonal 
changes, structural brain changes, and environmental factors can influence 
subtle developmental changes related to social cognition (Blakemore & 
Mills, 2014). Therefore, we tested whether there were regions in the social 
information-processing network that continued to change during adolescence. 
Based on previous research on adolescents, our expectation was to find age-
related changes in mPFC, right temporal pole, and bilateral IFG (Gunther Moor 
et al., 2012, see also Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore & Mills, 2014). Longitudinal 
analyses are particularly useful for addressing this question because the 
increase in power by testing the same participants over time allowed us to 
detect also small within-person changes. 
The first region showing age-related change was the right IFG. As was 
described in the previous section, this region showed relative stability over 
time, but age comparisons revealed also subtle developmental changes. The 
main contrast of mental state > control resulted in a developmental decrease 
over time. As such, the IFG showed the same linear age effect as was shown 
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in the cross-sectional study of Gunther Moor and colleagues (2012). Post hoc 
tests, however, showed that activity in the control condition increased over 
time, whereas activity in the mental condition did not change. Therefore, it is 
important to have a better understanding of the processes involved in the 
control condition. Several aspects of the control condition deserve attention 
in future studies. First, the mentalizing condition displayed different words for 
each trial, whereas the control condition used the same words. Even though the 
words were presented at different locations on each trial to avoid pre-decisions, 
the reading demands were much lower than in the mental state condition. 
Second, behavior is less stable for the control condition over time. Third, adults 
may have more experience with making age or gender judgments than children. 
Therefore, different groups may use different strategies when making age or 
gender judgments. Future studies disentangling the processes involved in the 
control condition may further reveal these possible strategy changes. 
The second region that showed an age-related change was the mPFC. 
In accordance with previous studies that demonstrated a developmental 
decrease in mPFC involvement with increasing age (Blakemore, den Ouden, 
Choudhury, & Frith, 2007; Burnett & Blakemore, 2009a; Gunther-Moor, 2012), 
this study confirmed a developmental change in mPFC recruitment. However, 
the pattern of change was observed in two directions. The mental state > 
control contrast showed a quadratic pattern with a dip in mid adolescence, but 
the post hoc comparisons revealed an age-related decrease for the mental 
condition and a non-significant pattern for the control condition. The finding 
of an age-related decrease in mPFC has interesting parallels with structural 
changes in this area of the brain from childhood to adulthood (age 8-23; e.g. 
Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014). The structural changes, 
indicated by a cubic decreasing trajectory for grey matter development and 
surface area, and a linear decrease of cortical thickness, could be an indicator 
for the functional decrease. Although, no study up till now has investigated 
the link between functional and structural brain imaging concerning the 
social brain in relation to age, larger scale longitudinal studies are necessary 
to test these relations. Moreover, functional studies concerning mentalizing 
abilities have consistently found age-related decreases in mPFC activation 
(Blakemore, 2008), although it is currently unclear which process accounts 
for this decrease in activity. Perhaps, young adolescents make more use of 
complex, higher-order processes for mentalizing whereas older adolescents 

















use more automatic social perceptual processes (Blakemore, 2008). Overall 
this could indicate a strategy shift from childhood to adulthood (Blakemore, 
den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith, 2007). Note that some of the stimuli in the 
RMET task include direct gaze, which has previously been related to increased 
mPFC activation (Kuzmanovic et al., 2009). Although this was not the main 
manipulation in the current experiment, future studies should focus on the 
role of mPFC in direct and diverted gaze.
A limitation of this study is that the sample size was relatively small 
to detect more complex developmental patterns, and future studies are 
necessary with three of four longitudinal measurements to fit growth models. 
Despite this limitation, this study adds to a growing number of studies showing 
that longitudinal change in neural regions involved in social cognition can be 
detected by comparing the same individuals over two time points (Pfeifer et 
al., 2011; Pfeifer et al., 2013; Van den Bulk et al., 2013) and provides important 
information about stability and change which cannot be detected in cross-
sectional comparisons.  
CONCLUSION
Taken together, several studies have been performed in order to map the 
neural development of mentalizing abilities from childhood to adulthood and 
resulted in inconsistent findings. The current study used a longitudinal design 
and revealed stability over time in the extended social detection network (RSTS 
and RIFG). In addition, the current study proved that longitudinal measures are 
able to detect small subtle changes in activation patterns in brain regions that 
are involved in mentalizing, including the dmPFC and the right IFG. Although 
interpreting the exact processes of mentalizing that are developing during 
adolescence is challenging, it is likely that more complex social cognitive 
processes are still ongoing during adolescence.
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2.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
FIGURE S2.1 | We performed additional correlation analyses in order to test for stability between T1 and 
T2 for the remaining five ROIs (LSTS, LIFG, L temporal pole, R temporal pole, and dmPFC) performed 
separately for the contrasts mental state > fixation and control > fixation. Correlating mental state > 
fixation at both time points resulted in significant correlations in two of the five areas: LSTS ( = .45,  = 
.009) and LIFG ( = .5,  = .003). A correlational analysis for the control > fixation contrast between T1 and 
T2 resulted in a significant correlation in LIFG ( = .42,  = .017). 
FIGURE S2.2 | Additional analyses for the contrast mental state > fixation for the remaining five areas 
(bilateral STS, LIFG, and bilateral temporal pole), resulted in significant age-effects in the left STS and 
the right temporal pole. No age effects were found for the remaining three areas. First, activation in the 
left STS showed a curvilinear pattern with age ( = .02), being lowest around mid-adolescence. Also after 
removing an outlier that showed the largest developmental decrease, this quadratic effect in left STS 
remained significant ( = .02). Second, contrary to our expectation concerning age-related changes in the 
right temporal pole for the contrast mental state > control, we did not replicate the findings of Gunther 
Moor and colleagues (2012) who reported higher right temporal pole activation in 10-12 years old 
compared to older adolescents and adults. However, a post hoc analysis of only the mentalizing 
condition demonstrated a linear decrease across age ( = .01), the quadratic effect of age was not 
significant. Additional analyses for the contrast control > fixation for the same remaining five areas 
(bilateral STS, LIFG, and bilateral temporal pole) resulted in a significant age-effect in the right STS. No 
age effects were found for the remaining four areas. Activation in the right STS for the control > fixation 
contrast showed a linear decrease with age ( = .01), the quadratic effect of age was   significant at trend-
level and showed a dip in mid-adolescence ( = .05). 
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Chapter 3:
A cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analysis of reward-related brain 
activation: eff ects of age, pubertal 
stage, and reward sensitivity
This chapter is published as:
van Duijvenvoorde, A.C.K.*, Op de Macks, Z.A.*, Overgaauw, S., Gunther-Moor, 
B., Dahl, R.E., & Crone, E.A. (2014). A cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis 
of reward-related brain activation: effects of age, pubertal stage, and reward 
sensitivity. Brain and Cognition. *shared fi rst authorship. E-pub ahead of print.
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ABSTRACT
Neurobiological models suggest that adolescents are driven by an overactive 
ventral striatum (VS) response to rewards that may lead to an adolescent 
increase in risk-taking behavior. However, empirical studies showed mixed 
findings of adolescents’ brain response to rewards. In this study, we aimed 
to elucidate the relationship between reward-related brain activation and 
risky decision-making. In addition, we examined effects of age, puberty, and 
individuals’ reward sensitivity. We collected two datasets: Experiment 1 reports 
cross-sectional brain data from 75 participants (ages 10-25) who played a risky 
decision task. Experiment 2 presents a longitudinal extension in which a subset 
of these adolescents (n = 33) was measured again two years later. Results showed 
that 1) a reward-related network including VS and medial PFC was consistently 
activated over time, 2) the propensity to choose the risky option was related to 
increased reward-related activation in VS and medial PFC, and 3) longitudinal 
comparisons indicated that self-reported reward sensitivity was specifically 
related to VS activation over time. Together, these results advance our insights 
in the brain circuitry underlying reward processing across adolescence.













Adolescence is characterized as a period of hormonal changes and pronounced 
changes in social-affective engagement such as increases in sensation seeking 
and risk taking. Neurobiological models of adolescent development have 
suggested that adolescents are more sensitive to rewards due to a relatively 
increased limbic response in combination with reduced down-regulation by 
the prefrontal cortex and other cortical areas (Ernst & Fudge, 2009; Nelson, 
Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005; Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010). Accordingly, 
these models suggest that such neurobiological changes may underlie typical 
adolescents’ risky behaviors such as substance abuse, unsafe sexual behavior, 
and reckless driving (Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2008).
A typically found ‘reward-network’ in the brain includes dopamine-rich 
areas in the midbrain and their targets: striatum and medial prefrontal cortex 
(Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009; Tom, 
Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). More specifically, ventral striatum (VS) has been 
implicated in anticipating and processing different types of rewards, as well as 
in producing learning signals known as prediction errors (Cohen et al., 2010; 
Delgado, 2007; Galván et al., 2005; Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 
2001). Similarly, medial PFC – specifically the part that overlaps with the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) – is also related to prediction-error coding (Van den Bos, 
Cohen, Kahnt, & Crone, 2012), but also to action-related reward associations 
(Kennerley & Walton, 2011; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 
2011), and detecting the need for increased control (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). In contrast, a more ventral region of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, adjacent to medial orbital frontal cortex, has been implicated 
in coding rewards and is linked to representations of ‘value’ (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005; McKell Carter, Meyer, & Huettel, 2010). Moreover, research indicates 
strong interconnections between the VS and several parts of the medial PFC. 
These so-called striatal-cortical loops may be important for regulating reward-
related responses and subsequent goal-directed behavior (Haber & Knutson, 
2010). Together, these findings suggest that goal-directed behavior (e.g., risk 
taking) is driven by a reward-valuation system, in which VS encodes the more 
‘basic’ aspects of reward and medial PFC integrates the different aspects of the 
reward to represent its subjective value and is important for selecting actions 
and controlling behavior.
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Results of previous developmental functional MRI studies suggest that 
adolescent decision-making may be biased by a relatively hypersensitive VS 
response to rewards. That is, research has indicated that adolescents (ages 13-
17 years) show a larger VS response to rewards compared to children and adults 
(Galván et al., 2006; Padmanabhan, Geier, Ordaz, Teslovich, & Luna, 2011; Van 
Leijenhorst et al., 2010a; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b). However, other studies 
have indicated striatal hypo-activation in adolescents during reward anticipation 
(Bjork et al., 2004; Bjork, Smith, Chen, & Hommer, 2010) or have shown little 
differences between adolescents and adults in VS response to rewards (May et 
al., 2004; Paulsen, McKell Carter, Platt, Huettel, & Brannon, 2012). Moreover, 
only some studies have found that the VS response to rewards correlates with 
risk-taking behavior in every-day life (Galván, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 
2007). Thus, several questions remain with respect to the specificity of the VS 
and medial PFC responses to rewards in adolescence and their relationship to 
risky behavior. For instance, it remains to be determined whether higher risk-
taking in adolescence is associated with a higher VS response to rewards, a lower 
medial PFC response, or less functional connectivity between these areas (see 
also Cohen et al., 2012; Van den Bos, Cohen, Kahnt, & Crone, 2012). 
Mixed findings in adolescents’ reward-related brain activation might 
have several causes, such as differences in task design and analyses (Galván, 
2010). In addition, prior contradictory findings may point toward individual 
differences in adolescence (Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010). One important 
source of influences on subcortical and cortical responses could be pubertal 
development, which may serve as an important individual difference measure 
in adolescents’ brain activation in response to rewards and appetitive cues. That 
is, gonadal hormone levels significantly increase during adolescence and have 
both organizational and activating effects on brain functioning (Blakemore, 
Burnett, & Dahl, 2010; Sisk & Zehr, 2005). For instance, higher testosterone 
levels have been associated with increased VS activation (Forbes et al., 2010; Op 
de Macks, Gunther Moor, Overgaauw, Güroğlu, & Crone, 2011) and to adolescent 
typical risk-behavior such as experimentation with alcohol (De Water, Braams, 
Crone, & Peper, 2013). 
Another possible source to explain individual differences in reward-
related brain activation could be a persons’ sensitivity to rewards. For instance, 
prior studies reported that activation in the VS correlated positively with self-
reported 1) reward sensitivity, as measured by the behavioral approach system 












(BAS) scale (Beaver et al., 2006), 2) sensation seeking, as measured by the brief 
sensation-seeking scale (Bjork, Knutson, & Hommer, 2008), 3) impulsivity, as 
measured by the psychopathic personality inventory (Buckholtz et al., 2010), 
and 4) real-life risk taking (Galván et al., 2007). Possibly, these personality 
differences in reward-related response tendencies may explain why some 
adolescents are more responsive to rewards than others.
In the current study we examined reward processing in adolescence in 
more detail. Specifically, we aimed to elucidate the relationship between reward-
related brain activation, frontostriatal connectivity strength, and behavior. In 
addition, we focused on examining effects of age, pubertal development, and 
individual’s self-reported reward sensitivity on reward-related brain activation. 
To these ends, we report two experiments using a risky decision task, in which 
participants could choose to take a gamble (and win or lose 10 Eurocents) or pass 
on this gamble (in which case nothing was gained or lost). We were specifically 
interested in the brain’s response to rewards and losses as a result of an active 
gamble, since prior studies have shown that outcome monitoring is more salient 
when the outcomes are the result of an active choice (Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, 
Hoang, & Detre, 2008; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004).
In the first experiment, we reanalyzed the adolescent sample (10-16 
years old) previously reported by Op de Macks et al. (2011) and added a young-
adult sample (18-25 years old). The study by Op de Macks et al. (2011) primarily 
examined individual differences in the reward-related brain activation in 
relation to testosterone levels, but made no age comparisons. In the current 
study, we studied age, puberty, and individual difference in reward sensitivity 
in the same sample. The second experiment included a longitudinal extension 
of Experiment 1. That is, a subset of the adolescents from Experiment 1 was 
re-invited two years later, and completed the same risky decision task. This 
combined cross-sectional/longitudinal approach presents unique insights in 
the development of the reward system across adolescence and allows us to 
link changes in reward-related activation to individual’s changes in behavior, 
age, pubertal development, and reward sensitivity.
Replicating prior studies, we expected to observe activation in VS 
and medial PFC when processing rewards. Second, we predicted that risk-
taking propensity would be positively correlated with VS activation, negatively 
correlated with medial PFC activation and/or the strength of connectivity in this 
reward network. Third, based on prior findings we expected VS activation to 
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change with age (quadratic or linear). Finally, we tested whether the VS response 
to rewards was related to pubertal development, or to self-reported reward-
sensitivity (as measured with the self-report BAS scale).
3.2 METHODS EXPERIMENT 1
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-eight right-handed participants (50 adolescents, 28 adults) were 
scanned while performing a risky decision task. All participants reported an 
absence of neurological or psychiatric impairments (on a brief screening module) 
and provided written informed consent for the study (parental consent and 
participant assent for minors). The cross-sectional adolescent data has been 
reported before in Op de Macks et al. (2011), but that study focused primarily on 
the association between individual differences in reward-related brain activation 
and testosterone levels in adolescents and did not examine age effects across 
adolescence. The goal of this study was to extend this (cross-sectional) data 
set by including a sample of young adults. All procedures were approved by the 
local Medical Ethics Committee.
Three participants (12, 15, and 16 years old) showed head motion 
exceeding 3 mm during scanning and were therefore removed from further 
analyses. Accordingly, the final sample consisted of 75 participants (10-25 
years old, Mean age= 15.9 years old, SD = 4.1, 47 females). Mean head motion 
correlated with Age, r = -.27, p = .02, but was overall low, Mean = 0.85 mm, 
SD = .04. Pubertal development was measured for all adolescents (10-16 years 
old, n = 47, 32 females), using the Pubertal Development Scale (PDS; Petersen, 
Crockett, Richards & Boxer, 1988)1. No PDS scores were obtained for the young 
adults, since we presume all of the adult subjects have completed puberty. PDS 
score was positively correlated with age in the adolescent group, r = .62, p < .001. 
Participants completed two subscales (similarities and block design) of 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children or the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Adults in order to obtain an estimate of their intelligence quotient (Wechsler, 
1991; Wechsler, 1997). Estimated IQ scores correlated negatively with Age, r = -.4, 
p < .01. Therefore IQ was included as a covariate of no-interest in further analyses.
 
1The reason for choosing PDS as a puberty index instead of testosterone levels was because PDS 
measures were available for adolescents in both experiments (cross-sectional and longitudinal). 













Participants performed the Jackpot Task, a risky decision task that has been 
used to assess developmental changes in reward processing and risk-taking 
behavior (Op de Macks et al., 2011; see Figure 3.1). In the Jackpot task, participants 
were presented with a slot machine with two of the three slots showing the 
same fruit. Participants were requested on each trial to choose between the 
risky option ‘spin’ (i.e., ‘play’ trial), or the safe option ‘reset’ (i.e., ‘pass’ trial). A 
‘play’ decision was indexed by a button press with the right index finger; a ‘pass’ 
decision was indicated by a button press with the left index finger. The choice 
to play led to a monetary reward or loss (10/-10 Eurocents), whereas the choice 
to pass a trial led to no monetary reward or loss (0 Eurocents). The chance to 
win was indicated by pictures of the possible fruits for the third slot, which were 
visible to the participants. The chance to win varied between trials (66% versus 
33%), although eventually rewards and losses occurred in 50% of the cases 
for both trials. Participants played 50 trials in total (30 high risk trials and 20 
low risk trials) and for current analysis purposes all trials were averaged. In the 
prior study by Op de Macks et al. (2011) it was found that the reward-related 
brain activation did not differ between high and low-risk rewards. Therefore, 
averaging across these trials increased the power of the dependent measure. 
On average, there were 17 loss trials and 17 reward trials. Participants were given 
initial play money (2 Euros), and were instructed that they would be paid (in real 
money) according to the final outcome at the end of the experiment.
We focused specifically on the outcome phase after play choices, 
since the design was not optimal to study the feedback and the decision phase 
separately. That is, ‘pass’ trials were followed by ‘reset’ and ‘play’ trials were 
followed by valence feedback. Given the short time window between choice 
and feedback, the choice trials were confounded by feedback type. For this 
reason, our analysis focused on the ‘play’ trials, which were unpredictably 
followed by reward or loss. 
Each trial started with a centrally presented fixation cross, followed 
by the stimulus presentation (3000 ms). During this time participants had to 
select a choice (‘play’ or ‘reset’) by a button press. Subsequently, feedback 
was given (reward, loss or reset) for 2000 ms. If no timely response was given, 
the text ‘too slow!’ was presented for 2000ms, followed by the next trial. This 
happened rarely, in less than .02 % of the trials. Between trials a fixation cross 
was presented for 1-6 seconds, jittered in steps of 500 and 1000 ms. 
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FIGURE 3.1 | The Jackpot task (Op de Macks, 2011). Example of a trial in which the participant is 
presented with a 1/3 chance of a reward (+10) and a 2/3 chance of a loss (-10). The participant 
decides to play by pressing the right button and which results in a reward (feedback screen). 
Reprinted from “Testosterone levels correspond with increased ventral striatum activation in 
response to monetary rewards in adolescents” by Z.A. Op de Macks, B. Gunther Moor, S. Overgaauw, 
B. Güroğlu, R.E. Dahl, & E.A Crone, 2011. Reprinted with permission.
PROCEDURE
Before entering the scanner, participants received instructions and briefly 
practiced the task. All scanning procedures were explained using a mock 
scanner. The Jackpot task was acquired in a single run that lasted approximately 
5 minutes. The task was one of a battery of four tasks and was presented first in 
the battery (for results of the other tasks, see Gunther Moor et al., 2012) lasting 
a total of approximately 50 minutes. Self-report measures were administered 
immediately after the scan in a separate room; for the adults, the BIS/BAS 
questionnaire was administered at home.
REWARD SENSITIVITY
Reward sensitivity was measured using the behavioral inhibition system/
behavioral approach system scale (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994). A recent 
study examined the psychometric characteristics of the Dutch version of Carver 
and White’s (1994) BIS/BAS scales in two large independent samples of early 
and mid-adolescents; their findings confirmed that “the scales are suitable for 
use in research settings” (p. 500; Yu, Branje, Keijsers, & Meeus, 2011). The BIS/
BAS scales consist of 24 items across four scales: one BIS scale that measures 
punishment sensitivity and three BAS scales that measure reward sensitivity. 
Note that in the current study we were specifically interested in the BAS scales. 
The BAS Drive scale measures the persistent pursuit of desired goals, the 
BAS Fun Seeking scale measures both desire for new rewards and willingness 
2 When including BAS-subscales (Drive, Fun seeking, and Reward responsiveness), proportion of plays, Age, and IQ as a covariate of no interest 
in one whole-brain analyses the reported effects generally remained. Only proportion of plays showed a weaker effect, in which an associa-
tion with reward-related activity was observed specifically in medial PFC and at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001, >10 contiguous voxels.












to approach potentially rewarding events on the spur of the moment, and 
the BAS Reward Responsiveness scale measures the positive response to 
(the anticipation of) reward. Higher scores indicate greater reward sensitivity. 
Seventeen young adults (7 females) did not fill out the BIS/BAS scale, leaving a 
total of n = 58 who filled out the BIS/BAS scale.
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
fMRI data were acquired with a standard whole-head coil using a 3-Tesla Philips 
Achieva scanner. T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPI’s) were obtained during 
one functional run, in which the first two volumes were discarded to allow for 
equilibration of T1 saturation effects. Volumes covered the whole brain (38 
slices; 2.75mm slice thickness; interleaved acquisition) and were acquired every 
2200 ms (TE = 30 ms). A high resolution T1 image was collected at the end of 
each scan session, together with a high-resolution T2-weighted anatomical 
scan with the same slice prescription as the EPIs. Visual stimuli were projected 
onto a screen that was visible for participants via a mirror attached to the head 
coil. Head motion was restricted due to foam inserts that surrounded the head. 
FMRI PREPROCESSING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data preprocessing and analysis were conducted using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). Images were corrected for 
differences in timing of slice acquisition, followed by rigid body motion correction. 
The T1 structural image was co registered to the functional images and segmented 
according to gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid. Functional images 
were then spatially normalized using the normalization parameters obtained 
from the segmentation procedure. For seven adolescents no T1 was obtained, 
due to time constraints or technical problems, in which case functional volumes 
were spatially normalized to EPI templates. The normalization algorithm used 
a 12-parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear transformation 
involving cosine basis functions. During normalization the data was re-sampled 
to 3-mm cubic voxels. Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic space 
(Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, & Evans, 1997). Functional volumes were smoothed 
with a 6-mm full-width at half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
Statistical analyses were performed on individual subjects’ data using 
the General Linear Model (GLM) in SPM8. The fMRI time series data were 
modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
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response function. In a whole-brain analysis, reward and loss outcomes were 
modeled as single events with zero duration at the onset of the presentation of 
the outcome. This whole-brain analysis focused on the contrast [reward > loss]. 
Reset trials and trials on which the participant did not respond within the 3-s 
time frame were modeled separately, but were not included in contrasts.
Task-related responses were considered significant if they consisted 
of at least 10 contiguous voxels that exceeded a family-wise error (FWE) or a 
false discovery (FDR) corrected threshold of p < .05 (see Results). For region of 
interest (ROI) analyses the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8 was used (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).
PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL INTERACTION
To study the interplay between VS and other brain regions during processing 
of rewards compared to losses, functional connectivity was assessed using 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 1997). In PPI, 
functional connectivity is defined as significantly correlated hemodynamic 
response patterns over time between brain regions as a function of the 
experimental task context, here reward versus loss processing. Note that this 
method does not imply directionality of connectivity between regions.
The seed region in the PPI analysis was the right and left VS mask based 
on the reward > loss whole-brain contrast. Since VS was bilaterally activated, 
two separate PPIs were conducted with the right and left VS mask. By means of a 
peak-detection algorithm, we detected a peak voxel of activation per participant 
within the (left and right) VS mask. Around this peak voxel a sphere of 7 mm was 
drawn to create a seed ROI. After the extraction of the time course from the VS 
mask and the psychological vector of interest (weighting rewards with 1 and 
losses with -1), their interaction term was computed. This interaction regressor 
indicated which brain regions are functionally correlated with the respective 
seed VS mask. In other words, the resulting estimates from this interaction 
regressor express the extent to which activity in each voxel correlates with the 
seed region more when processing a reward than when processing a loss. 












3.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 1
BEHAVIOR
The average proportion of ‘play’ decisions was .67 (range = .28 – 1, SD = .14). 
A linear regression with proportion of plays as a dependent and Age as an 
independent variable showed no significant effect of Age (p’s > .1). Similar 
analyses with PDS score, and the BAS scales (Drive, Fun-seeking, and Reward-
responsiveness) as an independent variable, also showed no significant effects 
of PDS or BAS scores on proportion of plays (p’s > .1). Together these results 
reveal that the tendency to make a risky decision was not related to age, 
pubertal development or individual’s reported reward sensitivity. Note that 
this resulted in an approximately equal number of trials in the neuroimaging 
analyses across ages.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSES
Results for the contrast [reward> loss; FWE corrected, p < .05, > 10 contiguous 
voxels] across all participants revealed bilateral VS activation and a cluster of 
activation in the medial PFC (see Figure 3.2). Reward-related activation was also 
found in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and other frontal and parietal 
brain regions (see Table 3.1 for regions of activation and their coordinates). No 
significant results were found for the opposite contrast [loss > reward].
The first question we aimed to address was the relation between reward-
related brain activation and proportion to play (i.e., gamble) in the Jackpot task. 
To detect brain regions in which reward-related activation correlated with 
behavior, proportion of plays was added as a regressor of interest in a whole-
brain analysis [reward> loss], and IQ was included as a covariate. At an FWE 
corrected threshold, p < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels, no regions were detected. 
At an FDR corrected threshold of p < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels, proportion 
of plays showed a positive association with reward-related activation in VS, 
medial PFC, PCC, thalamus, and other frontal brain regions (see Figure 3.2 and 
Table 3.1 for regions of activation and their coordinates). No significant results 
were found for a negative association with proportion of plays. Thus, VS and 
medial PFC were more active following rewards, for those individuals who more 
often played. 
The next question we aimed to address was the relation between 
reward-related brain activation and individual differences in BAS scores (BAS 
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drive, BAS Fun-seeking, and BAS reward-responsiveness). BAS subscales 
were added as regressors of interest in a whole-brain analysis [reward> loss, 
n = 58], and IQ was included as a covariate. At an FWE corrected threshold (p 
< .05, > 10 contiguous voxels), no regions were detected. At an FDR-corrected 
threshold of p < .05, 10 contiguous voxels, only the BAS Fun-seeking score 
showed a positive association with reward-related activation in VS, medial PFC, 
thalamus, and other frontal and parietal brain regions (see Figure 3.2 and Table 
3.1 for regions of activation and their coordinates). No significant results were 
found for a negative association with BAS scores. Thus, VS and medial PFC were 
more active following rewards, for individuals who in every-day life are more 
willing to approach a potentially rewarding event on the spur of the moment, 
as measured by items such as “I’m always willing to try something new if I think 
it will be fun”, and “I crave excitement and new sensations” (Carver & White, 
1994).
Finally, we addressed the relation between reward-related brain 
activation and age, based on prior studies that reported a peak in adolescence 
in response to rewards (Ernst et al., 2005; Galván et al., 2007; Van Leijenhorst et 
al., 2010a; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b). To detect brain regions in which reward-
related activation correlated with linear and quadratic changes in age, Age 
and Age^2 were included as regressors of interest in a whole-brain analyses, 
with IQ included as a covariate. No results survived FWE or FDR correction. 
Lowering the threshold to an uncorrected p < .001 level, indicated a cluster of 
linearly increasing activity in left putamen (x = -24, y = 6, z = 9, 33 voxels), but no 
regions were found when testing for a linear decrease or a quadratic pattern. A 
similar whole-brain analyses to test the relation between reward-related brain 
activation and puberty (n = 47) also showed no significant cluster of activation, 
not even at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001.
Thus, in the current study, we found no evidence for a peak in the brain’s 
response to rewards in mid-adolescence, and weak evidence for a monotonic 
age-related increase in reward-related activation. Instead, these results 
indicate that reward-related brain activation was predominantly related to 
propensity to play and self-reported individual differences in fun seeking 
across adolescence2.
2 When including BAS-subscales (Drive, Fun seeking, and Reward responsiveness), proportion of plays, 
Age, and IQ as a covariate of no interest in one whole-brain analyses the reported effects generally 
remained. Only proportion of plays showed a weaker effect, in which an association with reward-
related activity was observed specifically in medial PFC and at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001, >10 
contiguous voxels













A final question was whether connectivity in a VS-medial PFC network was 
related to proportion of plays and other individual difference measures. For this 
purpose, two whole-brain PPI analyses with left VS and right VS masks from 
the whole-brain analysis (see Figure 3.2, upper panel) as seed regions showed 
that processing rewards compared to losses enhanced functional connectivity 
between VS and medial PFC (including ACC and dorsal medial PFC regions; 
FDR corrected, p < .05, >10 contiguous voxels). Analyses for left VS and right 
VS pointed to partly overlapping regions, including medial PFC, visual cortex, 
and other frontal-parietal brain regions. However, functional connectivity with 
left VS showed an additional cluster in right anterior insula (see Figure 3.3A and 
supplementary Table S3.1 and S3.2 for functionally connected regions and their 
coordinates). 
 We extracted the strength of functional connectivity between medial 
PFC and left VS, medial PFC and right VS, and right anterior insula and left 
VS for each participant. We tested whether the strength of these functional 
connections was correlated with individual’s proportion of plays, age, pubertal 
development, and BAS-scores. Results indicated no significant results for 
functional connectivity strength between medial PFC and (left and right) VS. 
However, functional connectivity between right anterior insula and left VS was 
related to proportion of plays in the task, in which larger connectivity was related 
to a lower number of plays, r = -.30, p < .02 (see Figure 3.3B).
SUMMARY EXPERIMENT 1
Taken together, whole-brain analyses revealed that rewards compared to 
losses activated a reward-related brain network, including VS and medial PFC. 
Whole-brain results indicated that reward-related activation in these regions 
was positively associated with proportion of plays and self-reported reward 
sensitivity (as measured by BAS Fun Seeking-score). PPI analyses indicated 
increased functional connectivity after reward compared to losses between 
bilateral VS and (dorsal) medial PFC. Functional connectivity between left VS 
and right anterior insula also increased after rewards compared to losses, and 
this connectivity was associated with attenuated risky decision-making.
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These cross-sectional results led to specific points of focus for the longitudinal 
analyses in Experiment 2. That is, in Experiment 2 we examined whether 
reward-related activation of VS and medial PFC [as defined by reward > loss 
activation] was related to changes in behavior, age and/or pubertal stage, and 
self-reported reward sensitivity over time. 
TABLE 3.1 | Coordinates for the brain regions showing activation for the Reward > Loss contrast and brain 
regions showing a positive correlation in the reward > loss contrast with proportion of plays and self-
reported BAS Fun-seeking, peak voxels are reported at cluster level. PFC = prefrontal cortex, VS = 
ventral striatum, ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex, BA = Brodmann Area.
Anatomical Area MNI coordinates (mm)
Cluster Size x y z Z-max value
Reward > Loss, FWE corrected p < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels
L VS 100 -15 15 -6 6.87
R VS 32 12 9 -9 6.23
R ACC (BA24) 38 6 0 33 5.46
L Posterior Cingulate Cortex 213 -6 -36 36 6.23
L Lateral PFC 88 -42 45 12 6.36
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 106 -21 33 45 6.76
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 99 -12 66 15 6.22
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 16 39 9 54 5.34
R Precentral Gyrus 58 21 -27 60 5.93
R Precentral Gyrus 12 42 -15 60 5.57
L Precentral Gyrus 23 -21 -30 60 5.71
R Putamen 11 30 -12 -12 6.10
L Thalamus 25 -6 -18 9 5.25
L Angular Gyrus 75 -39 -69 39 5.55
R Inferior Parietal Lobe 32 42 -42 57 5.31
R Superior Parietal Lobe 15 18 -54 66 5.00
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 10 -57 -45 6 5.09
L Occipital Lobe/Lingual Gyrus 1830 -12 -78 -15 7.82
Proportion of plays, FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels
R ACC/ (Para)cingulate Gyrus 887 3 45 18 4.43
R (Para)cingulate Gyrus 72 9 18 45 3.47
L ACC (BA24) 20 -3 12 24 2.98
R Lateral PFC 131 45 15 48 3.84
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 24 -27 9 54 3.38
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 11 30 12 57 3.11
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 20 18 42 39 3.35
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 59 -39 24 -9 3.61












Anatomical Area MNI coordinates(mm)
Cluster Size x y z Z-max value
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA9) 41 51 9 24 3.79
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA47) 12 45 21 -6 2.85
L Precentral Gyrus 67 -45 -3 45 4.38
L Postcentral Gyrus 56 -51 -21 48 3.38
R Supplementary Motor Area 39 3 6 60 3.51
R Thalamus (including striatum) 339 9 -21 12 4.36
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 25 45 -54 6 3.15
L Posterior Cingulate Cortex 23 -3 -45 6 3.13
L Intracalcarine Cortex 191 -24 -66 9 4.28
L Precuneus / Occipital Lobe) 3047 -15 -54 39 5.26
BAS Fun-seeking scale, FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels
L ACC 135 -9 33 9 4.65
R ACC (BA24) 17 9 21 27 3.05
L Paracingulate Gyrus 16 -6 24 45 3.37
L VS (putamen) 235 -18 12 -9 4.08
R VS (putamen) 18 27 -3 -3 3.23
L Brainstem 103 -9 -21 -12 4.18
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 58 15 33 48 3.97
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 22 33 21 42 3.53
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 87 -33 27 45 3.46
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 24 42 33 0 3.41
R Cingulate Gyrus 87 15 6 45 4.01
L Precentral Gyrus 14 -45 0 33 3.42
R Insula 38 27 24 9 3.82
R Insula 11 36 6 0 3.06
R Parietal Lobe (Precuneus) 77 15 -48 39 3.63
R Parietal Lobe (Angular Gyrus) 15 36 -51 39 3.32
L Parietal Lobe (Angular Gyrus) 13 -33 -60 39 2.98
R Superior Parietal Lobe 11 15 -51 69 3.22
L Intracalcarine Cortex 19 -3 -69 15 3.18
L Occipital Lobe / PCC 2261 -15 -45 -3 4.88
L Occipital Lobe (Cuneus) 34 -21 -72 18 3.45
L Lateral occipital cortex 14 -12 -84 36 3.26
L Lateral occipital cortex 11 -45 -63 21 2.89
TABLE 3.1 | Continued
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FIGURE 3.2 | Whole-brain results for the contrast [reward > loss] for all participants, at an FWE corrected 
threshold of < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels (upper panel). Whole brain results for the contrast [reward > 
loss], displaying regions that showed increased activation with increased number of plays (middle panel) 
and displaying regions that showed increased activation with increasing BAS Fun-seeking score (lower 
panel). Both results are reported at an FDR corrected threshold of  < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels.












FIGURE 3.3 | (A) Whole-brain results for the psycho-physiological interaction regressor with a seed 
region in left VS (red) and right VS (yellow) – orange indicates overlap – at an FDR-corrected threshold 
of  < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels. The interaction regressor shows regions that enhance functional 
connectivity with VS (left and right respectively) when processing rewards compared to losses. (B) 
Scatterplot depicting the positive association between functional connectivity between left VS–right 
anterior insula and proportion of plays. 
3.4 METHODS EXPERIMENT 2
PARTICIPANTS
A subset of the adolescents from Experiment 1 (n = 33) were scanned again 
approximately two years later, and were administered the same risky decision 
task. The goal of this study was to extend this dataset with a longitudinal sample. 
All participants signed informed consent (parental consent and participant 
assent for minors) and procedures were approved by the local Medical Ethical 
Committee.
 Two participants showed head motion exceeding 3 mm during scanning 
at time point 2 (T2) and were therefore removed from further analyses. For 
longitudinal analyses, 31 adolescents were included at time point 1 (T1) and T2 
(T1: 10-16 years old, Mean age = 13.1 years old, SD = 2.0; T2: 12-19- years old, 
Mean age = 15.3 years old, SD = 2.1, 18 female). The average time difference 
between the first and second scan was 2.13 years (1.8 – 2.3 years old, SD = .14). 
The average head motion on T1 was significantly correlated with Age at T1, 
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r = -.41, p < .05, however, head motion at T2 was not related to Age at T2, p = .2. 
Note that the mean head motion was low at both time points (T1: Mean = .1 mm, 
SD = .05; T2: Mean = .09 mm, SD = .04).
Similarly to T1, PDS scores at T2 were positively correlated with age 
at T2 (r = .39, p < .05). A repeated measures ANOVA indicated an increase in 
pubertal development from T1 to T2, F (1, 30) = 32.8, p < .001, that did not differ 
significantly between boys (Mean PDS increase = .83) and girls (Mean PDS 
increase = .76), p = .8. 
The task, procedure, and MRI acquisition in Experiment 2 were identical 
to those described in Experiment 1. 
FMRI PREPROCESSING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data preprocessing and analysis was conducted using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). Preprocessing steps in 
Experiment 2 were identical to those described in Experiment 1. 
Two types of statistical analyses were performed on this longitudinal 
dataset. First, we used the ROIs defined based on the whole-brain analysis 
[reward > loss] in the cross-sectional study (left VS, right VS, and medial PFC) 
to examine longitudinal changes in neural activation related to changes in 
behavior, age, pubertal development, and individual’s reward sensitivity. 
Second, we performed a whole-brain analysis on the longitudinal dataset 
within the GLM framework, with a 2 (reward, loss) × 2 (T1, T2) repeated measures 
ANOVA (flexible factorial design). The latter analysis allowed for a whole-brain 
inspection of a main effect of outcome [reward > loss], a main effect of time [T2 
> T1], and an interaction between the contrast [reward > loss] × time.
3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 2
BEHAVIOR
The proportion of plays in the adolescent longitudinal sample was .62 (SD = .13) 
for T1 and .63 (SD = .11) for T2. A correlational analysis between T1 and T2 showed 
that proportion of plays was significantly correlated across sessions (r = .41, p < 
.02), however, this correlation also indicates there was a fair amount of within-
individual differences in choice behavior across time.












A set of linear regressions with proportion of plays at each time point 
as a dependent and Age (continuous) at each time point as an independent 
variable showed that Age did not significantly predict behavior on T1 and T2 
(respectively) nor did Age on T1 predict the change in behavior from T1-T2. 
Similarly, BAS subscales and PDS scores at T1 and T2 did not predict proportion 
of plays on T1 and T2 (respectively) nor predicted scores on T1 the change in 
behavior from T1-T2. (p’s > .05). Thus, risk-taking propensity was generally 
stable across time and was not related to developmental factors and individual 
differences. 
ROI ANALYSES
We extracted individual activation values for the longitudinal dataset from the 
ROI masks used in the cross-sectional whole-brain analysis and focused on 
the contrast [reward > loss] in left VS (x=-16, y=11, z=-5), right VS (x=16, y=11, 
z=-5), and medial PFC (x=-6, y=55, z=7). These ROIs were chosen to enable 
comparison with Experiment 1. A repeated measures ANOVA was performed 
for each ROI with reward-related activation at T1 and T2. There was no effect 
of Time (i.e., Age) on brain activation in the VS and medial PFC. An additional 
correlational analysis for each ROI between reward-related activation at T1 and 
T2 showed no significant correlations over time within these ROIs.
We performed a linear regression [backward selection] with proportion of 
plays, PDS score, BAS scores, and IQ as independent and brain activation in an 
ROI [reward > loss] as a dependent variable. The same analysis was repeated 
with Age instead of PDS scores. These regression analyses were performed for 
behavioral scores and brain activation at T1, T2, and the change in behavioral 
scores and brain activation between T1 and T2.
The regression for medial PFC at T1 showed no significant results of 
any of these predictors. The regression analysis for left VS at T1 showed that 
BAS Fun-seeking score, Beta = .51, p < .01, and pubertal developmental score, 
Beta = .32, p < .05, were positively associated with left VS activation. A regression 
analysis for right VS at T1 showed that BAS Fun-seeking score was positively 
associated with right VS reward-related activation, Beta = .51, p < .01. A similar 
set of regressions for T2 showed no significant effects of Age, proportion of 
plays, PDS or BAS scores on reward-related brain activation at T2. 
Crucially, regression analyses were performed with the change over 
time in reward-related activation in medial PFC, Right VS, and Left VS as 
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dependent variables, and the change over time in proportion of plays, PDS 
score, and BAS scores as independent variables. The regression for medial PFC 
showed no significant results of any of these predictors. A regression for left VS 
showed that the change in BAS Fun-seeking score was positively associated 
with the change in reward-related activation in left VS, Beta = .38, p < .05. A 
regression for right VS showed that the change in BAS Fun-seeking score was 
positively associated with the change in reward-related activation in Right VS, 
Beta = .36, p < .05 (see Figure 3.4). 
These results suggest that an increased VS response to rewards 
is associated with increased self-reported fun seeking; this relationship is 
independent of developmental factors, such as age and pubertal development.
FIGURE 3.4 | Scatterplots for the change in reward > loss activation (T1-T2) and the change in left and 
right Ventral Striatum (VS) and self-reported Fun-seeking.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSIS
To ensure that the pre specified ROIs did not prevent us from observing brain 
regions that showed changes in activation over time when processing rewards 
compared to losses, we performed a whole-brain 2 (reward, loss) × 2 (T1, T2) 
repeated measures ANOVA (flexible factorial design) on the longitudinal 
dataset. 
Results for the main effect of outcome [reward> loss] across all 
participants resulted in VS activation (right) and a cluster of activation in the 
medial PFC (see Figure 3.5). Reward-related activation was also found in the PCC 
and visual cortex (see supplementary Table S3.1 for regions of activation and 
their coordinates). No significant results were found for the opposite contrast 












[loss > reward]. The interaction term between reward-loss × time showed no 
significant results at FWE or more lenient corrected thresholds (FDR p < .05 and 
uncorrected p < .001). 
Thus, even though correlations in ROI activation values indicate intra-
individual variability in brain activation, there was a strong main effect of 
reward-related activation at the group level.
FIGURE 3.5 | Whole-brain results for the main effect of outcome [reward > loss] for all participants in T1 
and T2 from a 2 x 2 flexible factorial ANOVA. Results are shown at an FWE-corrected threshold of  < .05, 
> 10 contiguous voxels.
3.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine stability, change, and individual differences 
in reward processing in adolescence. We first examined the relation between 
brain and behavior in the context of reward processing and risky decision-
making. Second, we examined the effects of age, pubertal development, and 
reward sensitivity on reward-related brain activation in a cross-sectional and 
longitudinal comparison. To these ends, Experiment 1 utilized a risky decision 
task in a cross-sectional sample of adolescents and young adults. Experiment 
2 was a longitudinal extension, in which an adolescent subset was re-studied 
using the same paradigm two years later.
For the current study, we used a task in which participants had the 
opportunity to ‘play’ or ‘pass’. The advantage of this design is that rewards and 
losses are thought to be more meaningful when there is an active choice to 
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play (Rao et al., 2008; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004). Therefore, the analyses 
were focused on the brain responses to reward and loss following play trials. As 
expected, monetary rewards resulted in robust activation in the bilateral VS and 
medial PFC in the cross-sectional sample (Delgado, 2007; Knutson et al., 2001).
The longitudinal analysis confirmed these findings by revealing 
activation in a highly similar reward-related network including most 
predominantly VS and medial PFC. These activation patterns are in line with 
the functional roles of these regions, such as the coding of reward throughout 
various stages of decision making for the VS (Liu et al., 2007), and action 
regulation and control for the medial PFC (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Rushworth, Mars, & Summerfield, 2012). We, however, did 
not observe brain activation in the ventral medial PFC and the adjacent orbital 
frontal cortex. Given that these regions have been related to the representation 
and the comparison of value during risky choice (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; 
Rushworth et al., 2011), it may be that these regions are more readily activated 
in response to choice than outcome processing. 
Interestingly, no results were found for the opposite contrast (i.e., 
loss > reward), suggesting that the brain regions involved in winning and 
losing overlap. This finding is supported by previous findings that also showed 
no results for the contrast no-gain versus gain in a similar design (e.g., Van 
Leijenhorst et al. 2010a). A possible explanation could be that in the current 
context negative feedback was not a learning signal and therefore there was no 
activation greater for loss than gain (Van Duijvenvoorde & Crone, 2013). 
A whole-brain analysis showed that the propensity to play (i.e., to 
choose the risky option) was related to increased reward-related activation in 
both VS and medial PFC. That is, participants who generally played more often 
showed, as expected, increased activation in VS, but also increased activation in 
medial PFC after rewards compared to losses. Previous studies demonstrated 
that activation in medial PFC regions during decision-making was related to 
increased risk-taking tendencies (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a; Xue et al., 2009; 
but see Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine & Ernst, 2007), which is consistent with its role 
in reward-related action tendencies (Rushworth et al., 2011; Rushworth, Mars, 
& Summerfield, 2012). The current study extends previous findings by showing 
that medial PFC activation during outcome processing was positively related to 
the tendency to choose a risky option in a cross-sectional sample. 












DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
A current debate in the literature concerns the VS response to rewards in 
adolescence. Prior studies have reported both increases and decreases in mid-
adolescence, although this may depend also on task demands (Bjork, Smith, 
Chen, & Hommer, 2010; Galván, 2010; Richards, Plate, & Ernst, 2013). In a prior 
study by Op de Macks et al. (2011), which involved a subset of participants 
reported in this study, it was found that reward-related brain activation 
correlated positively with testosterone levels, in both boys and girls. This led us 
to hypothesize that reward-related activation would peak in mid-adolescence, 
as can be expected based on adolescent-typical changes in the dopamine 
system (Galván, 2010; Luciana & Collins, 2012). However, a comparison with 
a sample of young adults (18-25 year olds) did not show developmental 
differences related to age or puberty. Only at lower (uncorrected) thresholds, 
reward-related activation in left putamen increased linearly with age. Thus, 
these results report no direct evidence for a peak in adolescent VS activation 
and suggest that individual differences in adolescence may be more important.
 Indeed, this study showed that reward responses in the VS were related 
to the extent to which participants reported to be fun seeking in everyday life. 
Previously, Galván et al. (2007) reported that neural responses to rewards in 
adolescence could be partly explained by individual differences in risk-taking 
behavior in everyday life. It was previously reported in a large behavioral 
developmental study including 935 participants between ages 10 and 30 
that self-reported sensation seeking peaks in mid-adolescence (Steinberg 
et al., 2008). Possibly, findings in prior studies of heightened VS activation 
in adolescents compared to adults were driven especially by risk-seeking 
adolescents. The current study provided further evidence for this hypothesis 
by showing that within individuals, changes in fun seeking over time correlated 
positively with changes in reward-related VS activation. This longitudinal 
extension provides a strong case for the role of individual differences in reward-
seeking behavior, which may bias some adolescents to respond more strongly 
to rewards than others. Further study is needed to study how hyperactivity in VS 
is related to individuals’ learning and decision-making.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY
The next question concerned whether there was functional connectivity 
between VS and medial PFC. In the current study a functional connectivity 
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analysis in the cross-sectional sample indicated increased connectivity 
between VS and medial PFC after processing rewards compared to losses. 
Contrary to expectations we did not find a relation between VS-medial 
PFC functional connectivity and task-related behavior (i.e., proportion of 
plays). Instead, increased functional connectivity was found between VS and 
insula after rewards compared to losses, and the strength of this functional 
connectivity was related to individuals’ risky decision-making. That is, greater 
connectivity was associated with an attenuated tendency to play, suggesting a 
potentially regulatory role of the insula (see also Cho et al., 2012). Indeed, insula 
activation has been implicated in saliency detection (Menon & Uddin, 2010), 
harm avoidance (Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003), and risk 
processing (Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010). However, given the low number of 
trials in the current study, these results need to be interpreted carefully. 
Previous work also indicated a relation between frontostriatal 
structural connections and choice behavior, in which higher integrity of 
frontostriatal white-matter tracts was associated with less impulsive choice 
behavior, suggesting that the PFC has a regulatory role over the VS (Peper et 
al., 2012). However, other findings demonstrated that more mature white-
matter tracts in the frontal cortex (corpus callosum, connecting left and right 
prefrontal and orbital frontal cortex), is related to increased engagement in 
risky behaviors (Berns, Moore, & Capra, 2009). These mixed findings indicate 
the need to further study how frontostriatal connections influence risk taking 
in adolescence. 
LIMITATIONS
There are a couple of critical aspects to take into account when reporting and 
comparing studies on risk and reward processing (Galván, 2010). First, studies 
may differ in the component of the decision-making process targeted (e.g., 
decision-making, cue/anticipation, and outcome). Due to its task design the 
current study focused specifically on outcome processing. However, future 
studies may profit from analyzing both decision-related and outcome-related 
responses (see also Barkley-Levenson, van Leijenhorst & Galván, 2013; Paulsen 
et al., 2012; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a). Also, the current task was not aimed 
toward decomposing influences of risk, expected value, and reward that may 
drive individuals’ decision making. Combinations in future paradigms will be 
valuable to further disentangle these components of decision-making.












Second, it is important to consider the task contrast and/or baseline 
used across studies. That is, while this study used a typical contrast of reward vs. 
loss, future studies may benefit from a neutral baseline (e.g., including a neutral 
condition) to distinguish whether differences in reward processing are due to 
differences in the brain responses to reward or responses to loss. Alternatively, 
parametric modulation of rewards and losses (e.g. Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 
2007; Xue et al., 2009) may be a promising approach in distinguishing reward 
versus loss-related activation across development.
Third, even though the current longitudinal sample is an important 
starting point, the sample size is relatively small for detecting subtle 
developmental changes. We aimed to present these data as evidence that 
change scores are informative for understanding developmental patterns. In 
future studies, larger sample sizes will allow us to make stronger inferences 
about developmental trajectories. Related, the relative low number of trials 
for each contrast (i.e., on average, 17 reward and 17 loss trials) could hinder 
the detection of age-related changes. While previous fMRI studies reported 
developmental changes in reward processing based on similar numbers of 
trials per condition (i.e., 18 trials per condition; Bjork et al., 2004; Ernst et al., 
2005), these studies included more than two conditions, suggesting the need 
for a larger number of trials in future studies.
Finally, task context may be driving age-related changes in risk-taking 
or brain activation. For instance, a recent study suggested that adolescents may 
be more ambiguity-tolerant, instead of more risk-tolerant compared to adults, 
indicating they are more likely to take a risk under conditions of unknown 
probabilities (i.e., an ‘ambiguous’ decision-situation) compared to known 
probabilities (i.e., a ‘risky’ decision-situation) (Tymula et al., 2012). Future 
studies are important for disentangling adolescent sensitivities across different 
decision contexts, such as risky, ambiguous, or social decision contexts.
CONCLUSION
In the current study, we used a risky decision task to investigate 
neurodevelopmental changes (cross-sectional and longitudinal) in the 
processing of rewards and its relation to task-related behavior (i.e., the 
proportion of play choices), age, pubertal development, and individuals’ 
reward sensitivity. Adolescence is characterized as a period of increased reward 
sensitivity and risk taking, but it remains unclear whether changes in reward-
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related brain activation drive the changes in risk-taking behavior. The results 
of the experiments reported here advance our understanding of the potential 
mechanisms underlying reward processing and risky decision-making in 
adolescence. Specifically, these results indicated that increased activation 
within a network of brain regions responsive to rewards — including VS and 
medial PFC — is related to an increased tendency to play and heightened self-
reported fun seeking. Longitudinal comparisons confirmed the association 
between VS activation and individual’s fun seeking. Furthermore, we observed 
increased connectivity between VS and medial PFC after rewards versus 
losses, but only the increased functional connectivity between VS and insula 
was associated with attenuated risky decision-making. Future challenges lie 
in unraveling how localized brain activation and frontostriatal connections are 
related to changes in risk taking across adolescence and in creating paradigms 
that are sensitive to individual and developmental differences in risk-taking 
tendencies.
3.7 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
TABLE S3.1 | Coordinates for the brain regions showing greater functional connectivity during rewards 
than losses with a left and a right ventral striatum seed. Peak voxels reported at cluster level with FDR 
corrected < .05, > 10 contiguous voxels. SFG = superior frontal gyrus, SMA = supplementary motor area, 
BA = brodmann area.
Anatomical Area MNI coordinates (mm)
Cluster Size x y z Z-max value
Ventral Striatum (seed) Left
L Paracingulate Gyrus 144 -6 30 33 4.01
R SMA / Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 9 -12 51 3.93
R Lateral PFC 15 51 36 24 3.58
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Insula 37 45 21 -6 3.71
R Precentral Gyrus 56 42 -9 42 4.21
R Inferior Parietal Lobe 22 48 -33 48 3.68
L Inferior Parietal Lobe 41 -45 -45 42 3.64
R Superior Parietal Lobe 132 27 -39 60 4.01
L Precuneus 26 -21 -66 48 3.30
R Lateral Occipital Cortex 1320 30 -81 24 5.26












Anatomical Area MNI coordinates (mm)
Cluster Size x y z Z-max value
L Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 188 -39 -69 -15 4.73
L Cerebellum 45 -6 -75 -27 3.54
Ventral Striatum (seed) Right
R SFG / Paracingulate Gyrus 157 6 36 45 4.18
R Anterior Cingulate Cortex 11 12 15 33 3.47
R Lateral PFC 10 -48 9 42 3.42
R PrecentralGyrus 38 51 6 39 3.80
R PostcentralGyrus 44 36 -21 39 3.90
R Hippocampus 17 36 -21 -9 3.91
L Precuneus (BA 7) 23 -24 -57 54 3.46
R Precuneus (BA 7) 90 24 -57 48 4.22
R Lateral Occipital Cortex/ Precuneus 14 9 -78 51 3.67
R Lateral Occipital Cortex 2005 27 -81 24 5.36
L Cerebellum 15 -12 -66 -21 3.90
TABLE S3.2 | Coordinates for the brain regions showing activation for the main effect of outcome 
[Reward > Loss] across T1 and T2. Peak voxels are reported at cluster level with FWE corrected < .05, > 10 
contiguous voxels. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, PCC = posterior cingulate cortex.
Anatomical Area MNI coordinates (mm)
Cluster Size x y z Z-max  value
Reward > Loss
R Ventral Striatum 91 15 9 -15 6.99
L Ventral Striatum 47 -15 3 -12 6.65
R ACC (BA32) 184 3 48 -3 6.14
R PCC (BA23) 12 3 -12 33 5.09
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 18 -21 36 45 5.32
R Lateral Occipital Cortex 182 30 -84 15 6.52
L Lateral Occipital Cortex 183 -24 -87 21 7.46
L Lateral Occipital Cortex 22 -48 -69 -12 5.80
L Lingual Gyrus / Fusiform Gyrus 724 -15 -78 -15 >8.0
TABLE S3.1 | Continued
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Chapter 4: 
Assessing empathy across 
childhood and adolescence:
Validation of the Empathy 
Questionnaire for Children and 
Adolescents (EmQue-CA)
Sandy Overgaauw, Carolien Rieffe, Eveline A. Crone, Berna Güroğlu.
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ABSTRACT
Empathy plays an important role in socio-emotional functioning. In this study, 
1262 children and adolescents (10-15 year olds) performed the newly developed 
Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA) that was 
tested on reliability, construct validity, and concurrent validity. The EmQue-CA 
aimed to assess three components of empathy: Affective Empathy, Cognitive 
Empathy, and Prosocial Motivation. A Principal Components Analysis confirmed 
the three-factor model representing these three components. Reliability analyses 
demonstrated high construct consistency of the scales. The scales showed 
high construct validity, as the three concepts of the EmQue-CA were positively 
correlated with Empathic Concern (Affective Empathy) and Perspective Taking 
(Cognitive Empathy), scales of the well-validated Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980). With regard to concurrent validity, higher empathy was related to 
more awareness of others’ emotions, higher friendship quality, less focus on 
own affective state and lower levels of bullying behavior. The EmQue-CA is a 
reliable and valid empathy instrument useable for both typically and atypically 
developing (e.g. Severe Language Impairment, Autism Spectrum Disorder, 
disruptive behavior disorder) children and adolescents aged ten and over.























Empathy is defined as the ability to read, share, and understand emotional states 
of others (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). It entails two separate but intertwined 
components: affective and cognitive empathy (Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, 
2006). Affective empathy refers to sharing an emotional state of others; 
cognitive empathy is the ability to understand emotional states of others, 
also referred to as ‘perspective-taking’ (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Preston & 
De Waal, 2002). Feeling compassion for a suffering person is the result of this 
combined ability to share and understand emotions. These skills are crucial 
to think of ways to help the suffering person or to act upon these thoughts, 
often indicated by the term ‘prosocial behavior’ (Eisenberg, 2000; Jolliffe 
& Farrington, 2006; Goudena et al., 2007). In this sense, the tendency to act 
upon this empathic sharing and understanding in a prosocial manner forms the 
third crucial component of empathy, which we will label ‘Prosocial Motivation’. 
Examining this third component of empathy is particularly important during 
childhood and adolescence, as prosocial behavior has found to be crucial for 
adaptive social-emotional functioning.
 Empathic skills have a large impact on how children and adolescents 
act toward individuals in their social group. Children with higher empathic skills 
are generally better able to regulate their emotions, show less aggression, 
and act more prosocially (Eisenberg, 2000; Pouw, Rieffe, Oosterveld, 
Huskens, & Stockmann, 2013). These skills are important for bonding with 
primary caregivers, friends, and other eminent people (Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, 
Van Hulle, Hyun Rhee, & Robinson, 2008). Cognitive empathy predicts high 
quality friendships, involving mutual reciprocity and stability (Soenens, Duriez, 
Vansteenkiste, & Goossens, 2007). However, cognitive empathy without the 
affective component can result in bullies, who are emotionally less affected 
by others’ emotions, tormenting defenseless peers (Jolliffe & Farrington, 
2006). In similar vein, affective empathy without the motivation to emotionally 
support the suffering person could hamper rather than strengthen the 
relationship (Pouw et al., 2013). Therefore, it is useful to have an instrument 
that disentangles all three components of empathy (affective- and cognitive 
empathy, and prosocial motivation), as development might be disharmonic, 
which could result in symptoms of psychopathology. An instrument that can 
identify the different components of empathy on each of these skills enables 
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professionals working with children in a clinical setting to focus on specific 
deficits in empathic behavior. 
4.1.1 Empathy measures
Albeit sharing feelings with others (affective empathy) has been included 
in existing empathy questionnaires (Davis, 1980; Hawk et al., 2013; Jolliffe 
& Farrington, 2006; Lietz et al., 2011; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), as well as 
the understanding of these feelings (cognitive empathy) (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Hawk et al., 2013; Hogan, 1969; Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2006; Lietz et al., 2011), the corresponding tendency to behave 
supportive to the person in distress to date has been mainly neglected (Rieffe, 
Ketelaar, & Wiefferink, 2010). Moreover, due to difficult grammar constructions, 
many of the existing questionnaires for empathy are less suitable for children 
with language impairments, as we often see in children with Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI; Durkin & Conti-Ramsden, 2007), ASD (Pouw et al., 2013), and/
or hearing impairments (Ketelaar, Rieffe, Wiefferink, & Frijns, 2013). Therefore, 
we designed an empathy questionnaire for children and young adolescents, 
accessible to children from the age of ten, and also easy to understand for less 
well developing children and adolescents, consisting of the following three 
scales: 1) Affective Empathy: a scale that measures the extent to which the 
subject feels for the emotion of the suffering person, 2) Cognitive Empathy: 
a scale that measures the extent to which the subject also understands why 
the person is in distress, and 3) Prosocial Motivation: a scale that measures 
the extent to which the subject is also inclined to actually help or support the 
suffering person.
4.1.2 Present study
The current study aimed to examine the construct and concurrent validity of 
the Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA) based 
on a dataset of participants aged 10-15. For the construct validity, we examined 
links of the EmQue-CA scales with two scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI), which is a commonly used measure for empathy across adolescence 
(Davis, 1980; Hawk et al., 2013). We expected positive correlations between the 
scales Empathic Concern (Affective Empathy) and Perspective Taking (Cognitive 
Empathy) of the IRI with the Affective and Cognitive Empathy scales of the 
EmQue-CA respectively. 






















To examine concurrent validity, the associations of the EmQue-CA 
scales with related concepts have been examined. Concerning intrapersonal 
functioning, it was expected that adolescents high on Affective Empathy 
would be less focused on their own internal affective states (i.e. lower scores 
on the scales Differentiating Emotions and Bodily Awareness of Emotions of the 
EAQ, the Emotion Awareness Questionnaire), but give more importance to be 
informed about others’ affective states (i.e. higher scores on scale Attending to 
Others’ Emotions, EAQ) (Rieffe & De Rooij, 2012). Furthermore, it was expected 
that adolescents scoring high on Cognitive Empathy and Prosocial Motivation 
would be more focused on others’ emotions (i.e. higher scores on the scale 
Attending to others’ Emotions), and show a negative or no relationship with 
Differentiating Emotions and Bodily Awareness of Emotions. 
Concerning interpersonal functioning, it was expected that adolescents 
high on Affective Empathy would bully less (De Wied, Goudena, & Matthys, 
2005; Menesini, Camodeca, & Nocentini, 2010; Rieffe, Camodeca, Pouw, Lange, 
& Stockmann, 2013; Stavrinides, Georgiou, & Theofanous, 2010; Warden & 
Mackinnon, 2003) and have better friendship qualities as these adolescents 
feel for another peer in distress. Moreover, reporting higher friendship qualities 
was also expected to be related to Cognitive Empathy, as understanding why 
someone feels distressed is important for maintaining good social relationships. 
For Cognitive Empathy in relation to Bullying there was no clear expectation. 
In fact, there is a controversy in the literature suggesting on the one hand that 
bullies are high on Cognitive Empathy, which makes them the so-called cold-
blooded intelligent bullies (Rieffe et al., 2013; Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 
1999). And on the other hand, the literature suggests that adolescents high 
on Cognitive Empathy would bully less because of a better understanding of 
the causes for the distress and thus better know how to support this person 
(Kokkinos & Kipritsi, 2011). Additionally, we expected that adolescents who are 
more inclined to help the person in distress (high scores on Prosocial Motivation), 
bully less, and have better friendship qualities.
Our final aim of this study was to examine empathy development 
across childhood and adolescence by studying age differences for the three 
empathy components assessed by the EmQue-CA (Van der Graaff et al., 2014). 
We hypothesized that empathic abilities in general would show age related 
increases, though with prudence as the literature shows inconsistencies 
(Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 2005; Lockwood, Seara-
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Cardoso, & Viding, 2014; Mestre, Samper, Frías, & Tur, 2009; Davis & Franzoi, 
1991). Additionally, we took the role of gender into account.  We expected 
affective empathy to remain stable with age in girls and to show a decrease with 
age in boys. Concerning cognitive empathy we hypothesized that both boys and 
girls would show a developmental increase (Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 
2013; Van der Graaff et al., 2014). For prosocial motivation our expectation was 
to find an increase in prosocial motivation with age, stronger in girls. 
4.2 METHOD
4.2.1 Participants
In total 1262 children and adolescents aged between 10 and 15 years participated 
in the study (Mean age = 13.24; SD = 1.68; 50% girls). All participants were 
recruited from local elementary and high schools with different levels of 
education, including preparatory schools for vocational secondary education 
and university. From the 974 participants (77% of the sample), a total of 124 
(13%) children attended elementary school, 222 (23%) attended secondary 
vocational education, 175 (18%) attended higher general secondary education, 
and 453 (46%) attended secondary science education. 
TABLE 1 | Sample sizes, gender distribution (%), mean age and standard deviation (SD) in years of the 
participants from six age groups.





























Note. The Chi square analyses indicated that gender distribution did not differ across the age groups (χ2 
(5) = 5.16, p = .40; see Table 1).
4.2.2 Procedures
Both schools and parents provided written consent for participation. Data 
collection took place at school. The participants were given classical instructions 
where it was emphasized that participation was entirely anonymous and voluntary 
and that there were no right or wrong answers. They could ask questions any 
time during the data collection session, which was part of a larger session and 






















lasted 45 minutes on average. The university ethical committee approved the 
procedures and questionnaires.
4.2.3 Measures
Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA). This 
self-report measure consists of 19 items grouped in three scales: Affective 
Empathy (7 items), Cognitive Empathy (6 items), and Prosocial Motivation (6 
items; see Figure 1 for a complete list of all items). Participants were asked to 
rate to what extent the description was true for them on a 3-point scale: 1) 
not true, 2) somewhat true, and 3) true (Pouw et al., 2013). All questions were 
formulated positive, where higher scores reflected higher empathic abilities. 
Mean scores were calculated per scale. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Two scales of the IRI (Davis, 1980) 
were obtained from subsamples of this study: Empathic Concern (e.g., ‘I am 
often quite touched by things that I see happen’; N = 171), and Perspective 
Taking (e.g., ‘I believe that there are two sides to every question and I try to look 
at them both’; N = 1145). From this point forward, the Empathic Concern scale 
will be referred to as Affective Empathy, and the Perspective Taking scale will 
be indicated with Cognitive Empathy. Both scales contained 6 items; each item 
was rated on a 5-point Likert scale with 0) completely untrue, 1) not quite true, 
2) in between, 3) quite true and 4) completely true. The construct consistency 
between the items of the scales was good (see Table 2).
Emotion Awareness Questionnaire (EAQ). Three scales of the well 
validated EAQ were included in a subsample of this study (Rieffe, Oosterveld, 
Miers, Meerum Terwogt, & Ly, 2008; N = 171): Differentiating Emotions (7 items; 
e.g. ‘Sometimes, I feel upset and I have no idea why’), Bodily Awareness of 
Emotions (5 items; e.g. ‘When I am scared or nervous, I feel something in my 
tummy’) and Attending to Others’ Emotions (5 items; e.g. ‘If a friend is upset, I 
try to understand why’). All items were answered on a 3-point scale with 1) not 
true, 2) sometimes true, 3) often true. Mean scores were calculated per scale. 
The items of the scales showed good construct consistency (see Table 2).
Friendship Quality Scale (FQS). We used an adapted version of the FQS 
(Bukowski, Hoza, & Boivin, 1994; N = 863) containing 28 items assessing five 
aspects of friendship quality: companionship, help, security, closeness, and 
conflict. Participants were asked to indicate how much each item was true for 
their relationship with their best friend on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1)
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not true to (5) completely true. Based on a previously reported subdivision of the 
questionnaire in two separate factors (Demir & Urberg, 2004), exploratory factor 
analyses were performed to make a distinction between positive and negative 
friendship quality. Here we included the positive friendship quality factor with 
a total of 13 items (e.g., ‘My friend and I help each other’). Sum scores were 
calculated and higher scores indicated higher relationship quality. Cronbach’s 
Alpha of .90 showed high construct consistency of the positive Friendship 
Quality Scale (see Table 2).
Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire (OB/VQ). Self-reported bullying was 
assessed using the well-validated OB/VQ (Olweus, 1986; N = 967). Participants 
were asked to indicate how often they engaged in different acts of bullying in the 
last six months on a 5-point scale with answers varying from (1) I haven’t bullied 
other children to (5) several times a week. Sum scores of the six bullying items 
were used to indicate engagement in bullying. The consistency of the bullying 
subscale is high with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .80 (see Table 2).
4.2.4 Statistical analyses
In order to assess the construct validity of the EmQue-CA, we first examined 
the intended three-factor structure and conducted a Principal Component 
Analyses (PCA) with varimax rotation. The three factors were based on the 
previously established scales and required that each intended item would show 
a factor loading of at least > .40 on their key factor. Furthermore, the inter-factor 
correlations were computed to demonstrate diversity between the scales, and 
Cronbach’s alphas were computed to examine construct consistencies. Next, 
we examined the associations between the Affective and Cognitive Empathy 
scales of the EmQue-CA with the scales Affective Empathy and Cognitive 
Empathy of the IRI respectively. The concurrent validity of the EmQue-CA was 
also tested, for which we examined the associations between the three EmQue-
CA scales with emotion awareness, friendship quality, and bullying behavior. 
Finally, we applied Fisher r-to-Z transformation to calculate a value of Z to 
assess the possible significance of the difference between boys and girls for 
the correlations between the scales of the EmQue-CA and the scales of the IRI, 
EAQ, FQS and OB/VQ, and age.























4.3.1 Factor structure, internal consistency and construct validity
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on all 19 items was performed with 
three factors (see Figure 1). All items loaded on the intended factor, except 
for one item that failed to load on the intended factor for Cognitive Empathy 
and was thus removed (‘I often don’t understand why someone gets angry’). 
Cronbach’s alphas of the three scales of the EmQue-CA indicated good internal 
consistencies for the scales: Affective Empathy .68, Cognitive Empathy .64, and 
Prosocial Motivation .75 (see Table 2). The mean scores in Table 2 show that girls 
score higher on Prosocial Motivation, but not on the other scales. Correlations 
between all three scales were significant (see Table 3), also when analyzed 
per age group, but still below .60, so there was no collinearity. Additionally, 
correlations for the Affective and Cognitive empathy scales of the EmQue-CA 
correlated positively with the IRI scales (r(164) = .36; p < .01 and r(1138) = .34; 
p < .01, respectively).
4.3.2 Concurrent validity
To study the concurrent validity of the EmQue-CA, we examined the relationship 
between the EmQue-CA scales and related constructs (see Table 3). As 
expected, the results showed negative correlations between Affective Empathy 
with Differentiating Emotions (r(117) = -.28; p < .01) and Bodily Awareness of 
Emotions (r(117) = -.28; p < .01). Cognitive Empathy and Prosocial Motivation 
were related positively to higher scores on the EAQ scale Attending to Others’ 
Emotions (r(117) = .43; p < .01; and r(117) = .22; p < .05 respectively). 
When we examined the relationships of the EmQue-CA scales with indices 
for social functioning, we found that Friendship quality correlated positively with 
Affective Empathy (r(862) = .36, p < .01), Cognitive Empathy (r(863) = .30, p < .01), and 
Prosocial Motivation (r(863) = .42, p < .01). Bullying, on the other hand, correlated 
negatively with all three scales of the EmQue-CA (Affective Empathy: r(966) = -.14, 
p < .01; Cognitive Empathy: r(967) = -.20, p < .01; Prosocial Motivation: r(863) = -.42, 
p < .01). Moreover, all correlations reported in this section remained significant 
after controlling for age. Additionally, the means for the related constructs have 
been calculated separately for boys and girls (see Table 2). Results revealed 
gender differences only for Bullying, boys bullying more often than girls. The 
other constructs did not show gender differences.
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To assess the significance of the difference between boys and girls on 
relationships between scales of the EmQue-CA and other variables in this study, 
we applied Fisher r-to-Z transformation (see Table 3). Fisher transformations 
showed that the correlation between Affective Empathy and Differentiating 
Emotions differed significantly between boys and girls, resulting in only a 
significant negative relationship for boys (Z = -2.3; p < .05). The correlation 
between Prosocial Motivation and Attending to Others’ Emotions also showed 
gender differences (Z = 2.78; p < .01), resulting in a significant negative correlation 
for boys but not for girls. Additionally, Cognitive Empathy measured by the 
EmQue-CA and Cognitive Empathy measured by the IRI showed a difference 
between boys and girls, girls showing a significant stronger positive correlation 
than boys (Z = -2.63; p < .01).
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Note. Using independent t-tests, the means indicated with a * denote significant group differences 
(p < .05).






















FIGURE 1 | Principal Component Analysis with the three factor model of the Empathy Questionnaire for 
Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA).
4.3.3 Relation of EmQue-CA scales with age
Results showed a positive correlation between Age and Affective Empathy: 
r(1253) = .10, p < .01), a negative correlation between Age and Prosocial 
Motivation: r(1258) = -.14, p < .01), and no correlation between age and Cognitive 
Empathy. However, when testing for group differences for the correlations of 
the EmQue-CA scales and age between boys and girls by applying Fisher r-to-Z 
transformation to calculate a value of z, results showed a significant difference 
for Affective Empathy and Age (z = -2.30; p < .05). Girls showed a positive 
relationship between age and Affective Empathy (r(627) = .20, p < .01), whereas 
there was no significant relationship for boys (see Table 3).
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TABLE 3 | Correlations between the scales of the EmQue-CA and the scales of the IRI, EAQ, friendship 

















Bodily Awareness of Emotions




































Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Correlations are only presented separately for boys/girls when they significantly 
differed when tested by the Fisher r-to-Z transformation. All correlations remained significant when 
corrected for age.
4.4 Discussion
In this study we examined the construct and concurrent validity of the EmQue-
CA, a newly developed questionnaire for Children and Adolescents, that aims to 
assess the three major components that empathy consists of: Affective Empathy 
(feeling for the other person in distress), Cognitive Empathy (understanding 
where the distress comes from), and the urge that one can feel to help the other 
person in distress, which was labeled as Prosocial Motivation. The outcomes of 
this study confirm the three-factor structure. Moreover, the three identified 
scales (Affective Empathy, Cognitive Empathy, and Prosocial Motivation) show 
good internal consistencies, as well as correlations with related constructs in 
the expected directions. Both indices for social functioning (friendship quality 
and bullying) were associated with all three EmQue-CA scales.
 The negative correlations between Affective Empathy and the scales 
Bodily Awareness of Emotions and Differentiating Emotions were as expected. 
Children and adolescents who were more focused on other people’s distress 






















as assessed by the Affective Empathy scales, were less focused on their own 
internal state, as assessed by Bodily Awareness of Emotions. Prior studies have 
also shown that children or adolescents who were too much occupied by their 
own internal state, were not paying sufficient attention to the outside world and 
other people (Rieffe, & de Rooij, 2012). In order to sense the feelings of another 
person, one needs to overcome the idiosyncratic focus and be able to focus on 
the other person’s feelings instead. A willingness to Attend to Others’ Emotions 
was positively correlated with all three EmQue-CA scales, but most strongly 
with Cognitive Empathy. This makes sense as affective aspects of empathy, that 
is, the tendency to feel for the other person is supposed to be innate (Decety 
& Meyer, 2008), and triggered by the mirror neuron system, but the cognitive 
aspect of empathy, that is, understanding why the other person feels distressed, 
requires a genuine interest in the other person, which is reflected in the EAQ 
scale that measures a person’s tendency to Attend to Others’ Emotions. Unlike 
the affective empathy skill, cognitive empathy might more strongly reflect an 
intention, a skill that people can apply or not, depending on their social goals. 
In this sense, cognitive empathy reflects a higher order reflection than affective 
empathy (Decety & Meyer, 2008). 
 The positive relationship between friendship quality and empathy 
is in line with our expectations and confirms the importance of empathic 
abilities for social interactions irrespective of gender (Allemand, Steiger, & 
Fend, 2014; Soenens, Duriez, Vansteenkiste, & Goossens, 2007). High levels 
of empathy also corresponded with low levels of bullying behavior, indicating 
the protective role of empathic abilities in the motivation for offending. The 
finding that boys reported higher bullying behavior compared to girls is in line 
with previous studies on physical aggression (Warden & Mackinnon, 2003). 
To further unravel the specific role of empathy in social interactions during 
childhood and adolescence, examining how these components are related 
to the development of both positive and negative relationships is particularly 
important. 
 Empathy is an important tool for adaptive social interactions, which 
emphasizes the importance of investigating these abilities more thoroughly, 
especially in less well developing groups that may be delayed in or missing 
one or more components of empathy. Different studies already denoted the 
possibility of higher levels of affective empathy, combined with lower levels of 
cognitive empathy in children and adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
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(ASD), creating tension for these children who might then have no idea how 
to react adaptively when affectively aroused (Pouw et al., 2013). In contrast, 
the rule-breaking behavior of children and adolescents diagnosed with 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) or Conduct disorder (CD) could be due to 
lower levels of affective empathy, which in turn could hinder them in forming 
and maintaining friendships with peers (Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 2013). 
Future studies could focus on the development of empathic abilities in less 
well developing groups (e.g. SLI, ASD, and ODD/CD) and on the relationship with 
the person they empathize with. In the past, Meyer and colleagues (2013) for 
example showed that empathy for friends activated brain areas important for 
sharing emotions, whereas empathy for strangers activated a brain network that 
is involved in reasoning about others’ intentions. Perhaps this could explain the 
inconsistencies in the literature concerning the development of empathy. 
Furthermore, our results showed a developmental increase in Affective 
Empathy in girls, a developmental decrease in Prosocial Motivation in both boys 
and girls, and no age related changes for Cognitive Empathy. The finding that 
Affective Empathy is higher in girls than in boys was in accordance with previous 
findings that indicate that girls are more tended to share emotions with friends 
and other eminent people (Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 2013). The age 
related increase deviates from previous findings, though this could be explained 
by differences in selected age groups. It could be that Affective Empathy 
increases in early adolescence and stabilizes around mid-adolescence (Van der 
Graaff et al., 2013). The absence of age related differences in Cognitive Empathy 
was against expectations, as previous research demonstrated developmental 
increases in both boys and girls. A possible explanation could be that cognitive 
empathy develops from mid-adolescence onwards, as Van der Graaff and 
colleagues reported an age effect between 13 and 18 (Van der Graaff et al., 
2013). Finally, the developmental decrease in Prosocial Motivation in both boys 
and girls was unexpected and cannot be readily explained by previous findings. 
However, it should be noted that the differences in means levels of Prosocial 
Motivation in the different age groups are rather small and the reported age 
differences should be replicated and interpreted with caution (see Table S1).
Taken together, the EmQue-CA presents a significant contribution to 
the knowledge on empathic abilities in children and adolescents. Particularly, 
the scale assessing Prosocial Motivation presents a valuable addition to existing 
questionnaires measuring empathy. Future studies should further focus on 






















the development of empathic abilities, as empathy has found to be of great 
importance in forming and maintaining social relationships that are crucial for 
learning how to follow social rules.
Supplementary material
TABLE S1 | Mean and standard deviations of scores of the Empathy Questionnaire for children and 
adolescents (EmQue-CA): per scale and age group.
N 10 years M 
(SD)
11 years M 
(SD)
12 years M 
(SD)
13 years M 
(SD)
14 years M 
(SD)




1253 1.93 (.39) 1.97 (.35) 1.95 (.36) 2.05 (.38) 2.05 (.38) 2.04 (.41)
Cognitive 
Empathy
1255 2.37 (.4) 2.43 (.37) 2.4 (.36) 2.43 (.37) 2.44 (.37) 2.43 (.38)
Prosocial 
Motivation
1258 2.63 (.36) 2.6 (.34) 2.48 (.36) 2.56 (.4) 2.47 (.45) 2.47 (.41)
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Chapter 5:
Fairness considerations when 
I know more than you do: 
Developmental comparisons
This chapter is published as:
Overgaauw, S., Güroğlu, B., & Crone, E.A. (2012). Fairness considerations 
when I know more than you do: Developmental comparisons. Frontiers in 
Developmental Psychology, 3, 1-8.
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ABSTRACT 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a valuable paradigm to study fairness 
considerations. Here, we tested developmental differences between altruistic 
and strategic motivations in fairness considerations using a version of the UG 
with hidden conditions. Participants were proposers and could divide coins 
between themselves and an anonymous other. Hidden information conditions 
involved division of coins where some coins were only visible to the participant 
(e.g., 8/2 condition where, from the total of 10 coins, 8 coins were visible to 
both players and 2 coins only visible to the proposer). In total, 22 young adults 
and 79 children between ages 8 and 13 played multiple one-shot versions 
of the UG with hidden conditions with anonymous others. Overall analyses 
confirmed validity of the task and showed that participants of all age groups 
had strategic intentions. Specific task analyses revealed that adults divided 
the coins equally in the standard UG conditions, but gave less to the second 
player in the hidden information conditions. The developmental comparisons 
revealed an age × condition interaction, such that adults and 10- to 12-year-old 
children differentiated between standard and hidden conditions more than 8- 
to 9-year-old children. These findings indicate that young children have a basic 
understanding of different strategic motives, but that behavior of adults and 
older children is driven more by strategic intentions.















Making fairness related decisions is a common and important component of 
social interactions. These decisions are based on different underlying motives, 
including the relevance of true fairness and the need to comply with generally 
applicable social norms (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). Experimental tasks based on 
economic exchanges have proven successful in examining people’s strategies 
in bargaining situations and the factors that influence their decision-making. 
One of these tasks is the well-known Ultimatum Game (UG). In this two-player 
bargaining game, the first player (i.e., the proposer) makes an offer to divide the 
stake, for example 10 coins, between the two players. The second player (i.e., the 
responder) decides either to accept or reject the proposed division. If the offer 
is accepted, the coins are divided according to the offer of the proposer. In case 
the responder rejects the proposed offer, both parties receive nothing (Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwartze, 1982). 
Many studies have examined what motivates proposers to offer an 
equal distribution instead of a “game theoretic” smallest possible offer in 
the UG context (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Contrary to what might be expected, 
people are not always primarily motivated to maximize their own outcome and 
seem to care for equality. A commonly given explanation is that proposers are 
motivated by considerations of fairness (Binmore, Morgan, Shaked, & Sutton, 
1991; Pillutla, Murnighan, & Keith, 1996; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Reuben & van 
Winden, 2008, 2010), which might be partially caused by the acquired social 
norms of our society (Sally & Hill, 2006; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). However, 
besides the “altruistic” willingness to be fair (Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1995; van Dijk 
& Vermunt, 2000; Kohler, 2011), players might also be motivated by the fear of 
rejection (van Dijk, de Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004), resulting in strategic action 
(Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwartze, 1982; Binmore, Shaked, & Sutton, 1985). 
That is, if the offer is beneficial for the proposer but not for the responder (i.e., 
an unfair split), the responder may reject the offer. In this case, the responder 
prefers that both parties receive nothing over an unfair split. Thus, the proposer 
in the UG may wish to maximize self-profit, but may take the perspective of the 
responder who might reject an unfair offer, resulting in the socially desirable fair 
offer. In this case, fairness requires the ability to take the perspective of others 
into account (Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & 
Singer, 2012). In short, fairness considerations might be based on two different 
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processes: a true belief in fairness (i.e., an altruistic motivation), and a fear for 
rejection (i.e., a strategic motivation).
DEVELOPMENTAL COMPARISONS
Several studies have shown that children under the age of 7 prefer distributions 
in their own favor and that preference for fair distributions increases with age 
(Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; 
Gummerum, Hanoch, & Keller, 2008; Blake & Rand, 2010; Blake & McAuliffe, 
2011). These developmental differences between ages 3–4 and 8 years have 
been interpreted as an increased preference for equity (Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). For example, Blake and 
McAuliffe (2011) examined inequity aversion among 4- to 8-year-olds, where 
participants could use an apparatus that divided candy by pulling a green or a 
red handle, which allowed them to either accept or reject the offer. The game 
consisted of two conditions: disadvantageous inequity (1/4) and advantageous 
inequity (4/1). In both conditions the alternative distribution was the equity 
distribution (1/1), controlling for a default rejection tendency. Interestingly, only 
the 8-year-olds showed a preference for fairness in both advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequity conditions, willing to sacrifice their own coins in order 
to provide equity in the advantageous inequity condition. 
This developing preference for fairness over self-interest across 
childhood is thought to partly depend on the acquisition of perspective taking 
(PT) abilities, which enables children to take another person’s view (Harbaugh, 
Krause, & Liday, 2003; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 
2010). This progressing ability to take the perspective of others, which is 
defined here as the ability to understand thoughts and intentions by others 
and willingness to act on this understanding, can subsequently result in the 
development of strategic behavior. One way of examining strategic intentions 
behind fairness considerations is comparing offers made by proposers in the UG 
and the Dictator Game (DG). The DG differs from the UG in the way that proposals 
in the DG cannot be rejected by the receiver; the proposed offer determines the 
outcome for both players. If fairness is the driving force behind offering equal 
distributions, the proposals should be the same in both experimental games. 
Indeed, prior studies have demonstrated that fair proposals increase with age 
in the UG relative to the DG, with the greatest change occurring between ages 
7 and 10 years (Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Leman, Keller, Takezawa, & 














Gummerum, 2008; see also Steinbeis et al., 2012, who replicated the same 
finding in children between ages 6 and 13 years). 
 Güroğlu et al. (2009) studied proposer behavior in 9–18 year olds using 
an adapted version of the DG and the UG, which was developed to study the role 
of PT. This experimental variant, also referred to as the mini-UG, gave proposers 
two options for distributing 10 coins. One offer was always an unfair distribution 
(8 coins for proposer, 2 for responder), and this offer was presented next to 
another distribution which could be: 2 coins for the proposer and 8 for the 
responder (hyper-fair condition), 5 coins for both (fair condition),or 10 coins for 
the proposer and none for the responder (hyper-unfair condition). The findings 
showed that with increasing age, participants were increasingly strategic in 
the offers they made, such that they differentiated more between the three 
conditions based on the alternative distribution that was presented. 
Taken together, prior developmental studies show evidence for an 
increase in offers in the UG between ages 7–8 and 12–13 years, suggesting a 
developmental change in fairness considerations in this period. The comparison 
between UG and DG behavior suggests that even young children are able to 
act strategically (Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003), but that these strategic 
intentions increase with age (Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012). This leads 
to the question whether the developmental changes in UG offers can indeed 
be attributed to strategic (i.e., higher offers out of fear for rejection) rather than 
altruistic (i.e., higher offers because of equity/fairness preference) motivations 
behind fairness considerations.
DISSOCIATING ALTRUISTIC VERSUS STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Several researchers have employed a modified version of the UG with hidden 
information conditions in order to dissociate between altruistic and strategic 
considerations in UG offers (Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1995; van Dijk, de Cremer, & 
Handgraaf, 2004; van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011). Hidden information 
refers to information that is only available to the proposer and that can be used 
in his/her own benefit. For example, it can be the case that the proposer has 10 
coins to share with the responder, but the responder thinks that there are only 8 
coins in the game (i.e., 8/2 condition where from the total of 10 coins, 8 coins were 
visible to both players and 2 coins only visible to the proposer). If the proposer’s 
decision was based on altruistic motivations, he or she would offer 5 coins (a true 
fair split). However, if the proposer is motivated by strategic considerations, he or 
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she would offer 4 coins to the responder, knowing that the responder will think 
this is a fair split. These hidden information conditions give the proposer the 
opportunity to act in an altruistically fair manner or in a seemingly fair manner, 
by making a strategic offer and using the hidden information to maximize self-
gain (Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1995; van Dijk, de Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004; Koning 
et al., 2011). 
Prior studies demonstrate the influence of various sorts of hidden 
information on proposer behavior in adults. Overall, it was found that proposers 
make more equal offers in complete information conditions than in the hidden 
information conditions and take advantage of hidden information by making 
seemingly fair offers and maximizing self-gain (Camerer & Loewenstein, 1993; 
Straub & Murnighan, 1995; Rapoport & Sundali, 1996;Murnighan & Saxon, 
1998; van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011). The UG with hidden information 
therefore proves valuable to answer questions related to the development of 
fairness considerations based on altruistic versus strategic motivations.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In the present study, we asked children between ages 8–13 and adults to play 
the role of the proposer in the hidden information version of the UG. Our main 
expectation was to find an increase in strategic fairness with age. Specifically, we 
expected adults to make higher offers than children in the complete information 
trials compared to the hidden information trials, based on the assumption that 
adults are better able to take the perspective of others and make strategic offers 
based on what they are willing to receive themselves (Page & Nowak, 2002). This 
pattern of behavior was expected to emerge between ages 8 and 13 (Harbaugh, 
Krause, & Liday, 2003; Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 
2012). We also aimed to investigate the role of PT skills in fairness considerations 
across adolescence using a self-report index of PT abilities.
5.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In total there were 101 participants, including 22 adults between ages 18 and 
25 years (Mean age = 20.23, SD = 1.23, 5 males and 17 females) and 79 children 
between ages 8 and 13 years. The children were divided into four age groups: 














8- to 9-year-olds (Mean age = 8.5, SD = .27, 4 boys and 10 girls), 10-year-olds 
(Mean age = 10, SD = .71, 7 boys and 11 girls), 11-year-olds (Mean age = 11.41 SD 
= .28, 14 boys and 13 girls), and 12-year-olds and older (Mean age = 12.37, SD 
= .32, 13 boys and 7 girls; see Table 5.1). Of this sample, eight participants were 
excluded because of missing data and eight because they were extreme outliers 
(e.g., only pressing button “1” for the whole task). All children were recruited 
from elementary schools and participated voluntarily with the consent of the 
school and their parents. Adults were contacted through a university recruitment 
program and were tested in a quiet laboratory, comparable to the test session 
of the children.
TABLE 5.1 | Discriptives of sample sizes, gender distribution, and mean age in years (SD) of the five age 
groups.
Group

























THE HIDDEN ULTIMATUM GAME
The computer task was a variant of the classical UG. Written instructions were 
presented on the computer screen. Participants were told that they had to divide 
a certain number of coins, each with a value of 1 Euro, between themselves 
and the anonymous second players (i.e., the responders); the participants were 
told that the game was played online through an Internet connection with the 
responders. They were also told that the responder could accept or reject the 
offer they made: if the responder rejected the offer, both players would receive 
nothing; if the offer was accepted, the coins would be distributed as suggested 
by the participant. Subsequently, they were informed about the existence of 
two kinds of stakes: stakes with complete information and stakes with hidden 
information. In case of the complete information, both players were aware of the 
amount of coins in the game. In case of hidden information, only the proposer 
knew the total amount of coins that could be shared, and the responder was not 
aware that there was hidden information. 
The task consisted of 15 conditions with three levels for the total 
number of coins (8, 9, or 10 coins in the game) and five levels for the number of 
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hidden coins (0, 2, 3, 4, or 5 hidden coins). Each condition was offered twice in a 
random distribution yielding a total number of 30 trials. Each trial started with a 
fixation cross with duration of 1 s, followed by the stimulus, which was response 
terminated. Hidden information trials involved blue coins visible to both the 
proposer and the responder, and white coins only visible to the proposer (see 
Figure 5.1). When the stimulus appeared, the proposer could make an offer from 
0 to a maximum of 8, 9, or 10 coins (depending on the condition) by pressing an 
associated key on the keyboard. After the proposer made the offer, a screen 
appeared for 3 s, which signaled that the receiver was making his/her decision. 
The decision of the receiver was not presented to the proposer to avoid learning 
effects. Following the decision-time screen, a feedback screen of 5 s was 
presented which summed up the offer and indicated what the proposer would 
retain if the offer would be accepted.
 
THE INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX
In order to measure the cognitive component of empathy, participants filled out 
the PT subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). This self-
report questionnaire has been used extensively with children and adolescents 
before (Litvack-Miller et al., 1997; Eisenberg et al., 1999; Gleason et al., 2009). The 
PT subscale explicitly measures the cognitive tendency to see things from the 
point of view of others, without necessarily experiencing any affective response. 
The subscale consists of six items to be answered on a five point Likert scale 
with completely untrue, in between, and completely true. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the PT subscale was .71.
PROCEDURES
All participants were tested in a quiet laboratory or classroom. They were told 
that they were going to play an online game with anonymous same-age others 
from a different school or university. In reality, the other person was not present 
and waiting time was computer-simulated. It was explained that the computer 
would randomly choose trials at the end of the experiment, which would be 
paid to the participants as well as to the second players. It was thus emphasized 
that their final reward depended on their choices during the game and the 
acceptance of the offers by the responder. 














FIGURE 5.1 | Complete and incomplete information conditions visible to the participant in the role of 
proposer. The blue coins indicate visibility to both proposer and responder. The white coins indicate a 
hidden condition and are only visible to the proposer.
To make sure that the youngest participants also understood the 
instructions, the experimenters read the instructions out loud and used 
chocolate coins to explain the concept. They were explained that there were 
no right or wrong answers and that they could rely on their own judgment. After 
the instructions, the task was completed individually on a laptop computer. The 
task started with eight practice trials, followed by 30 experimental trials. The 
task was self-paced and all participants completed the game within 15 min. 
Following the task, the participants filled out the IRI questionnaire (Davis, 1980).
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The children were told beforehand that they could choose a small 
present from the money they would earn in the game. All of the presents the 
children could choose from had approximately the same value. Adults were 
told that they would receive the money they had won during the game. All 
adults were paid a fixed amount of 6.50 Euros (approximately 8 dollars). Neither 
children nor adults indicated to have any doubts about the genuineness of the 
task and/or the outcome of their payments.
5.3 RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES IRI
In order to examine age differences in PT skills on the self-report scale of the 
IRI, we first performed a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with PT as the 
dependent variable and age group as a fixed factor. Results showed a main 
effect of age [F(4, 89) = 3.65, p < .01], which indicates that the age groups differed 
on their PT skills. Tukey post hoc tests demonstrated a difference between the 
youngest and the oldest age group, where 20-year-olds scored significantly 
higher than the 8/9-year-olds (Mean age =15.95, SD = 2.73 and Mean age =10.75, 
SD = 4.79, respectively). The remaining age groups did not differ from each other 
(10-year-olds: Mean age =14.06, SD = 6.47, 11-year-olds: Mean age =13.4, SD = 
3.14, 12-year-olds: Mean age =12.47, SD = 3). The correlation between age and 
PT skills was also significant (r = .29, p < .01). 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES HIDDEN UG
First, we tested whether the context of the 15 conditions resulted in different 
offers. A 3 (total coins) × 5 (hidden coins) repeated measure ANOVA across 
participants indeed resulted in a main effect of total number of coins [F(1, 88) = 
103.29, p < .01], as well as a main effect of the number of hidden coins [F(1, 88) = 
425.72, p < .01]; there was no significant interaction. First, as can be seen in figure 
5.2, participants offered a higher amount of coins when there were more coins to 
be divided. Second, participants gave fewer coins when there was more hidden 
information. Thus, the main effects validated that the task was successful in 
measuring fairness considerations under hidden conditions.
The interaction between 3 (total coins) × 5 (hidden coins) × 5 (age group) 
was not significant. One reason for not finding age effects in this general analysis 














could be the large number of conditions, which undermined smaller age effects 
in strategic intentions. The unequal trials (counting up to an uneven number of 
total coins) were added for exploratory reasons, in order to see how participants 
would act in reaction to trials in which the participants are forced to choose 
an unequal distribution. A limitation of these trials is that it is not possible to 
distinguish between altruistic and strategic trials when the total number of trials 
is unequal (in essence, on these trials). For this reason, we performed additional 
tests on the equally numbered trials and as can be seen in the subsequent 
analyses, when we tested for specific comparisons for fairness considerations, 
the expected age effects emerged. Next, we present how these considerations 
are present in different age groups. 
FIGURE 5.2 | Mean offers and standard errors of offers made in the three complete information 
conditions (10/0, 9/0, and 8/0) and the 12 hidden information conditions with two (8/2, 7/2, and 6/2), 
three (7/3, 6/3, and 5/3), four (6/4, 5/4, and 4/4), and five hidden coins (5/5, 4/5, and 3/5).
In our analyses examining age effects, we only included the offers that contained 
an even number of coins (total 8 or total 10), and an even number of hidden coins 
(0, 2, or 4). These trials were
selected because they allow for direct comparisons of one factor while keeping 
other factors stable (e.g., 8/0 versus 8/2 tests for the role of hidden information 
while keeping total number of coins stable). Thus, the analyses below focus on 
specific questions targeted in this experiment. See table 5.2 for an overview of 
mean offers per condition and age group. 
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TABLE 5.2 | Descriptives of mean offers of the fifteen conditions in five age groups.
Mean age
9 yr 10 yr 11 yr 12 yr 20 yr





























































































The first question concerned whether there were age differences in the 
no-hidden information condition. A repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with 
amount of coins (two levels: 10/0 versus 8/0) as a within-subjects factor and 
age group (five levels) as a between subjects factor yielded the expected main 
effect of amount of coins [F(1, 88)=80.09, p < .001] and a marginally significant 
main effect of age [F(4, 88)=2.35, p = .06]. Post hoc Tukey comparisons on the 
age effect revealed that the 20-year-old group offered significantly more than 
the 8- to 9-year-old group, with the other groups showing intermediate scores.
The second question concerned whether the age groups were 
differentially sensitive to hidden information when this increased the total 
number of coins available. A repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with hidden 
coins (two levels: 8/2 versus 8/0) as a within-subjects factor and age group (five 
levels) as a between subjects factor yielded a main effect of hidden coins [F(1, 
88)=12.13, p < .01] and a main effect of age [F(4, 88)=2.99, p < .05]. There was no 
hidden coin × age group interaction. The main effect of hidden coins showed that 
all participants offered more coins when more coins were available in the hidden 
information condition (8/2) compared to the complete information condition 
(8/0; see Figure 5.3). The age effect was examined using Tukey’s b post hoc 














tests and the results showed that 8/9-year-olds kept signifi cantly more coins 
for themselves by making lower offers in both conditions than the 10-year-olds 
and the 20-year-olds. Ten and 11-year-olds did not differ signifi cantly from the 
other age groups. 
Third, in order to examine age differences in strategic motivations, we 
compared conditions with varying amounts of hidden coins, when this decreased 
the total number of coins available. A repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with 
hidden coins (three levels: 8/0 versus 6/2 versus 4/4) as a within-subjects 
factor and age group (fi ve levels) as a between-subjects factor again yielded a 
main effect of hidden number of coins [F(1, 88)=55.32, p < .01] and a marginally 
signifi cant interaction between hidden coins and age group [F(4, 88)=2.27, p < 




















FIGURE 5.3 | Mean amount of proposed coins and standard errors in the complete 8/0 condition versus 
the hidden 8/2 condition in all age groups.




















8/0 6/2 4/4 
FIGURE 5.4 | Mean amount of coins and standard errors offered in the 3 conditions with a total number 
of 8 coins (i.e., 8/0, 6/2, and 4/4) in fi ve age groups.
To examine whether offers in complete information conditions were 
signifi cantly different from offers made in the hidden conditions within age 
groups, a repeated measure (ANOVA) post hoc analysis was conducted between 
the conditions 8/0, 6/2, and 4/4 for each age group separately. The results 
demonstrated that all age groups differentiate between the three conditions 
[all Fs (1, 16–24)>9.91, p’s< .01], except for the youngest age group (8/9-year-
olds). 
The same analysis was performed for the 10 coins condition. Here, 
the repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with hidden coins (three levels: 10/0 
versus 8/2 versus 6/4) as a within-subjects factor and age group (fi ve levels) 
as a between-subjects factor again yielded a main effect of hidden number 
of coins [F(1, 88)=53.16, p < .001]. Contrary to what we expected, neither a main 
effect for age (p = .17) nor an interaction between hidden coins and age group 
(p = .66) was signifi cant. Thus, the age differences were restricted to specifi c 
conditions, which could indicate that the 8- to 9-year-old group has more 
variance in responding yielding only some of the age effects signifi cant. In order 
to determine whether this was the case, we have performed an independent 














t -test to measure the homogeneity between the different age groups for each 
condition separately. Levene’s test for equality of error variances showed that 
there was no significant variance between age groups in case of the conditions: 
8/0, 8/2, and 6/4. The remaining conditions did show unequal variance between 
age groups, such that variance was larger in the youngest groups compared to 
the older age groups: 10/0 (p < .01), 6/2 (p < .05), and 4/4 (p < .01). 
Next, we were still interested in testing whether there would be a 
difference when selecting only the youngest and the oldest age group, based 
on visual inspection of the graphs. A repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with 
hidden coins (three levels: 10/0 versus 8/2 versus 6/4) as a within-subjects 
factor and age (two levels: 8/9-year-olds versus 20-year-olds) as a between-
subjects factor yielded the expected main effect of condition [F(1, 31)=32.11, p 
< .01] and the expected main effect of age [F(1, 31)=5.23, p < .05]. This result 
is consistent with previous findings reporting lower offers by 8/9-year-olds 
compared to adults. We note though that this is a post hoc analysis and should 
be interpreted with caution.
LINKS WITH PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
To examine whether PT changes over time related to the offers made in the UG, 
correlations were computed between UG conditions and the PT scale of the 
IRI. The scale did not correlate with coins offered in the complete information 
conditions (8/0). In contrast, the PT scale was positively related to the number 
of coins offered in the hidden information condition 8/2 (r = .21, p < .05) and 
related marginally to the hidden information condition 6/4 (r = .19, p = .06), and 
4/4 (r = .19, p = .06). This
scale identifies the participants who are able to adopt the perspective of others 
in real life situations (Davis, 1980). Thus, this association seems to indicate that 
the hidden information condition required PT. 
After controlling for age, PT was positively related to the number of 
coins offered in all hidden conditions, except for the 8/2 (r = .23, p < .05, N =87) 
condition: 6/2 (r = .21, p < .05, N =87), 6/4 (r = .24, p < .05, N =87), and 4/4 (r = .28, p < 
.01, N =87). There were no significant correlations with the complete information 
conditions (8/0 or 10/0). 
In addition, we also performed a mediation analysis in order to be 
able to determine whether PT has a mediating role in the age differences in 
UG behavior. In the first regression model, age was found to be significantly 
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and positively associated with PT (b1 = .32, p < .01). In regression model two, 
the association between PT and amount of coins offered in the 8/2 condition 
was found to be significantly and positively associated (b2 = .23, p < .05). The 
third regression model found that age and amount of offered coins in the 8/2 
condition were significant and positively associated (b3 = .21, p < .05). Finally, 
when age and PT were included in the same model, the association between 
age and amount of coins offered in the 8/2 condition was no longer significant 
(b4 = .3, p < .08), fulfilling the requirements for full mediation. The Sobel Test 
confirmed that PT fully mediated the association between age and amount of 
coins offered (p < .01). Thus, older participants who scored higher on the self-
report PT subscale made higher offers in the specific case of the 8/2 condition. 
No mediation effects were found for the other conditions.
5.4 DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine the role of strategic versus altruistic 
motivations in fairness considerations and their developmental trajectories. 
The results of this study show that by age 8/9 children already show strategic 
fairness considerations. All participants reduced the number of coins offered 
when information was hidden, showing that the ability to use strategies 
already develops at a young age. Specific follow up comparisons revealed 
age differences in how children and adults used strategies. That is, in standard 
proposal situations (i.e., with no-hidden information), adults proposed more fair 
offers than 8/9-year-old children, with children between ages 10 and 12 showing 
an intermediate pattern. The results further show that by age 8/9 children 
distinguish less between the hidden and no-hidden information conditions 
compared to adults who clearly differentiated based on the impending 
information. It should be noted that it was only in a subset of the conditions 
that children in the age of 8/9 years-old acted less strategically than adults. Yet, 
these results may indicate that adults are in certain situations more strategic 
than children. Below, we interpret these results in the light of our hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis that was tested was whether adults show higher 
levels of concern for others and have altruistic motives for offering fair 
distributions. The results from the current study suggest the development of 
more strategic motives during late childhood, given that proposed offers in the 














complete information conditions increased with age. The average amount of 
coins adults proposed to the other party in complete information conditions was 
approximately 50% compared to an average of 40% of the youngest age group. 
This age-related increase in offers made in complete information conditions 
is consistent with prior results (Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Güroğlu, 
van den Bos, & Crone, 2009; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012). Consistent 
with this point of view, Epley et al. (2004) performed an experiment in which 
participants had to take the visual perspective of the other person, to see objects 
from their point of view. The results showed that adults compared to children 
viewed solutions from different perspectives and were better in controlling 
their self-centered tendency in taking perspective of others. In this study, 
strategic motivations can possibly explain the increased prosocial behavior in 
adults, where they make fair offers to maximize their own outcomes (Reuben 
& van Winden, 2010). People tend to offer higher amounts when they reason 
about what other people will find acceptable and what is accepted according 
to social norms (Straub & Murnighan, 1995). The fear of being rejected by their 
counterpart prevents proposers to make a low offer (van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000; 
van Dijk, de Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). 
The hypothesis of increases in strategic fairness considerations finds 
support in the analyses of the hidden conditions. The hidden, or incomplete 
information, conditions allowed for the comparison of offers where information 
was not available to the responder. All participants were strategic and offered 
less in the hidden, conditions compared to when all information was available 
to the responder. At the same time, all participants were also altruistic, because 
they did not lower their offer to 50% of what was visible to the responder (for 
example, even in the 4/4 condition, participants offered on average 2.8 coins, 
which is more than 2 coins which would have been considered a fair split by 
the responder). A comparison of age groups revealed lower offers by children 
and adults in case of the hidden 8/2, 6/2, and 4/4 conditions. Adults offered 
approximately 45% of their amount in the 8/2 condition, and children offered 
approximately 40%. In case of the 6/2, and 4/4 conditions, however, the offers 
of children and adults were no longer different from each other. These findings 
indicate that children already have a basic understanding of different strategic 
motives, but that behavior of adults is more consistent and seems to be more 
driven by strategic intentions. 
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Previous studies already pointed out that adult proposers like to 
benefit from a favorable situation (Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1995; van Dijk, de 
Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004; Koning et al., 2011). The current findings show that 
children showed a small decrease in number of coins proposed to the other 
player under hidden conditions, whereas adults dropped their offers to a much 
less altruistic, self-interested level compared to the complete information 
condition. Possibly, this reflects more self-oriented decision-making in case 
of more hidden information in the older age groups. One interpretation of 
this developmental difference is that the age-related increase in levels of 
PT, which allows individuals to predict what others find fair or unfair. This 
hypothesis is supported by our findings that behavior in the hidden conditions 
was correlated with self-reported PT skills and the outcomes of the mediation 
analyses revealing that self-reported PT mediates the relation between age 
and strategic UG behavior. 
A second possible mechanism which can explain the developmental 
difference is the increase in inhibitory control with increasing age. An intriguing 
study by Steinbeis et al. (2012) revealed a correlation between strategic 
UG behavior (indexed by the difference score of the UG and the DG) and 
performance on the stop-signal task, a measure for response inhibition. These 
differences were associated with developmental changes in the contribution 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a brain region known to develop 
across childhood and adolescence. Thus, it is possible that besides PT, the 
ability to control impulsive choices also contributes to the development of 
strategic bargaining. For example, Steinbeis et al. (2012) described that young 
children (age 6–9) can already point out when a division is unfair. Yet it is only 
with increasing age that they act strategically accordingly. 
Taken together, this study showed that between ages 8 and 13, children 
offer more to others in the UG, but also become more strategic in fairness 
consideration. These findings were interpreted in terms of increasing levels of 
PT and impulse control. One aspect which received less attention in this study 
was the role of individual differences. Takagishi et al. (2010) recently reported 
that half of the children younger than six already reject unequal offers. Thus, 
there are important individual differences in fairness considerations among 
children, which can have influenced the robustness of the findings in this 
study, especially in the younger children. Future studies would therefore 
greatly benefit from following children’s fairness behavior longitudinally, and 
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relate this development to individual differences in personality, empathy, 
and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 
2005).
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ABSTRACT
This study examined neural correlates of empathy in adolescence while 
observing harmful acts. A total of 32 participants (aged 12–19 years) viewed 
pictures depicting negative (offenders inflicting intentional harm) and positive 
(friends socializing) social situations. After viewing each picture, participants 
could allocate hypothetical points to either the offender or the victim in a dictator 
game. Behaviorally, participants of all ages acted prosocially towards victims, 
fairly towards positive individuals and punishingly towards offenders. Brain 
imaging analyses showed that viewing negative situations was associated with 
more activation in the bilateral intraparietal lobule and the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), whereas viewing positive situations was associated with more medial 
prefrontal cortex and left temporal parietal junction activity. Analyses testing 
for associations between brain activity and self-reported empathy showed 
that the STS was correlated negatively with reports of understanding others’ 
distress and the willingness to help others. Together, the findings suggest that 
adolescents show similar prosocial behavior, as previously reported in adults 
with greater STS activity, when observing negative social acts that is modulated 
by an individual’s empathy for others.












Adolescence is marked by pronounced social-cognitive and social-affective 
changes, requiring the acquisition of new social skills and providing new challenges 
with important repercussions for the development of social relationships (Dahl, 
2004). An important component for behaving adequately in response to others’ 
emotions and behavior is empathy. Empathy is often defined as the ability to 
feel and read (affective) mental states of others, which helps us to understand 
and predict their intentions (Decety, Michalska, & Akitsuki, 2008; Nummenmaa, 
Hirvonen, Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008). In childhood and adolescence, empathic 
skills play an important role in how children and adolescents act
toward individuals in their social group. For example, children who report higher 
empathic skills are better able to regulate their emotions and act in more 
prosocial ways towards others (Greimel et al., 2010; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, van 
Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008; Rieffe, Ketelaar, & Wiefferink, 2010). The current 
study aimed to investigate the neural underpinnings of individual differences 
in empathic concern in adolescence in the evaluation of intentional negative 
social situations involving offenders and victims. 
Empathy has previously been described as consisting of the following 
three components: 1) affective empathy, defined as the capability to identify 
with another person’s emotions, 2) cognitive empathy, defined as the ability 
to understand these emotions and reason about affective states, and 3) 
mentalizing, which refers to the ability to reason about cognitive states (Kramer, 
Mohammadi, Donamayor, Samii, & Munte, 2010; Walter, 2012). The latter 
component provides an important mechanism that enables us to differentiate 
between one’s own and others’ feelings. To put it briefly, empathy empowers 
us to feel and understand others’ emotions, and provides us with a regulatory 
system to counteract possible overarousal resulting from such an empathic 
reaction (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). 
Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that mentalizing is 
specifically linked to the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area that has been 
found to be crucial for social information processing. Studies on people with a 
lesion in this brain area have shown that these patients were not able to read 
others’ mental states based on nonverbal cues (Gupta, Tranel, & Duff, 2012; 
Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007) and neuroimaging studies report that 
this region is consistently engaged in mentalizing tasks (Blakemore, 2008). In 
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addition, neuroimaging studies showed that the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) are involved 
in processing intentional and goal-directed behavior of others (Iacoboni, 2009; 
Vander Wyk, Voos, & Pelprey, 2012; Van Overwalle, 2009). For example, Kramer 
et al. (2010) found that when interpreting dyadic interactions with empathic 
content, there was increased activation in the STS, but not in single-person 
situations, indicating the important role of the social context. 
Furthermore, mentalizing areas are differentially sensitive to observing 
positive and negative social situations. That is to say, it was previously found 
that observing pain was associated with increased activation in the IPS and STS, 
whereas observing happy scenarios was associated with increased activation in 
the mPFC and TPJ (Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2012). The mPFC is thought 
to code the emotional value of social display, as this region is more engaged 
when viewing social situations with more positive valence ratings (Winecoff et 
al., 2013). In other words, neural regions involved in observing social scenarios 
seem to be differentially sensitive to negative (e.g. harmful or painful) and 
positive (e.g. happy) social events. 
Developmental neuroimaging studies have suggested that the 
transition from an egoistic form of empathy in young children to a more reciprocal 
concern for other people in adulthood (Hoffman, 1990; Nakao & Itakura, 2009) 
is driven by the development of brain areas which support mentalizing (Decety 
& Svetlova, 2012; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). For example, it 
was previously shown that bilateral TPJ was more active in response to different 
mental states in adults compared to children (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, 
& Saxe, 2012; Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Pelphrey, & Scholz, 2009). In addition, 
several studies showed that during adolescence this network of mentalizing 
areas (TPJ, STS, mPFC) becomes increasingly active when reasoning about 
complex social emotions (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009b) or incorporating 
intentionality of others into decision making (Güroğlu, Van den Bos, van Dijk, 
Rombouts, & Crone, 2011; Van den Bos, McClure, Harris, & Fiske, 2007). These 
studies lead to the hypothesis that brain regions associated with empathy-
related mentalizing develop during adolescence. Given that cognitive empathic 
skills increase during adolescence (Van der Graaff et al., 2014), an important 
question concerns whether individual differences in empathic ability predict 
neural activity associated with empathy-related mentalizing. 











In the present study we examined neural responses in adolescence 
when viewing pictures of negative and positive social situations and how these 
responses relate to self-reported levels of empathy. We were specifically 
interested in neural responses when viewing negative social situations in 
which a person intentionally inflicts pain on someone else (attention directed 
to either the victim or the offender) and positive social situations (attention 
directed to one of the happy people). Using this manipulation, we tested 
whether regions in the mentalizing network (TPJ, STS, mPFC), that are known 
to develop during adolescence, were differentially sensitive to the perception 
of negative or positive social situations. It is currently unknown whether higher 
levels of empathy are related to enhanced activity in the mentalizing brain areas 
such as the mPFC, TPJ, STS and IPS due to increased mentalizing capacities 
(i.e. related to a higher degree of ‘feeling’ for the other) or due to a better 
ability to downregulate empathic responses (i.e. related to better self-other 
differentiation and regulation).
Following Decety et al. (2012), we tested whether participants 
differentiated between the agents in harmful and positive social events by 
examining subsequent punishing behavior. Decety et al. (2012) previously 
examined punishment behavior of children, adolescents and adults (4–37 
year olds) after observing harmful events. They found milder punishment with 
increasing age of agents who intentionally harmed a person. Based on these 
findings, participants played a hypothetical dictator game after observing 
harmful acts. The dictator game involves transfer to or sharing of money 
with others. Specifically, participants played dictator games with agents who 
harmed others, were being harmed, or were present in a positive social event. 
We predicted that less money would be allocated to offenders compared to 
victims or people in a positive social situation (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 




In total, 37 right-handed and typically developing adolescents between the 
ages of 12 and 19 years old participated (Mean age = 15.5, SD = 2.09, 14 males 
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and 23 females). Initially, we contacted 50 participants who were in the database 
for individuals who expressed willingness to participate in research; 13 of these 
participants could not participate due to braces, a clinical diagnosis or because 
they did not respond to our calls and/or e-mails. From the 37 participants who 
participated in the scanning session, we excluded data from 5 participants 
due to movement (> 3 mm, n = 4) or incomplete data (n = 1); this resulted in a 
final sample size of 32 participants. Participants were recruited from different 
secondary schools and through our subject recruitment database. Parents of 
adolescents under 18 years of age and participants over 18 were asked to give 
written consent. After participation, participants received a monetary incentive. 
The institutional review board of the university medical center approved all 
procedures before the start of the study.
EXPERIMENTAL TASK: EMPATHY-DICTATOR GAME
Participants performed an empathy-dictator game (EDG), in which they were 
presented with social situations involving individuals involved in a negative or 
a positive social situation. Following Decety et al. (2012), we tested whether 
participants differentiated between the agents in negative and positive social 
situations by examining subsequent punishing behavior. After viewing each 
situation, they were asked to distribute coins between themselves and another 
person depicted in the social situation. In a dictator game, the participant 
decides how to divide a certain stake (e.g. coins) between themselves and 
another player, thereby making a balance between concern for one’s own gain 
and concern for others. The current study used a modified dictator game that 
allowed us to examine whether participants differentiated between victims 
and offenders in their evaluation of harmful acts. In the current version of this 
coin distribution game the participants were given four fixed distributions of 
coins as options where they could choose from rather than allowing them to 
make a choice of 1–10 coins. We predicted that less money would be allocated 
to offenders compared to victims or persons in positive situations (Decety, 
Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012). 
The social situations showed either negative social situations (involving 
inflicting intentional harm on another person) or positive social situations. In 
the harmful social situations, participants were asked to either focus on the 
offender or on the victim. Thus, three conditions were created (negative offender, 
negative victim, positive happy person). Each condition consisted of 15 stimuli 











and these were presented in a random order. Fifteen adults, who were asked to 
score the different situations on how harmful they were, validated the 45 stimuli 
beforehand. Each situation contained at least 2 people of the same age group as 
the participant. A brief sentence describing the event was shown on the screen 
below the picture. The person with whom the participant was asked to share 
coins was indicated with an arrow pointing to him/her. Even though there were 
only positive social interactions in the positive condition, an arrow was inserted 
also in these conditions, pointing at 1 of the individuals in the picture in order to 
balance processing demands related to the arrow. In short, the person indicated 
by the arrow was either a victim, an offender or a person with positive affect 
(Figure 6.1). 
FIGURE 6.1 | Task display. Each trial consisted of a stimulus presented for 4.5 s followed by a dictator 
screen presented for 3.5 s. The stimulus could be a harmful act by an offender, a harmful act to a victim 
or a positive stimulus. The dictator game requires an allocation choice out of 4 options (see text for 
explanation). b Percentage allocated coins to an offender, a victim or a positive person.
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Prior to the presentation of each stimulus, a jittered fixation-cross 
appeared for a duration between 2,000 and 4,000 ms. Subsequently, the 
stimulus was presented for 4,500 ms. After the stimulus, a selection screen 
was shown with four options to divide coins: a prosocial offer (6/4; 6 coins for 
the other and 4 coins for the participant), an equal offer (5/5), an offer that is 
slightly more advantageous for the participant (4/6) and an unfair offer (2/8). 
This screen was presented for 3,500 ms, during which the response was made. 
In case participants did not respond within this time window, a screen with the 
message ‘Too late’ was displayed. This occurred in less than 2% of the trials, 
which were further discarded from the analyses.
BEHAVIORAL MEASURES: THE EMPATHY QUESTIONNAIRE
Participants completed 18 items of the Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue-CA; 
Pouw et al., 2013), a self-report with three scales: contagion (7 items), which 
refers to affective empathy (e.g. When a friend is upset, I feel upset too), 
understanding (5 items), which reflects cognitive empathy (e.g. When a friend is 
angry, I tend to know why) and support (6 items), which reflects the tendency to 
act prosocially (e.g. If a friend is sad, I want to do something to make it better). 
Answers could be given on a 3-point scale: 1) not true, 2) sometimes true and 
3) often true. All 18 questions were formulated positively, with higher scores 
reflecting higher empathic abilities. Mean scores were computed and used 
for the analyses (minimum score = 1, maximum score = 3). Scores on all three 
scales were normally distributed, with skewness as follows: .27 (SE = .414) for 
contagion, –1.02 (SE = .414), for understanding, 1.02 (SE = .414) and –1.93 (SE = 
.414) for support. Cronbach’s alphas of the three scales of the EmQue-CA. were 
as follows: contagion: .73, understanding: .64, and support: .75.
FMRI DATA ACQUISITION
E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pa., USA) and 
a rear projection system were used for the stimuli presentation. Scanning was 
performed using a 3-tesla Philips Achieva scanner at the Leiden University 
Medical Center. Functional data were acquired using T2 * -weighted echo-
planar images (TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30 ms, slice-matrix = 80 × 80, FOV = 220, 
35 transverse slices of 2.75 mm with 0.28-mm gap) during one functional 
run of 259 volumes. The first 2 volumes of this run were discarded to allow 
for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. After the functional scanning, 











high-resolution T2 * -weighted images and high-resolution T1 anatomical 
images were obtained. 
FMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Image processing was carried out with SPM8 (Welcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). For each participant, the T1-weighted image 
was segmented and spatially normalized using the default parameters. The 
fMRI data were corrected for motion, co-registered with the T1 anatomical 
image and normalized to a T1 template. Templates were based on the MNI305 
stereotaxic space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwam, & Evans, 1997). The normalization 
algorithm used a 12-parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear 
transformation involving cosine basic functions, and resampled the volumes to 
3-mm cubic voxels. Data were then spatially smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM 
isotropic gaussian kernel. Due to excessive head movement, 4 participants 
were excluded. The remaining participants did not exceed 1 voxel (<3 mm) in 
any direction for any scan. Mean and maximum head movement was 0.1 and 
2.91 mm. Images were corrected for differences in timing of slice acquisition, 
followed by rigid body motion correction. 
Statistical analyses were performed on group data using a random-
effects model using one-sample t tests. The fMRI time series data were 
modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function. The modeled events based on correctly performed trials 
were used as covariates of interest in a general linear model along with a basic 
set of cosine functions that high-pass filtered the data. The least-squares 
parameter estimates of height of the best-fitting canonical hemodynamic 
response function for each condition were used in pair-wise contrasts. The 
presentation of the social situation and the presentation of the decision screen 
were modeled as zero-duration impulse functions. Trials on which participants 
did not respond within the 3,500-ms time frame (i.e. too late screen) were 
not included in the contrasts of interest. The first-level analyses were group 
averaged at the second level and further analyzed using one-sample t tests. 
Activation related to processing negative and positive social situations were 
examined by contrasting negative social situation > positive social situations 
and vice versa. Activation related to empathy for processing of harmful acts 
was examined by focusing on two contrasts: trials where the arrow pointed at 
the offender versus positive situations (offender > positive) and trials where the 
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arrow pointed at the victim versus positive situations (victim > positive). To test 
for differences in neural responses to offenders versus victims, we examined 
the contrasts offender > victim and victim > offender. 
We used the MarsBar toolbox in SPM8 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & 
Poline, 2002) to perform region of interest (ROI) analyses to further investigate 
patterns of activation for the three conditions and to correlate neural activation 
with the self-report scales for empathy and average prosocial behavior on the 
empathy-dictator game. ROIs were defined based on functional masks of the 
whole-brain analyses (FWE corrected, p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels) and 
were averaged across all the voxels in the cluster, resulting in a mean value per 
ROI for each condition for each participant. All brain coordinates are reported 
in MNI atlas space.
6.3 RESULTS
SELF-REPORTED EMPATHY
Mean scores on the scales of the EmQue-CA are: contagion: 2.21 (SD = .41), 
understanding: 2.54 (SD = .36), and support: 2.58 (SD = .42).
EMPATHY-DICTATOR GAME
As can be seen in figure 6.1B, participants differentiated between the offender, 
the victim and the person in the positive situations in their allocation of coins. 
The 3 (person) × 4 (choice) repeated-measures ANOVA resulted in the expected 
person × choice interaction (F 1, 32 = 366.85, p < .001; η 2 = .92). The most frequent 
allocation for the positive person was an equal (5/5) distribution of coins (Mean 
= 60.85%), whereas the most frequent allocation for the victim was a prosocial 
(6/4) distribution (Mean = 61.18%) and an unequal (2/8) distribution for the 
offender (Mean = 77.07%). These findings confirm that participants clearly 
differentiated between the different conditions. 
FMRI RESULTS: WHOLE-BRAINCONTRASTS
We first examined the contrasts offender > victim and victim > offender in order 
to investigate differences in neural activation when focusing on offenders versus 
victims in observing a social situation. These contrasts yielded no differences 
in neural activation, thus these two conditions were combined as a ‘negative 
situation’ condition. 











Next we examined the negative situation > positive situation and the 
reversed contrasts. The negative situation > positive situation contrast resulted 
in more activation in the right STS (RSTS: 51, –57, 6), the left STS (LSTS: –51, –60, 
6), the right inferior parietal lobule (RIPL: 63, –30, 33) and the left inferior parietal 
lobule (LIPL: –57, –33, 24) when observing negative acts (Figure 6.2). The reverse 
contrast of positive situation > negative situation resulted in increased activation 
in the mPFC (–3, 57, 3) and left TPJ (LTPJ: –42, –69, 30; Fig. 6.3). The coordinates 
of all peak activations in both contrasts are reported in table 6.1. 
FIGURE 6.2 | Neural responses in the contrast negative situation > positive situation showing activation 
in bilateral IPL and bilateral STS (FWE corrected at p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). b Time series 
for bilateral IPL and bilateral STS. The colored horizontal bar represents the t values. For the coordinates, 
cluster sizes and statistical values for each active cluster we refer to table 6.1. The time series are 
presented in TRs of 2.2. s, where 0 marks the onset of the stimulus presentation. Note that the activation 
pattern in IPL is showing deactivation at the onset of stimulus presentation, which is not uncommon for 
social mentalizing areas [16, 27]. LSTS = Left superior temporal sulcus; RSTS = right superior temporal 
sulcus.
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FIGURE 6.3 | (A) Neural responses in the contrast positive situation > negative situation showing 
activation in the mPFC and LTPJ (FWE corrected at p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). (B) Time series 
for vmPFC and LTPJ. The colored horizontal bar represents the t values. For the coordinates, cluster sizes 
and statistical values for each active cluster we refer to table 6.1. The time series are presented in TRs of 
2.2. s, where 0 marks the onset of the stimulus presentation. Note that the activation pattern in vmPFC 
and TPJ is showing deactivation at the onset of stimulus presentation, which is not uncommon for social 
mentalizing areas [27]. LTPJ = Left temporal parietal junction.
TABLE 6.1 | All brain coordinates based on the whole brain contrasts negative situation > positive 
situation and positive situation > negative situation (FWE corrected,  < .05; 10 contiguous voxels).
Contrast Region MNI (x, y, z) 
coordinates
Z-value Volume1 (=kE value in SPM)
All participants: negative > positive
L Superior Temporal Sulcus -51, -60, 6 6.96 213
R Superior Temporal Sulcus 51, -57, 6 5.66               23
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -57, -33, 24 6.14 91
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 63, -30, 33 5.58 28
Precuneus 24, -81, 39 5.93 19
All participants: positive > negative 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex                     -3, 57, 3 5.81 100
L Temporal Parietal Junction -42, -69, 30 5.64 33
Hippocampus -24, -21, -18 5.68 11
Cingulate Gyrus 0, -45, 36 5.58 34











FMRI RESULTS: CONNECTION BEHAVIOR AND NEURAL ACTIVATION
To test whether there was a relationship between neural activity for negative 
situation > positive situation to subsequent behavior in the dictator game, an 
average prosocial offer score (positive outcome for responder) was created by 
averaging across the percentage chosen 6/4 and 5/5 divisions for each condition 
(offender, victim, happy person) separately. Subsequently, a correlation analysis 
with neural activity in the four ROIs extracted from the contrast negative 
situation > positive situation (LSTS, RSTS, LIPL, RIPL) and average prosocial offer 
scores, separately for each condition (offender, victim, happy person), showed 
that the R was negatively related to subsequent prosocial scores when dividing 
coins with offenders (r = – .35, p < .05, not Bonferroni corrected). Thus, more 
RIPL activity was associated with less prosocial and more punishing behavior. 
The other correlations were not significant. 
Similar correlation analyses with neural activity in the two ROIs extracted 
from the contrast positive situation > negative situation (mPFC, LTPJ) and 
average prosocial and antisocial offer scores showed no relationship between 
the frequency of prosocial or antisocial offers and neural activity in mPFC or 
LTPJ.
FMRI RESULTS: SELF-REPORTED EMPATHY ANALYSIS
Next we examined the relation between neural activation in the same ROIs 
extracted from the whole-brain analyses (bilateral STS, bilateral IPL, mPFC, LTPJ) 
and empathy. For this purpose, we performed correlation analyses between the 
difference scores for the negative situation > positive situation and scores on the 
empathy scales. There was a negative correlation between neural activation in 
LSTS (for negative situation > positive situation) with empathic understanding 
(r = –.40, p < .05) and support (r = –.47, p < .01), but not for contagion. Thus, 
adolescents who reported a better understanding of others’ distress and who 
were more willing to help showed less activation in the LSTS during negative 
social interactions (involving intentional harm), whereas adolescents who 
reported lower levels of understanding and support showed more activation in 
LSTS for negative social interactions (Figure 6.4). There were no other correlations 
found. See table 6.2 for correlations among the three scales.
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FIGURE 6.4 | Correlation between neural activation in LSTS for ROI values in the contrast negative 
situation > positive situation and self-reported empathic support and understanding – ROI based on 
whole-brain analyses for the main contrast negative situation > positive situation (FWE 0.05 corrected, 
at least contiguous 10 voxels; coordinates x = –51, y = –60, z = 6; see table 6.1). LSTS = Left superior 
temporal sulcus.
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6.4 DISCUSSION
In the current study we investigated neural activation in response to viewing 
negative and positive social situations during adolescence. Specifically, we 
tested which neural regions were sensitive to witnessing harmful acts and how 
these patterns of brain activity were related to social behavior and self-reports 
of empathy. The behavioral results showed that participants treated others 
differentially during the empathy-dictator game depending on the preceding 
social behavior of the person: they acted more prosocially toward victims, 
more punishingly toward offenders and more fairly toward persons involved in 
positive social situations. These behavioral findings indicate that empathy in the 
evaluation of negative social situations, involving intentionally harmful acts and 
harmed victims, is present in adolescents (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012; 
Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
Brain regions in the mentalizing network (TPJ, STS, mPFC) were examined 
to determine whether they were more active when observing negative (harmful) 
relative to positive social situations. The imaging findings showed that stimuli 
depicting victims and offenders were both associated with stronger activation 
in bilateral STS and IPL. These findings are consistent with prior studies showing 
that these regions are involved in predicting intentional behavior, perspective 
taking and mentalizing (Bruneau, Pluta, & Saxe, 2012; Danziger, Faillenot, & 
Peyron, 2009; van der Heiden et al., 2013). The STS has not been consistently 
found in all studies that showed physically painful situations (Jackson, Brunet, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lamm, Decety, & 
Singer, 2011). Possibly, this region is sensitive to the context in which the harm-
inflicting acts occur, as Kramer et al. (2010) found that only in the case of dyadic 
interactions (as in the current study) increased STS activation was found. In the 
current study we draw attention to the actors in the situation by pointing an 
arrow and giving a short written explanation, which may have resulted in more 
mentalizing in social interactions involving intentional harm. 
In order to investigate possible individual differences in neural 
responses to harmed (victims) or harming people (offenders) in the time span of 
adolescence, we related neural activation to individual differences in empathic 
traits. We focused on the domains of empathy: contagion (affective empathy), 
understanding (cognitive empathy) and support (tendency to act prosocial) as 
distinct predictors of empathy on neural activity. We found a negative correlation 











of LSTS activity when adolescents were looking at harmful acts and self-reports 
of empathic understanding and support. The higher the understanding- and 
support-related empathy skills the less STS activity – previously been shown 
to be involved in social perception (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This finding is 
consistent with previous work showing the involvement of the STS when taking 
‘other perspective’ versus ‘self-perspective’ (van der Heiden et al., 2013). It 
is possible that adolescents with lower empathy skills are more involved in 
their own perception than in the other. The RIPL showed a similar effect, that 
is to say, more IPL activity when observing offenders was associated with less 
prosocial, more punishing, behavior, although this effect was weaker than the 
STS effect and did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Taking these 
results together, the current results suggests that STS (and IPL) may be more 
involved in thinking about intentions when observing harmful acts and this 
effect is stronger in adolescents who report lower understanding and support 
(Ruby & Decety, 2004). In future research, it will be interesting to test these 
questions using connectivity analyses, as these analyses give information about 
communication between brain regions. 
The reversed contrast of positive versus negative situations resulted in 
an increase in hemodynamic activity in the mPFC and LTPJ. This effect is consistent 
with a previous study of Morelli et al. (2012), in which they found similar regional 
activity in adults when observing pictures of happy people relative to neutral 
pictures. Morelli et al. (2012) argued that individuals interpret physical pain by 
watching a person harming another, whereas situations with a more positive 
valence require evaluating the situation as a whole. Others have suggested 
that the ventral mPFC (vmPFC) tracks reward more generally based on social 
emotional stimuli (Winecoff et al., 2013). Although the current results are in line 
with these previous findings, vmPFC activation has also been found when adults 
observed pictures of intentionally negative acts (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 
2012). However, the paradigm used in these prior studies (Decety, Michalska, & 
Kinzler, 2012) contained pictures of only body parts without showing faces. Even 
though this effect was reported for negative situations, these stimuli could still 
make an appeal on the abilities to judge and evaluate a social situation (Morelli, 
Rameson, & Lieberman, 2012). Therefore, future studies are needed to clarify 
the role mPFC and TPJ play in evaluating social stimuli. 
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Contrary to prior studies, there was no consistent activation in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula and amygdala when observing harmful 
situations. ACC activation is often linked to affective rather than cognitive 
empathy (sympathizing with someone’s pain and experiencing the pain yourself; 
Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009; Singer et al., 2004). One possibility is 
that playing the dictator game after each social situation caused participants 
to predecide while observing the social acts rather than only experiencing 
the primary impact of observing pain. Alternatively, this outcome could be 
explained by the stimuli used in the current study. The negative stimuli depict 
an intention for a harmful social act, whereas previous studies focused on the 
mirror system for experiencing pain and empathizing with pain experienced by 
another (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). Future studies should focus on the role 
of the ACC in affective and cognitive components of empathy. 
Some limitations of this study deserve further attention. First, 
the adolescents clearly differentiated in their sharing treatment of others 
depending on whether the other was a victim, an offender or a person involved 
in a positive social situation, and this behavior was consistent across trials. A 
disadvantage was that therefore it was not possible to compare social and 
antisocial responses following observation of the same social interactions 
(e.g. participants almost always punished offenders, therefore we could not 
investigate neural responses to treating the offender fairly). In addition, given 
that we used restricted choice options, the positive options (6/4 and 5/5) 
were less generous than the negative options (4/6 and 2/8), which could have 
primed participants to make more greedy choices. Second, the sample size was 
relatively small with an unequal division between boys and girls, which impacted 
our power to investigate the unique contribution of gender to empathic abilities. 
Considering developmental trajectories of girls (13-18 years old) scoring high on 
both affective and cognitive empathy (Van der Graaff et al., 2014), it would be 
interesting for future research to investigate to what extent empathic abilities 
are mediated by gender differences. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
investigate the predictive role of age in combination with specific, context-
dependent and individual empathic abilities for prosocial behavior. In order 
to detect age-related changes, future longitudinal studies should examine 
whether these relations are based on trait versus state characteristics and their 
stability patterns across adolescence (Lindenberger, von Oertzen, Ghisletta, & 
Hertzog, 2011). 











Taken together, our findings highlight the involvement of social brain 
networks when observing negative (IPL and STS) and positive social situations 
(mPFC and TPJ) during adolescence. The neural correlates of empathy are 
important for understanding the mechanisms underlying the development 
of social behavior during this period (Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2011). 
Our findings emphasize an important role of individual differences in empathy 
at the social and neural levels of social cognition. Clearly, future studies that 
examine the impact of accidental harmful acts (Akitsuki & Decety, 2009; Decety 
& Michalska, 2010; Decety, Michalska, & Akitsuki, 2008), gossiping or social 
exclusion (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011) may further our understanding 
of empathy and social pain. The current study provides a first step in this direction.
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6.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
FIGURE S6.1 | Neural activation in the rostral ACC (3, 45, –3, 17 voxels, Z = 3.84) in the contrast negative 
situation > positive situation with the support subscale as regressor ( < .001 uncorrected, at least 10 
contiguous voxels). No other clusters were detected for this contrast.
FIGURE S6.2 | Neural activation in the dorsal ACC (–9, –12, 42, 10 voxels, Z = 3.55) in the contrast positive 
situation > negative situation with the support subscale as regressor ( < .001 uncorrected, at least 10 
contiguous voxels). No other clusters were detected for this contrast.
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Chapter 7: 
Summary & Discussion
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7.1  ADOLESCENCE AS AN IMPORTANT PERIOD FOR 
GAINING MATURE SOCIAL GOALS
The general aim of this dissertation was to investigate developmental changes 
and individual differences in social reorientation during adolescence on a 
behavioral and neural level, with a specific focus on empathy. More specifically, 
the studies described in this dissertation focused on: stability, change, and 
individual differences in the neural correlates of reading the mind in the eyes 
in a longitudinal sample (10-19 year olds) (Chapter 2), stability, change, and 
individual differences in reward processing in a longitudinal sample (10-25 year 
olds) (Chapter 3), the self-report assessment of empathy in adolescence in 
relation to social interactions with peers (10-15 year olds) (Chapter 4), empathic 
concern in the behavioral evaluation of fairness (8-13 year olds and 18-25 year 
olds) (Chapter 5), and neural correlates of empathic concern in the evaluation 
of positive and negative social interactions (12-19 year olds) (Chapter 6).
 The studies in this thesis were inspired by research showing that during 
adolescence social reorientation takes place, which enhances the importance 
of social skills as social networks with peers become central elements in the 
adolescent’s life. The key question of this dissertation is: how social decision-
making processes of adolescents are related to developmental changes and/
or on individual differences in empathic concern.
7.2  NEURODEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN READING 
MENTAL STATES AND IN RISK-TAKING:  
A LONGITUDINAL APPROACH
Over the last decennia, fMRI research has been performed in order to unravel the 
complex functions of the brain and to get a more profound understanding of the 
development of specific brain regions, their connectivity, and their relationship 
with for example hormonal changes. Some researchers have classified the brain 
by nodes (detection node, affective node, and cognitive-regulatory node) to 
describe how brain regions are involved in and interact during social information 
processing (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). Other theories have 
made distinctions between cognitive and affective systems (purportedly 
cortically and subcortically regulated) to indicate how the development of 












specific regions are involved in adequate or non-adequate social-emotional 
functioning (Ernst & Fudge, 2009; Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010; Steinberg 
et al., 2008). Decety and Meyer (2008) proposed the involvement of biological 
processes (MNS) in the perception of actions, and how this relates to processing 
information about emotions of self, versus emotions of others (Decety & 
Meyer, 2008). These neurodevelopmental theories were the starting points 
for examining developmental changes and individual differences in social 
reorientation and the role of empathy. 
 The study in Chapter 2 described a longitudinal study (two-years 
interval) on mentalizing (i.e. reasoning about mental states of others; Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). In this study, adolescents 
performed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task in which they were asked 
to indicate the mental state of the person presented in the picture, in which 
only the eye region of faces was shown (mental state condition). The control 
condition that was included in the RMET contained the same pictures as in the 
mental state condition, though in the control condition participants were asked 
to indicate gender (man or woman) and age (younger than 60 or older than 60) 
based on the following choice options: younger male, younger female, older 
male, and older female. 
 Behavioral results showed that the percentage correct trials was high 
in both early adolescents (10-14 years old) and mid-to-late adolescents (15-19 
years old), and that the percentage correct trials at the first measurement was 
correlated with the percentage correct trials at the second measurement. This 
indicates that from the age of 10, adolescents are already able to read mental 
states of others based on only the eye region of faces, and that individuals who 
performed well at the first time point also performed well at the second time 
point two years later. Mentalizing is a higher order form of Theory of Mind and 
helps in predicting goal directed behavior of others by taking the perspective of 
others and by reasoning about their mental state. Since predicting intentional 
behavior of others helps in understanding a social situation, it could also help in 
social interactions with peers. Therefore, it would be interesting to test in future 
research whether high performers on the RMET (high percentage correct trials 
in the mental state condition), report higher quality of friendships and have 
higher popularity ratings according to peers.
 On a neural level, the longitudinal study on reading the mind in the 
eyes demonstrated activity in bilateral superior temporal sulcus (STS), bilateral 
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inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral temporal pole, and dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex (dmPFC) for the whole brain contrast (mental state versus control). 
These regions are part of both the detection node (STS, temporal poles, 
IFG), and the cognitive-regulation node (dmPFC) of the SIPN model (Nelson, 
Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). Of these areas, the right STS and the right 
IFG showed stability within individuals over time. The right STS only showed 
stability in the mental state condition, whereas the right IFG showed stability for 
both the mental state and the control condition. This indicates that the regions 
important for detecting emotions from the eyes are relatively stable within 
adolescents, which is in line with performance on the task at both time points. 
Yet, although the right IFG showed stability over time, an age-related decrease 
was found as well. 
 In the dmPFC, a quadratic as well as a linear decrease age-effect was 
found for mental state reasoning. These findings suggest that the activity 
patterns of the two regions in the PFC (right IFG and dmPFC), which are important 
role in mentalizing, change over time. The ongoing maturation of this area in 
combination with gaining experience and becoming an independent adult could 
indicate a possible strategy shift in how adolescents read mental states. 
The ventral striatum (VS) is part of the affective node of to the Social Information 
Processing model (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005), which is often 
involved in processing rewards. Besides the involvement of the VS in receiving 
rewards, the VS is also involved when taking risks in the presence of peers and 
during positive social interactions (Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou, & Decety, 2010 ipv 
Chein et al., 2010; Guyer et al., 2008). 
 In the study presented in Chapter 3, participants played a gambling task 
presented as a slot machine. The paradigm consisted of 2 conditions: a high-
risk condition (a winning chance of 66%), and a low-risk condition (a winning 
chance of 33%). On each trial, the participant had the option to play (chance of 
winning or losing 10 Eurocents) and to pass (no gain or loss). On a behavioral 
level, both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal study showed that all 
individuals took more risks in the low-risk than the high risk condition, but age, 
puberty (Petersen, Crockett, Richards, & Boxer, 1988), and scores on the BAS 
scales (Drive, Fun-seeking, and Reward-responsiveness; Carver & White, 1994) 
were not related to risk-taking behavior as measured by the amount of ‘play’-
decisions. 












 On a neural level, both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal study 
described in Chapter 3 underlined the involvement of the VS in response 
to rewards, together with medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activity. For the 
reversed contrast (loss versus gain) no activity was shown. In contrast to what 
was hypothesized beforehand, no peak in VS activation was found around mid-
adolescence (Casey, Getz, & Galván, 2008; Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; 
Paus, 2005; Sowell et al., 2003; Steinberg, 2008; Steinberg, 2010). Although 
previous research on the dual systems model described that mid-adolescence 
is a representative period during which most risk-taking and sensation-seeking 
behavior is most prominently present, some contradictory findings have been 
reported as well (Willoughby, Good, Adachi, Hamza, & Tavernier, 2013). For 
example, some studies showed that risk-taking behavior increases linearly 
during adolescence instead of peaking around mid-adolescence (Hooshmand, 
Willoughby, & Good, 2012). In addition, peaks in risk-taking can occur later 
than during mid-adolescence, for example, substance use has been found 
to increase when adolescents are around 17/18 years old. Hooshmand and 
colleagues (2012) explained this high level of risk-taking in late adolescents, 
by the fact that it is legal to buy alcohol from the age of 18, which increases the 
opportunity to drink alcohol. Additionally, the transition to College/University 
can stimulate the alcohol use since drinking is socially accepted at Colleges and 
Universities and an easy way to meet new people and bond with them (Connor, 
Psutka, Cousins, Gray, & Kypri, 2013). However, others have found that pubertal 
development is an important predictor for initiating alcohol use, which is often 
interpreted as a biological influence on risk-taking behavior (De Water, Braams, 
Crone, & Peper, 2013). Thus, more longitudinal research with larger samples is 
necessary to examine the separate influences of biological and environmental 
factors in risk-taking behavior and neural responses to risk and reward. 
 Interestingly, risk-taking behavior as measured by choosing to play 
in both high-risk and low-risk trials was positively related to activation in the 
VS and the mPFC (gain versus loss). The propensity to play was also related 
to increased connectivity between the left VS and the right anterior insula 
(AI). Furthermore, there was a relationship between VS activation and self-
reported fun seeking. Increased activation in the VS was positively related to 
high scores on the fun seeking scale of the BAS, which indicates that processing 
gain or loss is sensitive to individual differences. This finding was reinforced 
by the longitudinal comparison, which showed that changes in fun-seeking 
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scores were correlated with change in brain activation. In other words, those 
adolescents who showed an increase in fun seeking over time also showed an 
increase in VS activation over time. Moreover, those adolescents who showed a 
decrease in fun seeking over time also showed a decrease in VS activation over 
time. Together, these results highlight that the affective node of the SIPN model 
is sensitive to individual differences in states. These findings may also indicate 
why developmental differences are not consistently reported across studies. In 
some studies, the selected adolescents may have a different high risk-taking 
propensity in real-life than other adolescents, and this may explain individual 
differences in VS activation (Galván, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2007).
7.3  EMPATHY DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE:  
A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH
Empathic abilities have been measured in multiple ways, for example by 
observational research (Ketelaar, Rieffe, Wiefferink, & Frijns, 2013), behavioral 
tasks (e.g. bargaining games) (Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000), and questionnaires 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Hawk et al., 2013). Yet, there 
are still controversies about how empathy should be measured. In Chapter 4, 
the validation of a new empathy questionnaire was described: the Empathy 
Questionnaire for children and adolescents (EmQue-CA), which was validated 
in over a thousand children and adolescents aged 10-15 years old. The EmQue-
CA contains three scales: 1) Affective Empathy (which measures the ability to 
share feelings of others), 2) Cognitive Empathy (which measures the ability to 
understand the emotional state of others), and 3) Support (which measures the 
tendency to act prosocially towards others). Factor analyses confirmed that 
the scales of the EmQue-CA measure three concepts that have found to be 
important for social cognitive development. High scores on the scales were 
related positively to high friendship quality, and negatively to bullying behavior. 
Although the EmQue-CA has proven to be a valid and reliable empathy 
measurement, this was not the first measurement on empathic abilities 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). 
The concepts affective and cognitive empathy have been measured before, 
therefore the Emque-CA differentiates itself particularly by the inclusion of a 
scale measuring the tendency to act prosocial (Support). 












In Chapter 5, prosocial acts were examined using an experimental approach, 
that is, by using a bargaining game. The behavioral study described in Chapter 
5 examined fairness considerations by using a hidden version of the Ultimatum 
Game (UG)  with  varying  amounts of coins in children aged 8-13 and adults 
aged 18-25. The hidden UG game consisted of two conditions: 1) a complete 
condition, in which all coins were visible to both players (participant is the 
proposer), 2) a hidden condition, in which one part of the coins was only visible 
to the proposer (participant) but not to the responder. The hidden condition 
allowed investigating strategic versus altruistic behavior, i.e. making a truly fair 
split (altruistic) by offering the hidden coins as well or making a seemingly fair 
split (strategic) by only offering coins that are visible to the other.
 The results described in Chapter 5 showed that already the youngest 
children (8/9 years old) showed strategic behavior, as they offered fewer coins 
to the other player in case of a hidden condition compared to the complete 
condition. Furthermore, there was a general age related increase in offering 
coins to the other player. However, an age x condition interaction showed that 
in the complete condition relative to the hidden condition, adults offered more 
coins than young children (strategic altruistic behavior). These findings are 
interpreted as a strategic decrease in self-interest during late childhood and 
into adolescence and adulthood. 
  This finding could be explained by the development of cognitive 
empathic abilities. A correlation analysis with self-report empathy showed 
that perspective taking was related to the amount of coins divided to the other 
player in the hidden condition, and this cognitive empathy skill mediated the 
relationship between age and strategic behavior in the hidden condition trials. 
A prior developmental study also showed that during adolescence individuals 
become strategically altruistic rather than general altruistic with increasing 
age, (Meuwese, Crone, Güroğlu, in press), which is consistent with the current 
findings. 
 The increase with age in strategic acts toward the other player, could 
also be explained or at least strengthened by the relationship between the 
participant and the other player. Previous studies demonstrated that empathy 
for a stranger is significantly lower than for a friend, which could enhance the 
strategic acts in the hidden UG described in Chapter 5 as the other player is 
no acquaintance, friend or family of the participant (Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou, & 
Decety, 2010; Meyer et al., 2013). This emphasizes the importance of including 
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the role of context, especially the relationships with the person(s) in that 
context as this could be of influence on individuals and their behavior (Güroğlu, 
Van den Bos, & Crone, 2014).
In Chapter 6, several measurements were combined in a newly developed 
empathy-dictator game (EDG). This new task had the function to measure the 
willingness of adolescents to help victims by allocating coins to them at their 
own expense. The EDG was combined with neural measurements and self-
report empathy using the newly developed EmQue-CA. 
 In the EDG, adolescents (12-19 year olds) were instructed to observe 
social pictures. In each picture, a social situation was presented: a positive 
situation containing happy people or a negative situation containing a victim 
and an offender in which the offender inflicted pain intentionally to the victim. 
Besides a picture of the situation, a sentence was added for clarification, and an 
arrow was pointed to one of the persons in the pictures (either a happy person, 
a victim or an offender). Subsequently, adolescents were asked to divide coins 
between themselves and the other person (a happy person, a victim or an 
offender). Adolescents had four options to choose from: 1) a prosocial option 
(6 for the other person and 4 for the participant), 2) a fair option (fair split), 3) a 
slightly unfair option (4 for the other person and 6 for the participant), and 4) an 
unfair option (2 for the other person and 8 for the participant).
 The EDG was intended to measure whether the division adolescents 
selected based on the condition (victim, offender or happy), was dependent 
on individual differences (i.e. self-reported empathic abilities). As expected, 
participants offered fair splits (5/5 divisions) to happy people, unfair divisions 
(2/8) to offenders, and prosocial divisions (6/4) to the victims. However, the 
results also showed that adolescents did not show variation in their choices, 
as all adolescents acted prosocially toward victims (6/4 or 5/5 division), fair 
toward happy people (5/5 division), and punishing toward offenders (4/6 or 
2/8 division). This seems to indicate that they were treating each trial within 
the same condition similarly. All pictures in the negative situations (victim and 
offender conditions) showed physical pain inflicting situations, though each 
picture contained different people (adolescents in the same age range as the 
participants). A possible explanation for the high consistency in chosen divisions 
for the negative situations could be morality. Morality can be explained as 
the ability to indicate if something/someone is (acting) fair, justified and in 












correspondence to universal social rules. By complying with moral codes, 
decision-making becomes influenced, as rules about how to behave in 
social groups become the norm (Decety & Cowell, 2014). The negative social 
situations could be judged on being morally right or wrong, and depending on 
the condition (victim or offender) the adolescent could select the most socially 
accepted division (mostly 6/4 for the victim and 2/8 for the offender). It will 
be interesting in future research to examine these divisions in adolescents 
who have difficulty to applying to social norms, such as in adolescents with 
oppositional behavior or conduct disorder (White, Brislin, Meffert, Sinclair, & 
Blair, 2013). 
The neural activation patterns showed that viewing negative (i.e., harm 
inflicting) situations was associated with increased activation in the STS and IPL, 
regions previously associated with detection of important social information. In 
contrast, viewing positive (i.e., happy) situations was associated with increased 
activation in the medial PFC and TPJ, regions previously associated with 
spontaneous mentalizing and perspective taking. Prior studies also reported 
activation in this same network when individuals were asked to observe or 
judge a social situation (Van der Heiden et al., 2013). In addition, the findings are 
also consistent with previous studies investigating moral development (Decety, 
Michalska, & Akitsuki, 2008), and with studies on mentalizing (Gunther Moor et 
al., 2012, see also Chapter 2). Considering that the conditions were quite clear 
as being morally right, neutral or wrong, it is likely that judging whether a social 
situation is morally right or wrong activates the detection node of the brain, 
including the bilateral STS and bilateral IPL.
A further goal of this study was to relate these neural patterns to 
individual differences in self-reported empathy. Therefore, all participants 
filled in the three subscales of the Empathy Questionnaire for children and 
adolescents (EmQue-CA): affective empathy (Contagion), cognitive empathy 
(Understanding), and the tendency to act prosocial (Support) described in 
Chapter 4. Scores on the EmQue-CA were examined in relation to neural 
activation in response to negative social situations (bilateral IPL and bilateral 
STS) and neural activation in response to positive social situations (TPJ and 
mPFC). The results showed that individual differences in cognitive empathy 
and tendency to act prosocial were negatively related to activation in the left 
STS when viewing negative situations. These findings suggest that individuals 
with high empathy show less activation in the detection node of the brain when 
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viewing negative social situations. There were no other regions that showed a 
positive relation with self-report empathy. In a prior study, Molenberghs and 
colleagues (2014) described a positive relationship between perspective taking 
and activation in the right STS when punishing in- and out-group members in 
adults. Therefore, the role of empathic abilities in social interactions should be 
further investigated in order to understand how individual differences could play 
a role in social situations. Possibly, the role of empathy is different depending on 
age; future research should examine individual differences in empathy across 
different stages of development using various social information processing 
paradigms. 
7.4  CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS
In general, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of stability 
and change in social reorientation during adolescence with a specific focus on 
individual differences in empathy. The following section will discuss the future 
directions based on the strengths and the limitations of the studies in order to 
further improve our understanding of developmental changes and individual 
differences in social reorientation and empathic concern and their relation with 
social behavior from a brain and behavioral perspective.
 The first strength of this thesis is the use of longitudinal designs 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Longitudinal research is an effective method to test for 
subtle changes in development. By tracking individuals over a longer period of 
time, the development of social and cognitive abilities can be investigated. This 
eliminates the possibility that developmental differences that are observed are 
due to cohort differences, because the same individuals participate at different 
time points, and it allows for the possibility to test for traits (i.e., behavior and 
brain responses showing high stability over time) versus states (i.e., behavior 
and brain responses showing high variability over time). Finally, longitudinal 
studies allow for the possibility to predict outcomes in behavior based on 
brain assessment earlier in time (Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Galván, 2014). 
However, it should be noted that the studies presented in this thesis are parts 
of the first set of longitudinal studies using fMRI, the sample sizes are relatively 
limited and the number of repetitions is limited to two sessions. Future studies 












should apply this method in larger samples and follow individuals over longer 
periods. The studies presented here show feasibility of this approach. 
 The second strength of this study is the use of multi-method 
assessments of the same construct. By the combination of experimental tasks, 
neural measures, and self-report indices it is possibly to get a more detailed 
view of the development of social reorientation. For example, in Chapter 6 a 
new experimental paradigm was presented, which was developed based on 
behavioral research (Chapter 5) and a thorough validation of a new questionnaire 
(Chapter 4). This combination of measurements is expected to provide more 
insight in commonalities and unique contributions of different measurement 
methods. 
 This approach was applied in a relatively restricted age group (12-19 
year olds). In future research, it will be important to use these multi-method 
perspectives in larger samples of various ages. In addition, Future research will 
benefit from making use of latent class analyses, which can be used to create 
groups based on specific characteristics that allow us to make predictions. This 
is especially relevant for an individually varying ability like empathy such as 
oppositional disorders or conduct disorder (White et al., 2013).
 Taken together, this thesis demonstrates that a multi-method approach 
combining self-report, behavior and neural activation gives new insight in 
social reorientation in adolescence and the different aspects of empathy. 
Future research can benefit from the presented studies by applying it to a 
more detailed analysis of individual differences in this important period in life, 
which may help to explain why some adolescents are successful in developing 
social competencies and relationships, whereas others experience difficulties. 
Eventually, this may lead to the development of interventions for youth who do 
not cope well with the social requirements from the environments, and help to 
improve their lives and the lives of the individuals around them. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Inleiding De adolescentie is een van de belangrijkste overgangsfases in ons leven 
en wordt gekenmerkt door de vele veranderingen die plaatsvinden op neuraal-, 
hormonaal- en sociaal-emotioneel vlak (Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore, 
Burnett, & Dahl, 2010). Sociale heroriëntatie is een essentieel onderdeel 
van deze veranderingen en houdt in dat er een verschuiving plaatsvindt wat 
betreft de sociale omgeving. Bij de transitie naar de adolescentie nemen 
leeftijdsgenoten namelijk een steeds prominentere plaats in en verdwijnt de 
invloed van ouders steeds verder naar de achtergrond (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; 
Steinberg et al., 2008). Relaties met leeftijdsgenoten worden steeds hechter en 
er worden vaak nieuwe vriendschappen gevormd, zowel op platonisch als op 
romantisch vlak (Selman, 1980). Het aangaan van relaties kan zorgen voor een 
toename in risicogedrag om zo aan de normen van een groep te voldoen, maar 
het kan ook zorgen voor een toename in zelfvertrouwen door de emotionele 
wederkerigheid die er ontstaat (Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 2013). Deze 
nieuwe ervaringen gaan hand in hand met de ontwikkeling van zelfbewustzijn, 
waardoor adolescenten zich steeds meer bewust worden van hun omgeving, 
hun eigen emoties en het besef dat hun gedrag door leeftijdsgenoten wordt 
beoordeeld (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Somerville et al., 2013). De transformatie 
die plaatsvindt tijdens deze roerige periode stelt de adolescent in staat om uit 
te groeien tot een onafhankelijk en zelfstandig individu (Brown, 2004). 
 Dit proefschrift heeft als doel om in kaart te brengen welke sociale 
vaardigheden nodig zijn om het proces van sociale heroriëntatie op een efficiënte 
wijze te kunnen doorlopen, waarbij de focus ligt op de neurale-, hormonale- 
en sociaal-emotionele ontwikkeling. Om dit proces te kunnen verklaren 
wordt in dit proefschrift getracht antwoord te geven op de volgende vragen: 
1) hoe ontwikkelen hersengebieden die betrokken zijn bij sociale heroriëntatie 
gedurende de adolescentie, 2) wat is de rol van individuele verschillen en 3) wat 
is de rol van hormonale veranderingen. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk beschrijft een longitudinale studie naar de neurale 
correlaten betrokken bij het verwerken van sociale informatie. Binnen deze 
studie is gebruik gemaakt van verschillende methodes waarmee subtiele 
veranderingen, stabiliteit en individuele verschillen op zowel gedragsmatig als 
neuraal niveau zijn gemeten. De vaardigheid om intenties af te lezen op basis 











van iemands emoties speelt een belangrijke rol bij sociale interacties. Op de 
vraag of dit vermogen al volledig is ontwikkeld tijdens de kindertijd of dat er 
nog subtiele veranderingen plaatsvinden tijdens de adolescentie kon tot nu toe 
nog geen antwoord worden gegeven. Met de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 
2 is onderzocht in hoeverre het aflezen van iemands emotie al is ontwikkeld 
op 10 jarige leeftijd en hoe deze vaardigheid zich ontwikkelt gedurende de 
adolescentie. Dit is onderzocht bij 32 adolescenten (10-19 jaar) aan de hand 
van de Reading the Mind in the Eyes taak (RMET). Deze taak liet foto’s zien 
van emotionele gezichten van zowel mannen als vrouwen waarbij alleen de 
ogen zichtbaar waren. In de experimentele conditie (mentale staat conditie) 
werd onder de foto een viertal antwoordmogelijkheden gegeven in de vorm 
van emotioneel geladen woorden (bijvoorbeeld: blij, verrast, verbaasd en 
bang), waaruit deelnemers een antwoord moesten kiezen waarmee de af te 
lezen emotie het best kon worden omschreven. In de controle conditie (leeftijd/
gender conditie) konden deelnemers kiezen uit de antwoordmogelijkheden: 
jongere man (jonger dan 60), jongere vrouw, oudere man (ouder dan 60 jaar) 
en oudere vrouw. 
 De gedragsresultaten voor de mentale staat conditie liet stabiliteit 
over tijd zien; een hoog percentage goede antwoorden op meting een hing 
samen met een hoog percentage goede antwoorden op meting twee. Hieruit 
kunnen we concluderen dat niet leeftijd, maar individuele verschillen tussen 
adolescenten van invloed zijn op het verwerken en op de juiste manier labelen 
van emoties. 
 Op neuraal niveau liet deze studie zien dat de linker en rechter superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), de linker en rechter inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), de linker 
en rechter temporal pole en de dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) werden 
geactiveerd tijdens de mentale staat conditie (hoofdeffect mentale staat versus 
controle). Deze gebieden zijn onderdeel van de detectie ‘node’ (STS, temporal 
poles, IFG; belangrijk bij het detecteren en verwerken van emoties) en de 
cognitieve ‘node’ (dmPFC; belangrijk bij het redeneren over iemands emoties) 
van het sociale informatie verwerking model (SIPN-model; Nelson, Leibenluft, 
McClure, & Pine, 2005). 
 Van de gebieden die actief werden tijdens het aflezen van de mentale 
staat lieten alleen de rechter STS en de rechter IFG stabiliteit zien over tijd 
(op basis van ROIs). Uit deze resultaten kan worden geconcludeerd dat de 
rechter STS, een gebied belangrijk bij het detecteren van de emotionele staat 
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van anderen, en de rechter IFG, een gebied met meerdere functies waaronder 
taalverwerking en sociaal begrip, een rol spelen bij het aflezen van emoties en 
dat deze gebieden relatief stabiel zijn binnen de adolescentie. Deze bevinding 
komt overeen met de bevindingen op gedragsniveau waaruit bleek dat de 
prestaties op de RMET stabiel bleven over de tijd.
 Hoewel de mogelijkheid om iemands emotie af te lezen al is ontwikkeld 
op 10-jarige leeftijd, kunnen subtiele veranderingen als gevolg van hormonale 
veranderingen, veranderingen in de structuur van het brein en omgevingsfactoren 
van invloed zijn op de sociale cognitie. De dmPFC liet zowel een kwadratisch als 
een lineair leeftijdseffect zien voor de mentale staat conditie, wat suggereert 
dat dit gebied een belangrijke rol speelt bij het aflezen van iemands mentale 
staat maar ook dat dit gebied een verandering laat zien over de tijd. De rijping 
van dit gebied in combinatie met het opdoen van ervaring met het aflezen van 
emoties zou mogelijk kunnen duiden op een strategie verschuiving gedurende 
de adolescentie, wat deze subtiele leeftijdsverandering zou kunnen verklaren. 
Toekomstig onderzoek is nodig om deze verklaring te ondersteunen.
In hoofdstuk 3 worden een cross-sectionele (75 deelnemers, 10-25 jaar) en 
een longitudinale studie (31 deelnemers, 10-19 jaar) gecombineerd waarin de 
relatie tussen beloningsverwerking en puberteit van jongens en meisjes is 
onderzocht. Het doel van deze studies was om te onderzoeken of activatie in 
het ventrale striatum (VS; beloningsgebied; onderdeel van de affectieve ‘node’) 
in reactie op beloning toeneemt met leeftijd en of er individuele verschillen 
zijn wat betreft activatie in dit gebied op basis van sensatie zoekend gedrag 
(zelfrapportage).  
 De taak waarmee beloningsverwerking is gemeten is de ‘Jackpot taak’, 
een gok taak gepresenteerd als een fruitmachine. De taak bestond uit twee 
condities: 1) een ‘hoog-risico’ conditie (66% kans om te winnen) en 2) een 
‘laag-risico’ conditie (33% kans om te winnen). Bij ieder nieuw spel (trial) kreeg 
de deelnemer de optie om te spelen met de kans om te winnen of te verliezen 
of om te ‘passen’ waarbij de deelnemer niks won of verloor. Op gedragsniveau 
namen alle deelnemers in zowel de cross-sectionele als in de longitudinale 
studie meer risico bij de ‘laag-risico’ conditie ten opzichte van de ‘hoog-risico’ 
conditie. Leeftijd, puberteit en scores op de BAS schalen (Drive, Fun-seeking, and 
Reward-responsiveness; Carver & White, 1994) lieten overigens geen relatie zien 
met risicogedrag gemeten aan de hand van de hoeveelheid gespeelde spellen. 











 Op neuraal niveau lieten deelnemers, in zowel de cross-sectionele als in 
de longitudinale studie, activatie in de VS en de mPFC zien in reactie op beloning 
gemeten met de ‘Jackpot taak’ voor het contrast winst versus verlies. Activatie 
in de VS en mPFC was ook positief gerelateerd aan risicogedrag gemeten aan de 
hand van het aantal keuzes om te spelen in zowel high-risk als low-risk condities 
(winst versus verlies). Deze keuze om te spelen was ook gerelateerd aan de 
connectiviteit tussen de linker VS en de rechter anterior insula (AI). Behalve een 
relatie tussen gedrag op de taak en activatie in de beloningsgebieden, is er ook 
een positieve relatie gevonden tussen fun-seeking (zelfrapportage) en de VS, 
wat erop duidt dat er individuele verschillen zijn in het verwerking van beloning 
en verlies. Het omgekeerde contrast (verlies versus winst) liet overigens geen 
activatie zien in VS of mPFC.
 De resultaten van de studies beschreven in dit hoofdstuk dragen bij aan 
ons begrip van de mechanismen die de basis vormen voor beloningsverwerking 
en het nemen van risicovolle besluiten in de adolescentie. Toekomstige 
uitdagingen liggen in het uitzoeken hoe specifieke gebieden in het brein 
(inclusief connectiviteit tussen verschillende gebieden) gerelateerd zijn aan 
risicogedrag tijdens de adolescentie en in het creëren van taken die gevoelig 
zijn voor individuele en ontwikkelingsverschillen bij de neiging tot het nemen 
van risico’s.
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de evaluatie van een nieuw ontwikkelde vragenlijst naar 
empathie: de empathie vragenlijst voor kinderen en adolescenten (Empathy 
Questionairre for Children and Adolescents; EmQue-CA). De validatie van 
deze vragenlijst is gedaan bij 1262 kinderen en adolescenten tussen de 10 en 
15 jaar. De vragenlijst onderzoekt drie verschillende aspecten van empathie: 
affectieve empathie, cognitieve empathie en prosociale motivatie. Affectieve 
empathie houdt in dat je je kunt inleven in andermans emoties en dat je met een 
ander persoon kunt meevoelen. Met cognitieve empathie wordt het vermogen 
bedoeld om jezelf te verplaatsen in de ander, waarbij je de emoties van de 
ander begrijpt. Prosociale motivatie houdt de neiging in om een ander zonder 
eigenbelang van hulp te voorzien. Behalve de validatie van de EmQue-CA wordt 
in hoofdstuk 4 ook beschreven hoe empathische vaardigheden samenhangen 
met positieve en negatieve aspecten van sociale interacties. 
 Resultaten hebben aangetoond dat de nieuw ontwikkelde empathie 
vragenlijst voor kinderen een adolescenten een betrouwbare en valide zelf-
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rapportage maat is om empathie te meten. Hoewel de EmQue-CA een goede 
maat is gebleken, is dit niet de eerste vragenlijst die empathische vaardigheden 
meet (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Jolliffe & Farrington, 
2006). Hetgeen waarin de EmQue-CA  zich onderscheid van eerdere vragenlijsten 
is de toevoeging van een derde schaal waarmee de neiging tot het vertonen van 
prosociaal gedrag (prosociale motivatie) kan worden gemeten. Daarnaast heeft de 
EmQue-CA als voordeel dat deze toegankelijk is voor jonge kinderen en klinische 
groepen vanwege het eenvoudige en op deze doelgroepen afgestemde taalgebruik.
 Behalve dat de vragenlijst een goede maat is om de aspecten affectieve 
empathie, cognitieve empathie en prosociale motivatie te meten, is ook gebleken dat 
de drie concepten samenhangen met maten voor sociaal cognitieve ontwikkeling. 
Het feit dat alle drie de schalen gerelateerd zijn aan een hogere vriendschap kwaliteit 
(Friendship Quality Scale; FSQ) en minder pestgedrag (Olweus Bully/Victimization 
Questionnaire; OBVQ), suggereert dat alle drie de aspecten van empathie elkaar 
aanvullen en evenredig van belang zijn bij het in stand houden van goede sociale 
relaties. Deze resultaten bevestigen de uitkomsten van eerdere studies waarin is 
gevonden dat empathie is gerelateerd aan betere sociale competenties en meer 
prosociaal gedrag (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991; Güroğlu, van 
Lieshout, Haselager, & Scholte, 2007; McMahon, Wernsman, & Parnes, 2006; 
Oberle, Schonert-Reichl, & Thomson, 2010).
 Met de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 demonstreren we behalve een 
goed geëvalueerde vragenlijst ook sterke links tussen empathie en positieve en 
negatieve aspecten van sociale interacties. Dit is zeer relevant voor de leeftijdsgroep 
waar de EmQue-CA voor is bedoeld, aangezien interacties met leeftijdsgenoten 
cruciaal zijn bij de sociale en morele ontwikkeling. Behalve dat de EmQue-CA 
bijdraagt aan de bestaande literatuur, dient dit paper ook als voorbereiding op 
hoofdstuk 6 waarin externe maten aan de EmQue-CA worden gerelateerd.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een gedragsstudie beschreven waarin is onderzocht wat 
de rol is van motivatie (strategisch versus altruïstisch) bij het onderhandelen 
over de verdeling van munten door middel van een Ultimatum Game (UG). Een 
Ultimatum Game is een munten-verdeelspel waarbij de verdeler een voorstel 
doet aan een ontvanger over de verdeling van een bepaald aantal munten (10 
in dit onderzoek). De ontvanger kan het bod accepteren, waarbij de munten 
worden verdeeld zoals voorgesteld, of afwijzen, wat als gevolg heeft dat beide 
partijen geen munten ontvangen. 











 In het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 speelden deelnemers 
tussen de 8 en 25 jaar twee soorten Ultimatum Games: 1) normale UG conditie: 
spellen waarbij alle munten zichtbaar waren voor zowel de verdeler (deelnemer) 
als de ontvanger en 2) verborgen UG conditie: spellen waarbij een deel van de 
munten alleen zichtbaar was voor de verdeler. De verborgen UG conditie bood 
deelnemers de mogelijkheid om een echt eerlijke (altruïstische) verdeling te 
maken door zowel de zichtbare als de onzichtbare munten met de andere 
speler (ontvanger) te delen of om een schijnbaar eerlijke verdeling (strategisch) 
te maken door alleen de voor beide partijen zichtbare munten te verdelen. De 
hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek was of deelnemers strategisch of altruïstisch 
zouden handelen wanneer een deel van de munten niet zichtbaar is voor de 
andere partij en hoe deze vaardigheden zich ontwikkelen met leeftijd. 
 Om te meten welke motivationele aspecten belangrijk zijn bij het 
maken van een verdeling, is gebruik gemaakt van een munten-verdeelspel. 
De motivationele aspecten die kunnen worden onderscheiden zijn: 1) handelen 
vanuit eigenbelang en 2) handelen vanuit het belang van de ander (Van Dijk & 
Vermunt, 2000). Om dit te kunnen meten is er in dit onderzoek een zelfrapportage 
maat voor cognitieve empathie (begrijpen van de emoties van een ander en 
je hierin kunnen verplaatsen) meegenomen (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; 
IRI; Davis, 1980). Er is namelijk aangetoond dat er individuele verschillen zijn 
in de mate waarin iemand het perspectief van de ander kan innemen en dat 
deze vaardigheden veranderen met leeftijd (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Takagishi et 
al., 2010). Om die reden wilden we testen of volwassenen hoger scoorden op 
cognitieve empathie dan kinderen en of volwassen meer altruïstische motieven 
hadden om te kiezen voor een eerlijke verdeling.
 De resultaten beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat de jongste 
kinderen (8-9 jaar) al in staat zijn om te handelen vanuit een strategische motivatie, 
aangezien ze minder munten aanboden aan de ontvanger in de verborgen UG 
conditie vergeleken met de normale UG conditie. Verder lieten de uitkomsten 
een interactie tussen leeftijd en conditie zien; volwassenen (18-25 jaar) boden 
meer munten in de normale UG conditie dan jonge kinderen (8-9 jaar). Deze 
bevindingen kunnen geïnterpreteerd worden als een toename in strategisch 
altruïstisch gedrag met leeftijd, aangezien het aantal voorgestelde munten 
alleen toenam met leeftijd bij de normale UG conditie en bij de verborgen UG 
conditie. Dit gedrag kunnen we verklaren vanuit de ontwikkeling van cognitieve 
empathie. Een correlatie analyse met zelf gerapporteerde cognitieve empathie 
31709 Overgaauw.indd   161 18-01-15   10:58
162
liet namelijk zien dat het nemen van perspectief samenhangt met het aantal 
voorgestelde munten in de verborgen UG conditie en dat cognitieve empathie 
een mediator is voor de relatie tussen leeftijd en strategisch handelen. Een 
uitkomst die aansluit bij eerder onderzoek waarin een positieve relatie werd 
gevonden tussen strategisch altruïstisch gedrag en leeftijd (Meuwese, Crone, 
De Rooij, & Güroğlu, 2014).
 De bevindingen in dit onderzoek suggereren dat kinderen al vroeg in 
staat zijn om strategisch te handelen, maar dat oudere kinderen (10-12 jaar) en 
volwassenen (18-25 jaar) deze motieven meer laten gelden. Daarnaast wordt in 
dit onderzoek aangetoond dat individuele verschillen op het vlak van cognitieve 
empathie een rol spelen bij strategisch handelen (hogere score op cognitieve 
empathie = meer strategisch).  
 Hoewel strategisch handelen verklaard kan worden vanuit leeftijd en 
vanuit cognitieve empathie, zou ook de relatie tussen verdeler en ontvanger 
een rol kunnen spelen. Zo heeft eerder onderzoek aangetoond dat men minder 
empathie voelt voor een vreemde dan voor een vriend of een familielid (Cheng, 
Chen, Lin, Chou, & Decety, 2010; Meyer et al., 2013). Dit benadrukt dat essentiële 
rol van de omgeving, met name de relaties met de mensen die van invloed 
zouden kunnen zijn op het gedrag van de individu (Güroğlu, Van den Bos, & 
Crone, 2014). Toekomstig onderzoek zou dit verder uit moeten wijzen.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een cross-sectionele studie besproken waarin is 
onderzocht welke hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij het evalueren van sociale 
situaties. In deze studie hebben in totaal 32 deelnemers (12-19 jaar) de Empathy 
Dictator Game (EDG) in de scanner gedaan. Aan deelnemers werd van tevoren 
uitgelegd dat ze munten moesten verdelen met een persoon op de foto, 
aangeduid middels een pijl. Na het zien van de foto moest een keuze worden 
gemaakt uit een van de vier verdelingen (Dictator Game): prosociaal (6 munten 
voor de ander, 4 voor jezelf), eerlijk (5/5), beetje oneerlijk (4/6) en straffend 
(2/8). De keuze die de deelnemer maakte kon niet door de ontvanger worden 
beïnvloed, dus de munten werden altijd verdeeld zoals voorgesteld. 
 Tijdens de taak kregen deelnemers positieve en negatieve sociale 
situaties te zien. Op de foto’s waar een negatieve sociale situatie te zien was, 
werden adolescenten getoond waarbij de een de ander fysiek pijn deed. De 
negatieve sociale situaties werden onderverdeeld in twee condities: 1) slacht-
offer (pijl gericht op het slachtoffer, deelnemer werd gevraagd munten te 











verdelen met het slachtoffer), 2) dader (pijl gericht op de dader, deelnemer 
werd gevraagd munten te verdelen met de dader). De positieve sociale situaties 
vormden de derde conditie, waarbij foto’s van blije gebeurtenissen (bijv. een 
verjaardag) werden getoond. Met deze taak kon inzicht worden verworven 
in verdeelgedrag van adolescenten na het observeren van positieve- en 
negatieve sociale situaties. De uitkomsten van de EDG op gedrags- en neuraal 
niveau zijn gecombineerd met de EmQue-CA. Het doel van dit onderzoek was 
om te onderzoeken of specifieke sociale hersengebieden gevoelig zijn voor de 
perceptie van negatieve sociale situaties en positieve sociale situaties en of de 
mate van zelf gerapporteerde empathie van invloed is op het gedrag op de taak 
en/of op de neurale activatie tijdens het uitvoeren van de taak. 
 De gedragsresultaten lieten zien dat deelnemers meer munten 
weggaven aan de slachtoffers, minder munten aan de daders en overwegend 
voor een gelijke verdeling kozen na het observeren van een positieve sociale 
situatie. Er waren geen onderlinge verschillen tussen adolescenten. Een 
mogelijke verklaring voor deze consistentie zou moraliteit kunnen zijn, oftewel 
de mogelijkheid om in te schatten of iets goed of fout is op basis van universele 
sociale regels (Decety & Cowell, 2014). Door deze sociale morele regels te 
handhaven wordt keuzegedrag beïnvloedt, wat zou kunnen verklaren waarom 
er weinig tot geen variatie is tussen de verschillende trials binnen de condities.
 De uitkomsten op neuraal niveau lieten zien dat het observeren van 
negatieve sociale situaties een toename in activatie in de STS en inferior parietal 
lobule (ILP) veroorzaakt, gebieden die geassocieerd worden met het detecteren 
van belangrijke sociale informatie. Het observeren van positieve sociale situaties 
liet een toename in activatie in de mPFC en de temporal parietal junction (TPJ) 
zien, gebieden die geassocieerd worden met het redeneren over andermans 
mentale staat en het jezelf verplaatsen in de ander. Eerdere studies hebben 
ditzelfde netwerk gevonden wanneer aan individuen werd gevraagd om een 
sociale situatie te observeren of te beoordelen (Van der Heiden et al., 2013). Dit 
geldt ook voor studies naar morele ontwikkeling (Decety, Michalska, & Akitsuki, 
2008) en voor studies naar het redeneren over iemands mentale staat (Gunther 
Moor et al., 2012, zie ook hoofdstuk 2). 
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 Tot slot wordt in hoofdstuk 6 de relatie tussen neurale activiteit 
tijdens de taak en de zelfrapportage scores op de EmQue-CA (zie hoofdstuk 
4) beschreven. Resultaten lieten zien dat er een negatief verband is tussen 
cognitieve empathie en de linker STS wanneer deelnemers negatieve situaties 
observeren. Ditzelfde verband werd gevonden voor prosociale motivatie en de 
linker STS. Deze uitkomsten suggereren dat deelnemers die hoog scoren op 
empathie, minder activatie laten zien in de detectie node van het brein wanneer 
ze negatieve sociale situaties observeren. Een uitkomst die tegenstrijdig is 
met eerder onderzoek naar volwassenen, waarbij een positieve relatie werd 
gevonden tussen perspectief nemen en activatie in de rechter STS wanneer in- 
en outgroup leden werden gestraft (Molenberghs et al. 2014).
 De rol van empathie in sociale interacties moet nog verder worden 
onderzocht om beter te begrijpen hoe individuele verschillen een rol kunnen 
spelen in sociale situaties, waarbij de verandering van empathie met leeftijd zou 
kunnen worden meegenomen. Daarnaast zou het interessant zijn om de EDG 
af te nemen bij groepen die moeite hebben met het naleven van sociale regels, 
zoals adolescenten met oppositionele gedragsstoornissen (White, Brislin, 
Meffert, Sinclair, & Blair, 2013). 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de studies uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken bediscus-
sieerd, waarbij aandacht wordt besteed aan de kwaliteiten en limitaties. 
Hoofdstukken twee en drie beschrijven longitudinale studies waarin 
adolescenten op meerdere tijdspunten (interval van +/- 2 jaar) meededen aan 
hetzelfde onderzoek. Longitudinaal onderzoek is een effectieve methode om 
subtiele veranderingen in de ontwikkeling te onderzoeken. Door individuen 
gedurende een langere periode te volgen is het mogelijk om de ontwikkeling 
van sociale en cognitieve vaardigheden in kaart te brengen. Hierdoor kan 
worden voorkomen dat ontwikkelingsverschillen worden opgemerkt als 
gevolg van verschillen binnen een cohort, aangezien dezelfde deelnemers op 
meerdere tijdspunten deelnemen. Daarnaast biedt longitudinaal onderzoek 
de mogelijkheid om te testen of bepaalde verschillen voortkomen uit een 
karaktertrek (stabiliteit over tijd) van een persoon of uit een tijdelijke staat van 
zijn (variabiliteit over tijd). Tot slot bieden longitudinale studies de mogelijkheid 
om gedrag te voorspellen op basis van eerder verzamelde gegevens over het 
brein (Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Galván, 2014). De studies gepresenteerd in 
dit proefschrift maken deel uit van de eerste serie longitudinale studies waarbij 











fMRI is gebruikt. De groepsgroottes zijn daarom relatief klein en het aantal 
herhaalde metingen blijft beperkt tot twee. Het zou een goede vooruitgang zijn 
als toekomstige studies deze methode in grotere groepen zouden toepassen, 
waarbij individuen over een langere periode gevolgd worden. 
 Behalve een longitudinale component in een aantal studies, hebben 
de hoofdstukken uit dit proefschrift een multi-method benadering. Zo zijn 
experimentele taken, neurale maten en zelfrapportage indexen gebruikt 
om een meer gedetailleerd beeld te krijgen van de ontwikkeling van sociale 
heroriëntatie. De combinatie van verschillende meetinstrumenten biedt de 
mogelijkheid om meer inzicht te verwerven over een bepaald concept, waarbij 
de unieke bijdrage van elk afzonderlijk meetinstrument kan worden onderzocht. 
Deze benadering is binnen dit proefschrift toegepast in een relatief smalle 
leeftijdsgroep (12-19 jaar). Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich moeten richten 
op grotere groepen waarbij een brede leeftijdsrange wordt aangehouden en 
waarbij meerdere methoden worden toegepast. Daarnaast zou toekomstig 
onderzoek kunnen profiteren van het gebruik van latente klassen analyses, 
waarmee groepen kunnen worden gevormd op basis van specifieke kenmerken. 
Hiermee wordt het mogelijk om voorspellingen te doen op basis van iemands 
karaktereigenschap(pen). 
 Toekomstig onderzoek kan profiteren van de gepresenteerde studies 
door individuele verschillen in deze belangrijke periode in het leven op een 
meer gedetailleerde wijze te analyseren. Dit kan helpen bij de verklaring 
waarom sommige adolescenten succesvol zijn in het ontwikkelen van sociale 
vaardigheden en relaties, terwijl anderen hier veel moeilijkheden in ervaren.
Uiteindelijk kan dit leiden tot de ontwikkeling van interventies voor jongeren 
die niet goed kunnen omgaan met de sociale eisen vanuit de omgeving 
(bijvoorbeeld jongeren met een antisociale gedragsstoornis) wat hen kan 
helpen om de kwaliteit van leven voor henzelf maar ook de mensen om hen 
heen te vergroten (White et al., 2013).
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